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Introduction
Mathematical theories of choice under risk and uncertainty are the bedrock on
which modern economics is built. Almost all matters that economists concern
themselves with involve some element of uncertainty: The value of a good is seldom
known at the time of purchase and the consequences of activities as diverse as
buying stocks, going to college, choosing an occupation, getting married, having
children, smoking or exercising, taking out a life insurance policy or saving for
retirement are either not known or unknowable when the decision is made. At
the heart of any model of these subjects is a model of how people behave under
uncertainty; how they perceive it, what their attitude towards it is and how the
two jointly determine decisions.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) introduced expected utility theory, the
first fully formalized theory of choice under risk, in their Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior.1 According to expected utility people make decisions as if
assigning values — “utilities” — to outcomes, weighting each utility by the ob-
jectively given probability with which the outcome will occur and then choosing
whichever option gives them the highest weighted, expected utility. Von Neumann
and Morgenstern thought of objectively given probabilities that were common to
everyone as a crutch and less than a decade later Savage (1954) demonstrated that
this crutch was unnecessary. Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory could be
generalized so that every person was free to hold their own, subjective belief and,
importantly, that under certain assumptions both people’s subjective beliefs and
the utilities they attach to different consequences can be inferred from the choices
they make.
1 Though this was the first complete formal treatment of expected utility, precursors can be
found in Daniel Bernoulli’s analysis of the St. Petersburg paradox in 1738 (Bernoulli, 1954).
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Expected utility — in both its objective and subjective version — quickly be-
came the workhorse model of human decision making in modern economics and
still holds that status today. But almost immediately after its introduction it came
under scrutiny for behavioral assumptions that were obviously at variance with the
way people actually behaved. In the seven decades since the publication of The
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior expected utility has gone through sev-
eral iterations and restatements and has been generalized in many directions in
response to these critiques.
In expected utility the likelihoods with which consequences will materialize are
either objectively given or subjective judgments of the decision maker but are then
consistently applied to evaluate all options. Some of the generalizations of expected
utility break with this consistency requirement. In (cumulative) prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), for example, decision
makers may distort the probability of an outcome depending on the rank of the
consequence in the gamble and even depending on whether the consequences is
seen as a gain or loss relative to a reference point. The salience theory of Bordalo,
Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) instead posits that some consequences “jump out” at
decision makers and therefore carry outsized weight in their decision-making pro-
cess. Lastly, theories of ambiguity aversion like those of Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989) or Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) posit that there
is a fundamental difference between making decisions in situations in which prob-
abilities are known and those in which they are not and that this gives rise to
extremely cautious behavior that (subjective) expected utility cannot accommo-
date. Other theories of choice under risk and uncertainty retain the evaluation of
options using a consistent probability measure but instead evaluate consequences
differently. In Loomes and Sugden’s (1982) regret theory, for examples the con-
sequences of a gamble are evaluated not in isolation but relative to the other
consequences that could have materialized: Gaining $100 may not be quite as
happy an occasion if an alternative option would have yielded even more.
While few of the stones from which expected utility is built have been left
unturned, almost all mathematical theories of choice under risk and uncertainty
have retained one of expected utility’s core ideas: In all theories, options are
evaluated by a functional that has expected utility form, however unusual either
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the utility function or the probability measure may sometimes appear to be. People
choose among the alternatives by enumerating the possible consequences, making
judgments about the likelihoods with which the consequences will occur, assigning
to each consequence a subjective value and then assigning to the overall option
a value that is a sum of the value of the consequences, each weighted by some
function of its likelihood. Common to all theories is therefore a separation of the
total value of an option that drives choice into the utilities of its constituent parts
and decision weights tied to beliefs about the likelihood with which those parts
will materialize.
The three chapters of this dissertation shine a spotlight on models of choice under
uncertainty in this tradition from three different directions. All three chapters are
empirical, designed to either study how the theoretical constructs of utility and
beliefs can be measured, which of the many theories describes choices best and
what explanatory power the theories hold.
Risk Aversion
Chapter 1 takes beliefs as a given and concerns itself with measuring and estimating
the curvature of the utility function, which drives aversion to risk in expected
utility. The chapter is a re-analysis of Harrison, List, and Towe’s (2007) “Naturally
Occurring Preferences and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of
Risk Aversion,” a paper that investigates the sensitivity of experimental procedures
for eliciting people’s risk preferences to a number of auxiliary assumptions.
In risk preference elicitations it is commonly assumed that subjects will behave
the same in the elicitation task — a task that is fashioned to be a close empirical
analogue to a theoretical construct, potentially at the cost of artifice — as they
would in the real-life situations that are of primary interest to economists. More-
over, it is assumed that both wealth held outside the lab and risks faced outside
of the lab (“background risk”) play no role in determining the choices made inside
the lab. Both assumptions had always seemed questionable on theoretical grounds
(see Gollier & Pratt, 1996; Rabin, 2000; Safra & Segal, 2008). Harrison et al. use
an artefactual field experiment (Harrisson & List, 2004) to test these assumptions
empirically.
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The authors recruit numismatists to participate in one of three different elicita-
tion tasks: All three tasks are multiple price list tasks à la Holt and Laury (2002),
in which participants face a series of lottery choices. The three tasks differ in the
nature of the prizes of the lotteries. The first task is an original Holt and Laury
task in which all prizes are monetary. In the second task the monetary prizes are
replaced by antique coins in different, known conditions. The authors view these
lotteries over coins with which numismatists are intimately familiar as less artifi-
cial and abstract than the lotteries over different amounts of money. In the third
task, finally, the prizes are the same coins as in the second but with the certificates
attesting to the coins’ condition removed. In this treatment subjects therefore had
to rely on their own expertise to assess the coins’ quality and must have felt at
least some uncertainty about the true value of the prizes, an additional risk that
would remain even after the lottery had played out and which is mathematically
equivalent to adding background risk.
Harrison et al. find that varying the artificiality of the experimental task has no
statistically significant effect on measured risk preferences nor do subjects behave
as if they integrated any of the wealth they hold outside of the lab. Exogenously
varying the amount of background risk, however, appears to have an enormous
influence on measured risk aversion: Being exposed to an additional risk makes
subjects much more risk averse.
At the heart of Harrison et al. and at the heart of the re-analysis in Chapter 1
is a measurement issue. The textbook image of choice under risk is a neat one:
every person has a utility function, uses this utility function to assign values to
prizes and then integrates these values using the given probability measure. He or
she does this without fault and whatever option yields the highest expected utility
is chosen consistently. Experimental data do not, unfortunately, always conform
to this textbook picture. Instead, when asked to make multiple choices, it is often
impossible to reconcile all choices with a single utility function. In the analysis
of choice data one therefore frequently resorts to stochastic choice models, which
allow for non-systematic, random deviations from the “structural” drivers of choice
(for an excellent survey of such models, see Wilcox, 2008).2
2 Some have argued that some classic behavioral “anomalies” could be the result of stochastic
choice, i.e. while they may appear to be systematic deviations from rationality they may, in
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The re-analysis shows that the conclusion that subjects become more risk averse
in the face of higher background risk is not robust. It is instead the result of choice
data that, for many subjects, could not have been generated by deterministic utility
maximization and an econometric model that takes the way in which choices depart
from deterministic utility maximization to be evidence of extreme risk aversion.
Moreover, the sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated effect
of exposing subjects to less artificial prizes is highly dependent on the way one
controls for individual heterogeneity in preferences.
Choices in Harrison et al.’s experiment are extremely noisy. One of the choices
that subjects in all treatments are presented with, for example, is a “sanity check”,
a choice between $200 and $350, both paid with certainty. For any subject who
values money this should be an easy choice. Yet, 47% of the subjects who face
this choice choose the lower $200. Overall, a full 65% of subjects make choices
that violate first-order stochastic dominance and are therefore inconsistent with
maximizing expected utility deterministically whatever their utility function. In
the treatment that identifies the effect of exposing subjects to background risk,
choices are particularly noisy. In this treatments subjects appear to be choosing
between any pair of options put before them entirely at random.
On this data Harrison et al. estimate a “Fechner” stochastic choice model3 to
test whether their experimental treatments have any effect on the amount of risk
aversion subjects display. As the Chapter shows, this stochastic choice model is
problematic given the extent to which experimental responses depart from deter-
ministic expected utility maximization. Perhaps surprisingly, there are two ways
in which the Fechner model can accommodate choices that are completely unsys-
tematic. The first and obvious way is by choosing a choice error so large that
any systematic preference is completely drowned out by noise. The second is by
fact, be entirely unsystematic (see e.g. Butler & Loomes, 2007; Collins & James, 2015; Hey
& Orme, 1994). Because it creates choices that violate classical postulates like transitivity
or monotonicity stochasticity is usually regarded as a mistake. More recently, however, some
authors have argued either that there is a higher form of rationality to stochastic choice —
choice being stochastic mainly when consequences are of very similar value and when it may
not be worth figuring out which option is truly better — or even that there are situations in
which people have a strict preference for randomization (see e.g. Agranov & Ortoleva, 2015;
Dwenger, Kübler, & Weizsäcker, 2014)
3 So named because its origins are widely attributed to early work in psychophysics (Fechner,
Adler, Howes, & Boring, 1966)
xassuming extremely large risk aversion. As is by now well known (Wilcox, 2011),
in the Fechner model higher risk aversion is mechanically linked to noisier choices.
Asymptotically, both choice errors and high risk aversion imply completely ran-
dom choice and identical distributions for the data, at which point the model is
no longer identified. Chapter 1 shows that depending on the exact specification
the data in the background risk treatment are either close to or squarely in this
asymptotic case, the reason for the noise being reflected in a high coefficient of
relative risk aversion rather than in choice errors being that Harrison et al. do not
allow the choice error to differ between treatments.
The extremely noisy data also makes HLT’s models numerically unstable and
other results highly dependent on model specification. The effect of manipulating
the artificiality of the task, negative and not statistically significantly different
from zero in the original paper, is statistically significantly positive in other spec-
ifications.
Subjective Beliefs
While Chapter 1 takes the utility function as its main object of interest, Chapter 2,
based on work with Georg Weizsäcker and Steffen Huck, puts its emphasis on
the second component of the expected utility functional: beliefs. The chapter
explores the role of subjective beliefs about stock market returns for stock market
investment behavior in a representative sample of the German population.
Taking its cue from Savage (1954) most of economics takes data on choices as
its empirical primitive. The beliefs that underly these choices, in contrast, are
imposed by assumption. Following a seminal paper by Muth (1961) agents are
often assumed to hold “rational expectations”, beliefs that are objectively correct,
at least on average. The reasons for assuming that beliefs are objectively correct
are less than compelling and making the assumption regardless may lead to biased
tests of other aspects of the theory. As an example, a person assumed to hold
rational expectations about stock market returns may appear to be extremely,
implausibly risk averse, this being the classical equity premium puzzle result of
Mehra and Prescott (1985). But the equity premium would be less of a puzzle if
people thought equity returns to be lower or to be more variable than asset pricing
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models show them to be.4 As pointed out by Manski (2004), rational expectations
are an identifying assumption without which central parameters of interest are not
identified. Following Manski a rapidly growing literature has pursued a different
strategy to achieve identification: by not only gathering data about people’s choices
but also asking them for their subjective beliefs.
One way to read Chapter 2 is as probing the properties of the subjective beliefs
people report when asked. In particular, the Chapter asks what relationship these
reported beliefs bear to the subjective beliefs of SEU. The latter are not beliefs
in the common sense meaning of that word but are instead beliefs derived from
choice, indeed the beliefs that rationalize choice. Though it may be tempting to
take it as a given that the two beliefs are identical, the chapter actually tests this
empirically. This test goes further than existing literature, which has found that
reported beliefs are predictive of behavior — people who expect the stock market
to do better than others tend to hold more stock (see e.g. Dominitz & Manski,
2011; Hurd et al., 2011; Kézdi & Willis, 2009) — but has also uncovered limits to
the consistency between beliefs and behavior (see e.g. Merkle & Weber, 2014) and,
importantly, has largely neglected issues of causality, i.e. whether people would
hold more stock if they believed stock market returns to be more favorable.
The standard portfolio choice problem, a decision task in which a fixed sum of
money is to be distributed over two investment vehicles, a risk-free asset that pays
a certain rate of return and a risky asset whose return is stochastic, serves as the
framework for a series of experiments that explore the determinants of real-world
investment behavior. In the main experiment subjects in Germany are given e 25
and confronted with the choice between a German government bond and an asset
whose return is tied to historic returns on Germany’s blue chip stock market index
DAX. An exogenous shifter whose sign and magnitude is known to subjects at the
time of investment is added to a return randomly chosen from the year-on-year
returns on the DAX over the last 60 years.
The experiment then asks subjects to split the e 25 with which they are en-
4 The empirical evidence on whether beliefs are biased in ways that could explain the equity
premium is mixed. Some surveys (Dominitz & Manski, 2011; Hurd, van Rooij, & Winter,
2011; Kézdi & Willis, 2009) find return expectations which are downward biased, others find
bias in the opposite direction (Dominitz & Manski, 2011). The survey used in Chapter 2 finds
beliefs to be a fairly accurate reflection of the historical distribution of returns.
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dowed between these two assets and elicits the beliefs that should, under expected
utility and more general models, be major determinants of the investment decision.
Subjects are asked for their subjective beliefs about the returns on the risky asset
they have before them. Using a question format due to Delavande and Rohwedder
(2008) and further developed by Delavande, Giné, and McKenzie (2011) we elicit
the entire subjective belief distribution.
It’s the degree to which beliefs explain investments that is one of the main
questions the experiment seeks to answer. Moreover, the study probes the extent
to which subjects’ beliefs and their investment choices respond to the return shifter.
Do subjects offered an investment in a risky asset whose returns are more favorable
also expect it to be more favorable? Do they invest more? Lastly, do subjects act
similarly in the lab experiment as they do in real life?
The experiment was run with two groups of people: A representative sample
of about 700 German households which answered the 2012 survey of the Innova-
tion Sample of the German Socioeconomic Panel, and a group of 198 students at
Technical University Berlin.
There are both similarities and differences between these two samples: In both
samples return expectations are positively correlated with the amount of money
allocated to the risky asset. In the SOEP sample, where information about partic-
ipants’ real-life investments are known, there is also a strong relationship between
choices in the portfolio choice experiment and stock market participation: The
larger the share of his or her endowment invested in the risky asset, the more
likely a participant is to own stocks. Indeed, this “equity share” appears to be an
extremely potent predictor of stock holding even after controlling for a number
of other determinants that can be found in the literature — gender, age, educa-
tion, household size, employment status, financial literacy, wealth and income —
while, surprisingly, both beliefs and a measure of risk aversion do little to explain
participation.
What is particularly interesting, however, are the responses to being treated
with different return shifters. In the SOEP sample neither beliefs nor investments
respond in any way to the treatment: No matter whether the risky asset pays a
past DAX return, a past DAX return minus ten percentage points or a past DAX
return plus ten percentage points, on average participants have identical beliefs
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about returns and allocate the same share of their endowment to the risky asset.
Not so in the student sample. Here, too, beliefs do not respond to treatment.
Investments, however, do change in the expected direction.
As an explanation for this surprising finding the paper offers a behavioral ex-
planation that departs from subjective expected utility’s assumption that options
which are payoff-equivalent must be treated identically. In subjective expected
utility all that is decision-relevant are the distributions over final outcomes of the
available options. The paper shows that while changes to the excess return of an
asset should lead to the same change in investments no matter whether the change
comes about because the expected return on the safe asset changes or whether the
expected return on the risky asset changes, this may not, in fact, be true.
What the Chapter posits instead is that people find it easier to mentally process
changes to an object that is relatively simple rather than one that is complex, as
suggested by previous lab and field evidence (see e.g Abeler & Jäger, 2015; Chetty,
Looney, & Kroft, 2009; Huck & Weizsäcker, 1999; Wilcox, 1993). In a portfolio
choice setting, they may find it easier to process changes to an asset that is fully
described by a deterministic return rather than one whose return is stochastic.
A separate experiment demonstrates that this is indeed the case. In a portfolio
choice problem, student subjects respond more strongly to changes to the riskless
asset than they do to payoff-equivalent changes in the risky asset.
Beyond Subjective Expected Utility — Ambiguity
Aversion
Chapter 3 departs from expected utility and considers more general models of
choice under uncertainty. Both the objective expected utility model of von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1947) and the subjective expected utility model of Sav-
age (1954) came under attack soon after their formulation. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern model was famously challenged by Allais (1953) for assuming that
probabilities enter the expected utility functional linearly, an assumption that is
violated at certainty and motivates the invention of alternative theories to this
day.
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The charge leveled against Savage’s subjective expected utility was of a different
nature: In a series of thought experiments Daniel Ellsberg (1961) demonstrated
that people treat situations in which the probabilities of events are not objectively
given — genuine uncertainty — differently from situations in which they are —
mere risk — in ways that are inconsistent with expected utility. Even Leonard
Savage himself showed an aversion to exposing himself to uncertainty that could
not be accommodated by a concave utility function. Instead the choice patterns
Ellsberg proposed and Savage followed violated one of subjective expected utility’s
axioms and precluded the existence of a single probability measure that would ra-
tionalize all choices. This phenomenon, which has been confirmed in countless
laboratory experiments (see Camerer & Weber, 1992, for an overview) has become
known as ambiguity aversion and lead to the development of generalizations of
subjective expected utility. The earliest such theories — the Choquet expected
utility (CEU) model of Schmeidler (1989), the multiple priors or max-min (MEU)
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and its generalization, α-max-min (Ghi-
rardato, Maccheroni, & Marinacci, 2004) were later followed by the smooth model
of Klibanoff et al. (2005, KMM for short) and a number of other models (see Gilboa
& Marinacci, 2013, for an excellent survey).
Interestingly, the choice-theoretic literatures on choice under risk and on choice
under uncertainty have seen little cross-pollination. The former built on von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1947) to accommodate e.g. the Allais paradoxes, either
by ascribing to people an anomalous preference for certainty, pessimism or dis-
tortions of the objectively given probabilities. The latter departed from Savage
to accommodate the Ellsberg paradoxes. The dearth of interaction between these
literatures is surprising given that both sets of paradoxes were accommodated by
relaxing axioms that bear some similarity.
To understand this, it is useful to look at subjective expected utility through
an alternative axiomatic characterization due to Anscombe and Aumann (1963).5
The objects central to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) are “lotteries”, ob-
jective probability distributions over outcomes. The objects central to Savage are
“acts”, mappings from states of the world into outcomes. Anscombe and Aumann
5Most modern theories on choice under uncertainty are formulated in this Anscombe-Aumann
setup.
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combine the two into a setup in which payoffs are determined by a two-stage pro-
cedure: The first stage is a “horse race”, a chance experiment in which outcomes
are contingent on the realization of the state of the world for which no probabilities
are given. The second stage is a “roulette wheel”, a situation in which outcomes
are contingent on the outcome of a chance experiment in which — in contrast to
the “horse races” above — there are objectively given probabilities. Anscombe-
Aumann model decision makers with preferences over mappings from horse races
into roulette wheels, which they dub “acts”.6 Every outcome is therefore contin-
gent on an upper level of uncertainty and a lower level of risk. Anscombe and
Aumann show that like the Savage axioms imposed on the set of Savage acts, a
set of axioms imposed on Anscombe-Aumann acts can be shown to be equivalent
to subjective expected utility. Chief among these axioms is “Independence”, which
states that for any three acts a, b, c ∈ F and any α ∈ (0, 1)
a ≿ b⇐⇒ αa+ (1− α)c ≿ αb+ (1− α)c. (0.1)
where F is the set of Anscombe-Aumann acts.
Like vonNeumann-Morgenstern’s famous Independence axiom, this axiom im-
poses on preferences an invariance to probabilistic mixing but does so on a much
richer domain. Note that the axiom holds for preferences between any pair of acts
and for mixing these acts with any other act, no matter whether in this act the
outcome depends on a “horse race” (i.e. the state of the world), a “roulette wheel”
(i.e. the outcome of the objective lottery) or some combination of the two.
All models of ambiguity aversion relax this axiom. However, they do so in
different ways. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), for example, show that the Ellsberg
paradoxes can be accommodated if one relaxes the Independence axiom to an
axiom they call Certainty Independence under which preferences are invariant
only to mixing with acts that do not depend on the state of the world (these acts
are known as constant acts because they yield the same roulette-wheel in every
state of the world). Indeed, a broad class of models of ambiguity aversion — the
class of invariant biseparable preferences (Ghirardato et al., 2004) which includes
6 The term “Anscombe-Aumann acts” is often used to distinguish these acts from the “Savage
acts” described above, which map states of the world directly into outcomes
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(α)-MEU and CEU — all relax Independence in the same way. Other models of
ambiguity aversion, most importantly KMM’s smooth model, in contrast, relax
this axiom further. In KMM, Independence still holds for any triplet of “roulette
wheels” but under KMM mixing two “horse races” with a “roulette wheel” does not
necessarily preserve preferences.
As shown by Epstein (2010) and Epstein and Schneider (2010) the theories differ
fundamentally in the way they conceptualize the “hedging”-value of constant acts.
In the class of invariant biseparable preferences mixing an acts with its certainty
equivalent is not valued by the decision maker (this is a direct consequence of
Certainty Independence, the certainty equivalent being a constant act) because
these mixtures do not insure the decision maker against the state of the world but
only reduce his exposure to it. KMM, in contrast, conceptualizes a decision maker
as being averse to dispersion in state expected utilities. Since mixing with an
act’s certainty equivalent reduces this dispersion the decision maker values it over
and above the reduction in exposure. Epstein and Schneider shows that Certainty
Independence is central to this difference: Imposing Certainty Independence on
top of KMM yields subjective expected utility.
Probabilistic mixtures of “horse races” with “roulette wheels” are therefore a do-
main on which theories of ambiguity aversion make differential predictions. Chap-
ter 3, based on work with James Andreoni and Charles Sprenger, provides a direct
experimental test of the Certainty Independence axiom by studying the valuations
that experimental subjects have for particular probabilistic mixtures.
In the experiment subjects are confronted with a source of uncertainty, an 2-
color Ellsberg urn. They are then presented with a series of urns designed to be
empirical analogues to probabilistic mixtures involving the Ellsberg urn: Each urn
contains a combination of balls that lead to an immediate monetary payoff and
balls that trigger a draw from the Ellsberg urn to determine the payoff. Varying the
share of balls that trigger a draw from the Ellsberg urn varies subjects’ exposure to
uncertainty. For the particular kinds of valuations the experiment elicits — lottery
equivalents as first introduced by Roth and Malouf (1979) — the class of invariant
biseparable preference theories predict that valuations be a linear function of the
proportion balls in the urn that trigger a draw from the Ellsberg urn. For KMM,
valuations ought to be non-linear functions but functional forms that are popular
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in applications of the theory also imply particular kinds of non-linearity.
The study finds average valuations that are inconsistent with invariant bisepara-
ble preferences. Valuations are also at variance with the predictions KMM makes
under common assumptions on functional form. Since none of the most popular
theories of ambiguity aversion can rationalize the experimental data, the chapter
closes with suggestions for properties that might prove useful in coming up with a
satisfactory theoretical framework that can.
xviii
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1 Comment on “Naturally Occurring Preferences
and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case
Study of Risk Aversion”
The experimental elicitation of risk preferences has received an increasing amount
of attention over the past 20 years. The literature has explored many issues, from
experimental procedures and stakes (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2006;
Holt & Laury, 2002) to the econometric methods with which the choice data from
such experiments are analyzed (Hey & Orme, 1994; Wilcox, 2008). Harrison,
List, and Towe (2007, HLT henceforth) contribute to this literature an artefactual
field experiment that investigates the sensitivity of elicited risk preferences to the
presence of background risk and to the artificiality of standard elicitation tasks.
Background risk is usually unobserved by the experimenter and econometri-
cian but may influence risk taking in the laboratory in an unknown direction.
Expected utility maximizers with decreasing absolute risk aversion, for example,
demand higher risk premia after being endowed with an unfavorable independent
risk (“risk vulnerability”, see Gollier & Pratt, 1996). Not controlling for this risk
leads to overestimation of risk aversion. Some psychological theories like dimin-
ishing sensitivity, in contrast, predict the opposite effect. Exogenously varying
subjects’ background risk affords HLT an opportunity to determine both the di-
rection and size of this potential bias. They find that adding background risk
makes subjects much more risk averse.
Whether an experiment, in which tasks are often highly stylized, manages to
capture the way subjects behave in their daily lives, in the situations that of
primary interest to economists is the second question HLT to which devote them-
selves. By variously using objects with which subjects are more or less familiar
1
2HLT investigate whether the artificiality of standard laboratory procedures has an
influence on measured risk preferences and answer the question in the negative.
This comment questions HLT’s statistical inference and interpretation. A more
detailed look at the experimental data and econometric model shows that the
conclusion that exposure to background risk increases risk aversion rests on an
experimental treatment in which experimental responses are indistinguishable from
having been made entirely at random and an econometric model that identifies
this noise as extreme risk aversion. Though the estimated model may seem to be
“expected utility plus noise” HLT’s parameter estimates imply that the structural
component of the model — expected utility — plays no role in fitting a large
share of the data. The conclusions that the artificiality of the elicitation task does
not measurably influence risk aversion, though based on more informative data,
depends on how individual heterogeneity in preferences is modeled.
1.1 Summary
HLT elicit the risk preferences of 113 numismatists at a coin convention using
a multiple price list design à la Holt and Laury (2002). In a multiple price list
subjects are asked to consider a series of binary choices between a “safe” binary
lottery A and a comparatively “risky” binary lottery B, whose prizes are a spread
over those in A. In the first row of the list both lotteries pay their low prize
with very high probability and their high prize with the small complementary
probability. Since lottery A’s low prize is higher than B’s only the most risk-loving
subjects choose B. As one moves down the list the probability of receiving the high
prize — always identical for both lotteries — increases steadily. In the last row
subjects face the choice between the two high prizes with certainty, a choice in
which every expected utility maximizer, no matter his risk attitude, should choose
lottery B.1
What makes this method appealing and has undoubtedly contributed to its
widespread use is that under certain assumptions it allows for a direct mapping
from experimental responses to preference parameters. For any (deterministic) ex-
1 In fact, this holds not just for expected utility but for all preferences that satisfy monotonicity.
3pected utility maximizer with strictly increasing utility function there is a unique
row in the list at which the subject switches from the safe to the risky lottery.
Under additional assumptions on functional form, say that subjects have constant
relative risk aversion, the observed switching point identifies the CRRA param-
eter up to an interval. Tables thus associating switching points with preference
parameters abound in the literature.
HLT use three variations of this design. In themoney treatment all lottery prizes
are monetary, the safe lottery A yielding either $125 or $200 and the risky lottery
B yielding either $40 or $350. In the graded coins treatment the lottery prizes are
1879-S Morgan silver dollars of different but known quality grades whose retail
value was identical to the monetary prizes in the money treatment. The ungraded
coins treatment, finally, features the same prizes as the graded coins treatment
but with the grading information withheld, the aim being to add uncertainty to
the value of each prize. Mathematically this is equivalent to endowing the subject
with background risk.
Instead of directly inferring subjects’ risk preference parameters from experi-
mental responses HLT use more sophisticated methods (Harrison & Rutström,
2008; Hey & Orme, 1994). They estimate a stochastic choice model according to
which each pair of gambles in the list is evaluated using a CRRA utility function
but choice is perturbed by i.i.d. normal (“Fechner”) errors:

















where mj, j = A,B are the prizes of lotteries A and B, ri is the CRRA coefficient







are the expected utilities, σi is the standard deviation of
the choice error and Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution. ri is
allowed to vary between subjects according to treatment and various individual
characteristics. The variance of the error differs only by subjects’ gender.
HLT estimate substantial risk aversion in themoney and graded coins treatments
and a difference between the two that is not statistically different from zero (See
4Parameter Variable Estimate Std. Error p-Value 95% Confidence Interval
r Constant 0.951 0.444 0.032 0.080 1.822
Coins As Final Outcomes -0.160 0.610 0.793 -1.355 1.036
Ungraded Coins As Final Outcomes 3.974 0.744 0.000 2.517 5.431
Frame to skew RA lower 0.756 0.399 0.058 -0.026 1.538
Frame to skew RA higher 0.142 0.299 0.634 -0.443 0.728
Female -1.259 0.711 0.077 -2.653 0.135
College education or higher 0.044 0.209 0.832 -0.366 0.455
Single and never married 0.838 0.379 0.027 0.094 1.581
Ever owned Morgan Silver dollars 0.032 0.573 0.956 -1.091 1.155
Coin dealer -0.984 0.596 0.099 -2.151 0.184
Dealer X coins 0.394 0.472 0.405 -0.532 1.319
Affiliated with a grading company -0.124 0.283 0.661 -0.680 0.431
σ Constant 0.408 0.734 0.578 -1.030 1.847
Female 12.537 38.277 0.743 -62.485 87.559
Table 1.1: Results for the main model (reproduced from Table II in HLT)
Table 1.1). Using monetary instead of “natural” prizes, in other words, has no
discernible effect on estimated risk preferences. Presenting subjects with ungraded
coins instead of graded coins, however, has a sizable effect on the estimated CRRA
parameter. The estimate on the ungraded coins treatment dummy is 3.974 and
highly statistically significant. While subjects in the other two treatments are
estimated to have average CRRA parameters of 0.88 and 0.77 respectively, the
average in the ungraded coins treatment is 4.78. HLT interpret this as a drastic
increase in risk aversion and as strong evidence of risk-vulnerability.
1.2 Reanalysis
A reanalysis of the data, however, reveals several problems with the original analy-
sis, some related to its econometric particulars, others of a more conceptual nature.
1.2.1 Signal vs. Noise
First, relative to the scale of the utility function assumed throughout the paper2
the estimated standard deviations of the choice error, σConstant and σFemale, are
100 times larger than those reported in Table II of the paper. This is because in
the specification that HLT estimate and whose parameters they report the utility
2 The scale implied by HLT’s equations (1)–(5)
5function is scaled down by a factor of 100.3 This reduces the estimated error stan-
dard deviations one to one. While the scaling of the utility function is arbitrary,
the size of the choice error relative to whatever scaling is chosen is an important
metric for evaluating the fit of the model. And while the stochastic component of
the model seems to play only a minor role under the reported parameters its role
is, in fact, major. For more than 3/4 of all subjects nothing but the stochastic
component of the model plays any role in fitting the data.
Second, the coefficient for the treatment indicator of the ungraded coins treat-
ment does not maximize the likelihood function and, best as can be told given
the limits of numerical precision, the likelihood may not have a maximum at all.
Figure 1.1 shows slices of the log-likelihood function for all 14 parameters and
indicates that while none of the other parameters can be changed to improve the
log-likelihood at the reported maximum, the log-likelihood has a positive albeit
small slope at the reported ungraded coins parameter.
What produces the estimate of 3.974 given this relatively flat likelihood is the
tolerance level at which the Newton-Raphson maximization algorithm declares
convergence. Lowering the tolerance on the scaled gradient (the main convergence
criterion in Stata 12) from its default of 10−5 to 10−8 changes the parameter to
316.638.45
3 In other words, the σs reported in Table II are the maximum likelihood estimates for the model
















and not for the model in Equation 1.1. For the corresponding Stata code, taken from HLT’s
supplementary material, see Listing 1.1 in Appendix 1.A1
4Other factors also play a role in producing this precise estimate. Using a different coding for
the treatment indicators – an indicator for the graded coins treatment plus an indicator for
the ungraded coins treatment instead of an indicator for both treatments involving coins and
an indicator for ungraded coins – produces an ungraded coins coefficient of 257.354 even at the
original tolerance setting. Moreover, for reasons detailed in Appendix 1.A5 even the sorting
of the data set can significantly change the reported maximum.
5 Interestingly, the near-complete flatness of the likelihood at the reported estimate is not re-
flected in the coefficient’s standard error because standard errors are clustered on the subject
level. Such clustering, which usually results in larger standard errors, can shrink standard
errors if the contributions of individual observations to the score offset each other within a
cluster. That this happens here is due to a sizable number of subjects whose responses are
highly erratic (See Appendix 1.A2 for details). The non-robust standard error is 513.23.
6Constant Coins As Final Outcomes
Ungraded Coins As Final Outcomes Frame to skew RA lower
Frame to skew RA higher Female
College education or higher Single and never married
Ever owned Morgan Silver dollars Coin dealer
Dealer X coins Affiliated with a grading company






















































0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.05 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15
3.6 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.4 0.68 0.72 0.76 0.80
0.13 0.14 0.15 -1.3 -1.2
0.0400 0.0425 0.0450 0.0475 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
0.030 0.032 0.034 -1.05 -1.00 -0.95 -0.90
0.36 0.38 0.40 0.42 -0.13 -0.12









Each sub-plot shows the log-likelihood for values of the respective parameter that are between 0.9 and 1.1 times the value shown
in Table 1.1 while all other parameters are held fixed. The HLT estimate for each parameter is shown as a vertical dotted line.
Figure 1.1: Log-likelihood function in the neighborhood of the HLT parameter vector.
7Perhaps surprisingly a treatment effect that is orders of magnitude or even in-
finitely larger than the one reported changes the model in no way that matters. All
other coefficients are unaffected by the mis-estimated coefficient on the ungraded
coins treatment dummy6 and increasing the coefficient does not materially change
the in-sample predictions of the model. The higher parameter values do, how-
ever, throw into sharp relief just what those predictions are even at the reported
estimates.
Consider the final row in the symmetric multiple price list. In this row subjects
face the choice between a prize worth $200 and a prize worth $350, both paid
with certainty. For any subject who values money this should be an easy choice.
Indeed, the row is usually included in the list as a “sanity check” by which subjects
who fail it can be excluded from subsequent analysis, if only as a robustness check.
Yet, assuming a CRRA coefficient of 4.78, the mean estimated CRRA coefficient
in the ungraded coins treatment, the $200 prize has an associated expected utility
of 1 · 2001−4.78
1−4.78 = −5.304138× 10−10 and the $350 prize has an associated expected
utility of 1 · 3501−4.78
1−4.78 = −6.3963319 × 10−11. Though the expected utility of the
$350 coin is higher the difference between these two numbers is so small even
relative to the reported error standard deviation of 0.408 as to render this decision
a virtual toss-up in which subjects randomize over the two options with roughly
equal probability.
Under the correctly scaled error standard deviation the logic above holds even
for subjects with substantially lower CRRA parameters. For the mean CRRA
parameter in the money treatment of 0.88 the utility difference is 1.09 and for the
mean CRRA parameter in the graded coins treatment of 0.76 the utility difference
is 2.14. Both are small relative to an error standard deviation of 40.84 and so
these subjects, too, randomize almost uniformly between $350 and $200.
Correspondingly, as Figure 1.2 shows, the number of subjects for which the
model predicts toss-ups not just in the final decision but for all decisions in the
list is substantial. For almost 75% of subjects in the money treatment and almost
60% of subjects in the graded coins treatment predicted choice probabilities for
6 The other parameters are unchanged when the model is estimated with a lower tolerance.
They are also unchanged when the model is estimated on the data from the money and graded
coins treatments only. The data from the ungraded coins treatment, in other words, does
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Points are semi-translucent to reduce overplotting.
Figure 1.2: Choice probabilities for lottery A under the estimated model for all list
items and treatments
the two lotteries never differ by more than 5 percentage points from 50:50 and for
only a handful of subjects are predicted choice probabilities ever close to zero or
one.
This is most extreme in the treatment that identifies the effect of background
risk. In the ungraded coins treatment, the model predicts a toss-up for all decisions
and all subjects. The estimated treatment effect on the CRRA parameter for the
ungraded coins treatment is so high, in other words, that the structural component
of the model – expected utility – has virtually no explanatory power for the data.7
A higher coefficient for the ungraded coins treatment dummy would only reduce
the explanatory power further.
These conclusions naturally raise the question how the estimates come to be,
7 The value of the parameter is also so high that none of the multiple price lists subjects were
presented with could have identified it had choice been deterministic. Three different multiple
price lists were used in the experiment, one in which the probability on the high prize varied
from 0.05 to 1 in step sizes of 0.05, and two in which the lists were skewed towards low and high
probabilities to test for an anchoring effect or centrality bias. As shown in HLT’s Figure 3 the
identification regions for these three lists – the lowest and highest CRRA parameters which
would produce a switching point in the list – were [-2.03,2.61], [-1.85,1.10] and [-0.23,2.78]
respectively.





























































The plotted Holt&Laury data are (from left to right) from the 1x, 20x (N = 93), 50x (N = 19) and 90x (N = 18) real money
treatments. The most closely comparable 90x treatment in black, treatments with weaker incentives in light gray.
Figure 1.3: Proportion of A choices by treatment
a question that is best answered by looking at the raw data. Figure 1.3 shows
the proportion of subjects who choose the safe lottery A as the probability p of
receiving the lotteries’ high prize varies from 0.05 to 1. For comparison the plot
also shows the proportion of safe choices from the incentivized treatments in Holt
and Laury (2002) with the most closely comparable treatment in black and the
treatments with lower stakes in gray8. If the multiple price list works as designed
this probability should (if subjects are not extremely risk loving) be one for p =
0.05 and then monotonically decline to zero for p = 1, i.e. when subjects face
the choice between certain $200 and $350. Yet, across all three main treatments
the proportion of A choices is never above 0.8 and never below 0.09. Moreover,
the proportion does not fall monotonically as in Holt and Laury but oscillates,
the consequence of a large number of subjects who switch between options A and
B not once but repeatedly. A look at the individual data — shown in full in
Appendix 1.A2 — also suggests that these switches may not be as unsystematic
8 Prizes in the most closely comparable, Holt and Laury’s 90x, real stakes treatment, were $100
and $80 for the safe lottery, and $192.50 and $5 for the risky lottery. As is clearly visible
in Figure 1.3, in treatments with lower stakes as well (as those with hypothetical choices),
subjects choose the safe option less often in almost all decisions. However, in all treatments
the number of safe choices is close to 100% for the lowest probability on the high prize and
close to 0% for the highest probability on the high prize.
10
as the model assumes. Instead, the responses of a substantial number of subjects
look patterned, with subjects alternating between A and B or repeating other
sequences.
Importantly, while the proportion of A choices decreases in p for the money and
graded coins treatments, it is essentially flat (up to ‘error’) for the ungraded coins
treatment. Changing the difference in expected values between the risky and the
safe lottery from $−73.25 to $150 has no systematic effect on the frequencies with
which the two lotteries are chosen!
The key to understanding how these data turn into the reported estimates lies
in the mechanics of the stochastic choice model. When holding the standard
deviation of the choice error σ fixed increasing the CRRA parameter has more
than one effect: First, as one would expect, the utility function becomes more
concave, which moves the point at which the difference in utilities between lottery
A and B turns negative further down the list. Second, the absolute scale of utilities
decreases, which makes choices more random.
The only way the model as it is specified can fit the complete absence of a
response to such large changes in the expected values of the gambles is to make
the CRRA coefficient so large as to make the absolute scale of the utility function
minuscule. Given this scale the structural part of the model becomes completely
irrelevant for choice. The extreme risk aversion HLT report for subjects exposed
to ungraded coins is a very peculiar kind of risk aversion in which expected utility
commands subjects to choose the safe option in all but the final row, but in which
they err so much that the choices they make are indistinguishable from being made
entirely at random.
Another way of making the same point fully within HLT’s model structure is to
consider an alternative specification in which replacing graded with ungraded coins
can have an effect not only on subjects’ CRRA parameter but also on the mag-
nitude of the error standard deviation σi. Simply adding an indicator variable to
the equation determining the error standard deviation yields an effect of ungraded
coins on noise of 9862.62 and an effect on the CRRA parameter of 4.581 × 1012
(all other coefficients are essentially the same as in Table 1.1). These estimates,
however, are misleading for this model does not even appear to be identified. Fig-
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All parameters not shown in the graph are held at the values they obtain after an indicator for ungraded coins is added
to HLT’s specification and the model is estimated to a tolerance on the scaled gradient of 1e-9 (see Table 1.A1 in Ap-
pendix 1.A3). Log-likelihoods are computed on a grid with rUngraded Coins as Final Outcomes ∈ {−3,−2.9, . . . , 7.9, 8} and
σUngraded Coins as Final Outcomes ∈ {10−5, 10−4.5, . . . , 1019.5, 1020} and then interpolated. Notches on highest contour line
are artifacts of interpolation. Point shows original HLT estimate.
Figure 1.4: Likelihood contour for treatment effects of ungraded coins on
both CRRA coefficient rUngraded Coins as Final Outcomes and error standard deviation
σUngraded Coins as Final Outcomes
of ungraded coins on both CRRA and noise standard deviation are varied while
all other parameters are held fixed at HLT’s estimates. The figure shows that the
two parameters can be traded off against each other, seemingly at will. HLT’s
original estimate for the treatment effect on the CRRA coefficient is shown in the
lower right but the identical likelihood is reached with a null effect on the CRRA
coefficient and a suitably large effect on the noise parameter. Identification of the
treatment effect on the CRRA parameter in HLT therefore depends crucially on
the assumption of no treatment effect on the magnitude of the choice error pa-
rameter. Such a lack of a treatment effect on the magnitude of the choice error
parameter seems hard to justify both because of the link between risk aversion
and noisiness that is baked into the model and the fact that the ungraded coins
12
treatment may very well have been more difficult for subjects to understand or
required more effort on their part.9
1.2.2 Variable Selection
As was shown in the last section, HLT’s enormous treatment effect for Ungraded
Coins as Final Outcomes is the result of experimental data in which there is no
behavioral response to changes in stimuli and a stochastic choice model that, in
the absence of a possibility to attribute it to choice errors, takes this absence to
be evidence of extreme risk aversion. Results for the other treatment effects, while
identified by data from treatments in which subjects do, however noisily, respond
to incentives, are dependent on model specification and, in particular, on the set
of controls for individual characteristics included in the model.
Figure 1.5 shows point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for the four treat-
ment effects and the effects of three of the seven individual characteristics included
in HLT’s original specification —– Female, Coin dealer and Single and never mar-
ried. It does so for specifications that contain the four treatment indicators and
any possible combination of the three individual characteristics, for a total of
seven specifications. For comparison, the Figure also shows estimates from HLT’s
original specification.
Note that in what one might consider a minimal specification, one that contains
only the four treatment indicators, all estimated effects are small and none are
statistically significantly different from zero. In fact, for this model an omnibus
F-test cannot reject the null (χ2(4) = 2.79, p = 0.59).
Only after the addition of controls for demographic characteristics does this
change. It is, of course, entirely correct to control for individual characteristics.
This not being a linear model, the estimated treatment effects would otherwise
suffer from omitted variable bias despite being orthogonal by design. Which con-
trols to include, however, is not an innocuous choice. Even within the small subset
9 In the money treatment subjects were told the monetary value of the four prizes. In the graded
coins treatment subjects were presented with four coins as prizes, all of which had an attached
certificate attesting to the coin’s condition. In the ungraded coins treatment the same four
coins were used. The certificates, however, had been removed by the experimenters. The coins

















































































































































+ single + dealer
treatments
+ single + dealer
treatments









-2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4 -2 0 2 4
Estimate
Confidence intervals based on clustered standard errors. Noise: Constant not shown for all models. College education or higher,
Ever owned Morgan Silver dollars, Dealer × coins, Affiliated with a grading company, Noise: Constant and Noise: Female
not shown for full model. “treatments + female + single” now shown because the specification shows the pathology described in
Section 1.2.2
**: p < 0.05
Figure 1.5: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for models involving treatment
indicators and the three individual characteristics Female, Single and never married and
Coin dealer
of possible specifications shown in Figure 1.5, the statistical significance, magni-
tude and even sign of all coefficient except for the one on Ungraded Coins as Final
Outcomes is dependent on the specification.
Including all three individual characteristics in the model ––– call this the re-
duced specification — yields estimates that are broadly similar to those in HLT’s
original specification and a log-likelihood that is only 4.10 points lower10. Esti-
10 It is unclear how these two models ought to be formally compared. A Wald test for a joint
restriction on HLT’s original specification at HLT’s parameter vector cannot reject the null
(χ2(5) = 2.31, p = 0.80). However, this test assumes that HLT’s parameter vector is likelihood
maximal, which it is not, see below.
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mated parameters for the individual characteristics that remain in the model are
very similar to those in the original specification. The picture for the treatment
effects, however, looks very different. Relative to the original estimates, the treat-
ment effect of Coins as Final Outcomes reverses sign and becomes statistically
significantly different from zero (point estimate: 0.24, p = 0.02). Under this speci-
fication, in other words, using “natural” instead of artificial prizes has a statistically
significant influence on elicited risk preferences. The estimated treatment effect
of Ungraded Coins as Final Outcomes is qualitatively similar to that in the orig-
inal specification, that is, it continues to suffer from the issue detailed in the last
section. Lastly, in HLT’s original specification the cross-treatment in which prob-
abilities in the multiple price lists are skewed towards values that would produce
lower measured risk aversion if subjects had a tendency to switch in the middle of
the list is estimated to raise the CRRA coefficient by 0.756 but is not statistically
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. In the reduced specification, the
treatment effect is estimated to be 0.90 and is now highly statistically significant
(p = 0.002).
What about specifications with other sets of demographic controls? It is at this
point that one must confront the unfortunate reality that the model is not identified
for most of the specifications that contain more than three individual characteris-
tics. Table 1.A2 in the Appendix shows the results of numerical maximization for
specifications involving all possible combinations of the seven individual character-
istics included in HLT’s original specification.11 For many of the specifications the
model shows groups of parameters moving towards infinity in opposite directions.
This phenomenon is similar to the (quasi-)complete separation which is some-
times encountered in standard binary choice models when a combination of vari-
ables allows the model to predict the dependent variable perfectly for a subset
of observations. In such cases the likelihood does not have a maximum because
predicted choice probabilities under the model can be driven ever closer to zero
11HLT’s original specification does not use all variables available in the dataset. The dataset
also contains a number of other variables: An experimenter effect, information about the
years of experience in the coin and paper money market, the number of shows attended and
the number of coins graded in a year, age, more fine-grained educational attainment, income
level, the marital status, size of the household, information about whether and how much a
subject smokes, which day of the 3-day show the experiment was conducted on, and whether
a participant only deals in graded or ungraded coins.
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or one by choosing more extreme parameter values. Similarly, adding individual
characteristics to HLT’s model sometimes gives it enough flexibility to drive the
coefficient of risk aversion of a group of subjects who are identical on the included
variables either towards positive infinity, which drives choice probabilities under
the model towards 0.5, or towards negative infinity, which drives choice proba-
bilities for the riskier option B to one. In both case no likelihood maximum can
exist because choices can always be moved closer to 0.5 by increasing the CRRA
coefficient or closer to 1 by decreasing it.
HLT’s data contain observations of subjects who choose the risky option B
throughout and subjects who choose very unsystematically. For the former group
the model can gain likelihood by assigning to the group a negative CRRA coef-
ficient while for the latter group it can gain likelihood by assigning the group a
very large, positive CRRA coefficient. As long as the specification is relatively
sparse each cell in the partition is unlikely to contain only subjects who make
such “extreme” choices and estimated coefficients and CRRA parameters will be
“reasonable”. Adding controls for individual characteristics, however, allows the
models to partition subjects ever more finely and on HLT’s data the partition
soon becomes fine enough to isolate extreme subjects. Once this happens, the
model can drive the coefficient of one of the individual characteristics shared by
these subjects towards infinity in either direction. The coefficients on some of
the other characteristics, meanwhile, move in the opposite direction so the CRRA
coefficient of subjects who share some but not all the characteristic does not also
move.
On HLT’s data such estimates are common and the model is easily pushed to-
wards them. Starting from the minimal specification that contains only treatment
indicators and in which the choice error does not differ by gender adding just one
demographic variable can already produce extreme results. By the time the model
contains four individual characteristics only 5 of the 35 specification still have
well-defined likelihood maxima. By five individual characteristics, these results
are universal (for details, see Appendix Section 1.A4).
The same problem ails HLT’s original specification: HLT use a Newton-Raphson
algorithm to find the estimates reported in the paper, at a log-likelihood of−1486.285.
All other maximization algorithms offered by Stata do not converge on a likeli-
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hood maximum. For the BHHH algorithm, however, intermediate solution can-
didates achieve log-likelihoods above −1460. Generalized simulated annealing,
which explores the parameter space randomly and therefore does not rely on the
problem being globally concave finds a solution that is better still (log-likelihood:
−1438.880). This draws into question the original estimates and inference based
upon them in their entirety.
Luckily, the reduced specification that contains only three of the individual
characteristics does not suffer from this pathology. For it, the likelihood maximum
seems to be well-defined aside from the issue with the Ungraded Coins as Final
Outcomes coefficient discussed in Section 1.2.1.12
All in all, the positive treatment effect of using Coins as Final Outcomes in the
reduced specification is not anomalous. In fact, it’s HLT’s estimate of a negative
treatment effect that is. It is positive and of roughly equal magnitude for all spec-
ifications shown in Figure 1.5 and of the 64 specifications in which estimates do
not show signs of the pathology described above, none feature a negative point
estimate for Coins as Final Outcomes. Its statistical significance, however, does
depend on which set of individual characteristics the model contains. The same
is true for the effect of the treatment designed to lower measured risk aversion by
skewing the multiple price list. This effect was already sizable in HLT’s specifica-
tion but not statistically different from zero. In the reduced specification the effect
is similarly large and statistically significant, but this is the only one of the models
shown in Figure 1.5 for which either are true. In most the effect is of variable sign,
small and not statistically significant.
1.3 Discussion and Conclusion
Harrison, List, and Towe raise important methodological questions and use an ele-
gant experimental design to attempt to answer them. Unfortunately, when probed
the experimental responses simply do not appear to be up to the task of providing
12While the reduced specification has a well-defined maximum on this sample, the same is
not always true for the model estimated on resamples of the data, e.g. for the purposes of
bootstrapping standard errors. Indeed, not even the minimal specification that contains only
treatment indicators seems to reliably possess a likelihood maximum under re-sampling
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answers. A majority of subjects makes choices that deviate from expected utility
maximization, which must mean that the results of any econometric analysis will
strongly depend on whether such “errant” observations are retained in the sample,
on the exact form deviations from rationality are assumed to take if they are and
on the modelling of individual heterogeneity. Wilcox (2011) has forcefully made
this point theoretically while Andersson, Holm, Tyran, and Wengström (2013)
have recently provided another empirical illustration: the oft-reported negative
relationship between risk aversion and cognitive ability may also be a statistical
artifact in which a higher error rate among subjects with low cognitive ability is
(mis-)identified by the econometric model as higher risk aversion.
The search for appropriate stochastic identifying assumptions will likely continue
for some time. In the absence of widely agreed-upon methods it is important to
assess the sensitivity of model estimates to alternative identifying assumptions and
to handle the interpretation of estimates from models which imperfectly separate
structure from noise with great care.
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* code up an EUT likelihood function for CRRA with Fechner errors
program define MLcrra_f
args lnf r noise
tempvar prob1l prob2l prob1r prob2r y1l y2l y1r y2r euL euR euDiff scale
quietly {
generate double `prob1l' = $ML_y2
generate double `prob2l' = $ML_y3
generate double `prob1r' = $ML_y4
generate double `prob2r' = $ML_y5
generate double ‘scale’ = 1/100
generate double `y1l' = `scale'*((($ML_y10+$ML_y6)^(1-`r'))/(1-`r'))
generate double `y2l' = `scale'*((($ML_y10+$ML_y7)^(1-`r'))/(1-`r'))
generate double `y1r' = `scale'*((($ML_y10+$ML_y8)^(1-`r'))/(1-`r'))
generate double `y2r' = `scale'*((($ML_y10+$ML_y9)^(1-`r'))/(1-`r'))
generate double `euL' = (`prob1l'*`y1l')+(`prob2l'*`y2l')
generate double `euR' = (`prob1r'*`y1r')+(`prob2r'*`y2r')
generate double `euDiff' = (`euR'-`euL')/`noise'
replace `lnf' = ln($cdf( `euDiff')) if $ML_y1==1
replace `lnf' = ln($cdf(-`euDiff')) if $ML_y1==0
}
end
Listing 1.1: Code defining the stochastic choice model, taken from HLT’s supplementary
material. Excerpt from coins_ml_code.do, lines 63 – 94. Line that scales down the utility
difference by a factor of 1100 highlighted in yellow.
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Figure 1.A1: Individual responses to the multiple price list
Figure 1.A1 plots the individual choice data. What is remarkable about these
data is that the share of subjects who switch multiple times is extremely high.
56% of subjects switch between A and B repeatedly and often do so in a patterned
fashion.
Two of the three alternative multiple price lists that were used also contain a
second “sanity check”. In the last item of the list subjects face the choice between
the high prize of lottery A and the high prize of lottery B with certainty. Because
this high prize is higher in lottery B than in lottery A every subject with an
increasing utility function must choose B. Yet, of the 72 subjects who face such
a choice 47% choose lottery A, a lottery that is dominated not just stochastically
but deterministically.
All in all, of the 113 subjects a full 65% make choices that violate first-order
stochastic dominance. Compared with other studies that use Holt and Laury-style
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lists this is extremely high. Holt and Laury (2002) report inconsistent responses for
20% of subjects in their low-stakes condition and 13% in the high-stakes condition.
All treatments in Holt and Laury use smaller monetary prizes than HLT. In a
survey of all published papers which use such lists Filippin and Crosetto (2016)
find that the percentage of inconsistent subject is 13.9% across all studies. The
incidence of inconsistencies varies predictably with several aspects of the list (see
e.g. Lévy-Garboua, Maafi, Masclet, & Terracol, 2011) and with the subject pool
used, with university subjects displaying fewer inconsistencies and subjects outside
of the lab producing rates of inconsistency that are often above 50% (see Charness
& Viceisza, 2012, and references therein).
While the proportion of inconsistent subjects if often so small that estimating
the model with or without them makes very little difference for the results, this is
not the case for HLT’s sample. Estimating the main model only on those subjects
who satisfy strict rationality drastically shrinks the treatment effect of ungraded
coins and makes all treatment effects statistically insignificant (see Table 1.A1).13
13Note, however, that eliminating responses that are inconsistent with strict rationality is not
a neutral criterion in the presence of subjects who choose naively. A subject who naively
chooses A throughout would be eliminated from the sample for choosing the dominated option
in the last row, while a subject who chooses B throughout would be retained and interpreted
as extremely risk loving, a fact that may explain the negative estimate for the constant in the
model.
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r Constant 0.951 0.951 0.951 0.951 1.050 -0.394
(0.444) (0.444) (0.445) (0.444) (1.306) (1.687)
Coins As Final Outcomes -0.160 -0.160 -0.160 -0.160 0.240 -0.124
(0.610) (0.610) (0.611) (0.610) (0.104) (0.238)
Ungraded Coins As Final Outcomes 3.974 316.638 >1000 11.423 0.169
(0.744) . . . (0.133)
Frame to skew RA lower 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.897 0.294
(0.399) (0.399) (0.400) (0.399) (0.294) (0.527)
Frame to skew RA higher 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.142 0.174 0.074
(0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.299) (0.172) (0.396)
Female -1.259 -1.259 -1.259 -1.259 -0.753 -0.999
(0.714) (0.712) (0.710) (0.711) (0.235) (3.575)
College education or higher 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.141
(0.209) (0.209) (0.210) (0.209) (0.335)
Single and never married 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.838 0.829 -0.107
(0.380) (0.379) (0.380) (0.379) (0.294) (0.233)
Ever owned Morgan Silver dollars 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.092
(0.573) (0.573) (0.574) (0.573) (0.335)
Coin dealer -0.984 -0.984 -0.984 -0.984 -1.227 -0.226
(0.596) (0.596) (0.597) (0.596) (1.217) (0.145)
Dealer X coins 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.394 0.363
(0.472) (0.472) (0.473) (0.472) (0.387)
Affiliated with a grading company -0.124 -0.124 -0.124 -0.124 0.051
(0.283) (0.283) (0.284) (0.283) (0.416)
σ Constant 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.408 0.979 1.868
(0.734) (0.734) (0.735) (0.734) (1.385) (10.940)
Female 12.540 12.543 12.542 12.539 304.166
(38.505) (38.335) (38.055) (38.291) (7234.324)









N 112 112 79 112 112 39
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. “.” = standard errors not reported by Stata.
For comparability all coefficients for σ reported on the same scale as in HLT.
“Original Model” refers to the estimates reported in HLT. “Lower Tolerance” refers to the same specification but estimated to
a tolerance of 10−8 on the scaled gradient (Stata option nrtolerance(1e-8)). “Without ungraded coins treatment” refers to the
Original Model estimated on a sample without subjects in the ungraded coins treatment. “Original + σUngraded Coins” refers to
a specification that contains not only a treatment effect of ungraded coins on the CRRA parameter but also one on the noise
parameter σ. “Reduced specification” refers to a specification in which College education or higher, Ever owned Morgan Silver
dollars, Dealer × coins, Affiliated with a grading company and the gender effect on the noise parameter have been removed
from the model. “No Inconsistent Subjects” refers to “Original Model” estimated on a reduced data set that contains only subjects
who switch at most once in the multiple price list and choose $350 over $200 in the final row of the list.
Table 1.A1: Alternative estimation results
1.A4 Point estimates for all specifications
Table 1.A2 contains the results of numerical maximization for all model specifica-
tions in which the CRRA parameter r is determined by a constant, the four treat-
ment indicators Coins As Final Outcomes, Ungraded Coins As Final Outcomes,
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Frame to skew RA lower and Frame to skew RA higher, any possible combination
of the seven individual characteristics contained in HLT’s original model, and the
noise parameter σ is either identical across all subjects or varies by gender. This
yields a total of 256 specifications.
I use the term “results of numerical maximization” rather than “maximum like-
lihood estimates” advisedly as the likelihood functions for many of these specifica-
tions, including HLT’s original specification, can be extremely rugged, with several
local maxima in which standard hill-climbing algorithms can easily get stuck. Even
maximization methods which do not rely on the likelihood being globally concave
and explore the parameter space randomly do not reliably find the likelihood max-
imum and it is nigh impossible to know whether the parameter vectors found in
extensive numerical searches and displayed in Table 1.A2 really do represent the
global maxima if they exist. Even specifications that include far fewer variables
than HLT’s original specification, however, very often do considerably better than
HLT’s original estimates.
I use the term “results of numerical maximization” also because for many spec-
ifications the log-likelihood does not appear to possess a maximum at all for the
reason discussed in Section 1.2.2.
As an example of the model driving predictions to extremes after the addition
of an individual characteristic, start with the minimal specification that contains
only treatment indicators and no individual characteristics. This is a model that is
well-behaved on HLT’s dataset: Essentially all maximization algorithms reliably
find the same likelihood maximizer, which produces the distribution of CRRA
coefficients shown in the top panel of Figure 1.A2.
Adding only Affiliated with a grading company to this model, however, changes
the parameter vector found via numerical maximization significantly: All coeffi-
cients but the one associated with Ungraded Coins as Final Outcomes are either
sharply negative or sharply positive for a distribution of CRRA coefficients that
looks like the one shown in the second panel of Figure 1.A2.
The third panel of Figure 1.A2 shows the distribution of CRRA coefficients in
the reduced specification that contains treatment indicators, Female, Single and
never married and Coin Dealer. In this specification subjects in the ungraded














“Full Model” is HLT’s specification evaluated at the parameter vector found via simulated annealing (see Table 1.A2). Area of
circles proportional to the number of subjects. For context, vertical lines mark the CRRA coefficient for which the probability of
choosing the dominant $350 over the dominated $200 option in the last row of the multiple price list is exactly 0.55, i.e. barely
better than chance, given the estimated noise standard deviation σ. In “Full Model”, the dashed line marks this threshold for male
subjects and the dotted line marks it for female subjects. In all other models, the dashed line marks the threshold for all subjects.
Figure 1.A2: Distributions of CRRA coefficients r for all subjects for four specifications
at parameter values shown in Table 1.A2
treatments have much lower CRRA coefficients14. The fourth panel shows the
distribution of CRRA coefficients for HLT’s full model evaluated at the parameter
vector found via generalized simulated annealing. The full model contains enough
controls for individual characteristics to allow the model to finely differentiate
between different groups of subjects. Note, however, that for almost all subjects
the parameters imply essentially random choice.
Of all 256 specifications shown in Table 1.A2 at least 192 show evidence of this
pathology15
The literature offers two main solutions to this problem:
1. Removing covariates until the maximization problem becomes well-defined
again
14Note that even comparatively small coefficients often imply choices that do not differ much
from complete randomization.
15 based on the ad hoc criterion that among the estimates for all r parameters other than the
one on Ungraded Coins as Final Outcomes there is at least one coefficient which is larger than
3 and one coefficient that is smaller than −3.
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2. Penalized likelihood estimation (Firth, 1993), a procedure in which a term
that penalizes extreme parameter values is added to the log-likelihood. This
ensures that the entire maximization problem is guaranteed to have a global
maximum even if the likelihood function does not.
Neither of these solutions is ideal. In as far as covariates help predict the de-
pendent variable their removal may restore identification but introduce bias at the
same time. Penalized likelihood estimation, on the other hand, will ensure the ex-
istence of a maximum but do so by essentially imposing specific values on groups
of parameters (how far the parameters are allowed to move away from each other
will depend on how high the penalty for large parameter values is), some of which
are the treatment indicators which are of main inferential interest.
Likelihood maximization — Methodology
The estimates displayed in Table 1.A2 are the results of extensive efforts to maxi-
mize the log-likelihood functions associated with all 256 specifications. Numerical
maximization was performed using a number of different approaches that differ in
the maximization algorithm used and in the way the algorithms are initialized.
First, I use a variety of maximization algorithms that break down into two
classes:
• hill-climbing methods: These include simplex methods like Nelder-Mead,
gradient ascent methods like BFGS, CG (conjugate gradient), nlminb (a gra-
dient ascent method using PORT routines), spg (spectral projected gradient)
and ucminf, and derivative-free methods using trust regions like newuoa,
bobyqa, and using other techniques like the Hooke-Jeeves algorithm for
derivative-free optimization. All methods are provided by R’s optimx pack-
age (Nash & Varadhan, 2011). These algorithms are generally fast to con-
verge to an optimum but may get stuck in local optima if the likelihood
function is not globally concave, in which case the value at which the pa-
rameter vector is initialized may matter.16
• generalized simulated annealing as implemented by R’s GenSA package
(Yang Xiang, Gubian, Suomela, & Hoeng, 2013). Simulated annealing (Kirk-
16 Implementation details: All algorithms were run for a maximum of 2500 iterations with default
criteria and threshold for convergence.
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patrick, Gelatt, P., & Vecchi, 1983) is a method that takes random jumps
through the parameter space in search of higher values of the objective func-
tion and in which the size of these jumps is reduced over time. This method
is generally more robust to getting stuck in local optima but is very slow.17
Second, to further reduce the likelihood of getting stuck in local optima or to miss
optima, each of the above maximization algorithms were initialized in two different
ways:
• independent: All parameters in the r equation were set to 0 and all pa-
rameters in the noise equation were set to 2.72 (e).18
• iterative: For each specification, the results from all nested specifications
were gathered and from this set the result with the highest log-likelihood was
selected. The maximization algorithm was then initialized at this parameter
vector while setting the parameters not contained in the nested model to
zero.
For each of the 256 specifications, Table 1.A2 shows the parameter vector which
achieves the highest log-likelihood among all maximization algorithm and among
all initialization procedures, no matter whether the algorithm in question success-
fully converged.
17 Implementation details: the algorithm searched for optima in a hypercube, with all r-
parameters in the interval [−15, 15] and all σ-parameters in the interval [exp(−20), exp(20)].
The algorithm was run for a maximum of 100, 000 iterations and would stop if no improvement
had occurred for 5, 000 steps.








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
TI only 0.10 0.19 0.85 -0.15 -0.10 2.05 -1534.74 2259
female -0.04 0.09 2.02 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 11.19 -1514.48 2239
college 0.04 0.19 1.06 -0.17 -0.12 0.04 2.68 -1534.46 2259
single 0.10 0.19 0.79 -0.15 -0.11 -0.03 2.06 -1534.68 2259
ms 0.09 0.19 0.86 -0.15 -0.10 0.01 2.05 -1534.74 2259
dealer 0.20 0.21 0.99 0.07 0.07 -0.38 1.38 -1511.45 2259
dealer.coins 0.10 0.55 0.86 -0.09 -0.02 -0.56 1.49 -1527.30 2259
grcomp 9.41 10.61 -0.88 -9.41 -9.37 -9.48 1.54 -1530.47 2259
female, college 14.96 -3.48 4.28 -5.69 -7.13 -4.59 -3.06 0.01 -1506.29 2239
female, single 14.73
-13.38
1.06 6.00 14.41 13.18 -7.05 0.00 -1501.25 2239
female, ms 1.47 0.48 2.12 -0.17 -0.99 -1.07 -0.94 38.60 -1503.15 2239
female, dealer 0.12 0.19 1.21 0.04 -0.00 -0.13 -0.32 2.45 -1496.08 2239
female, dealer.coins -0.06 0.30 1.20 -0.14 -0.07 -0.16 -0.37 6.80 -1508.36 2239
female, grcomp 15.00 -2.87 4.42 -2.30 -5.38 -9.56 -5.59 0.91 -1502.84 2239
college, single 14.83 -9.59 -0.13 3.63 6.63 11.43 -8.61 0.00 -1519.59 2259
college, ms 15.00 -3.41 -5.16 -8.28 7.38 6.22 1.93 0.00 -1533.77 2259








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
college, dealer.coins -0.08 0.76 1.08 -0.12 -0.04 0.13 -0.82 3.66 -1524.12 2259
college, grcomp 9.16 -3.02 5.53 0.03 5.65 -3.60 -5.60 0.00 -1502.54 2259
single, ms 15.00 3.68 -9.65 2.16 5.21 -8.01 -3.19 0.00 -1513.55 2259
single, dealer 0.21 0.22 0.96 0.09 0.08 0.02 -0.39 1.35 -1511.41 2259
single, dealer.coins 14.82 -3.00 2.38 -2.88 5.89 -8.61 -9.10 0.00 -1516.32 2259
single, grcomp 15.00 -7.13 4.27 -3.77 2.27 -3.83 -7.26 0.00 -1522.61 2259
ms, dealer 0.09 0.22 1.05 0.07 0.04 0.14 -0.41 1.46 -1510.84 2259
ms, dealer.coins 0.11 0.54 0.85 -0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.56 1.48 -1527.27 2259
ms, grcomp 9.02 10.28 -0.91 -9.05 -9.05 0.08 -9.17 1.47 -1529.49 2259
dealer, dealer.coins 0.15 0.61 0.95 0.06 0.06 -0.33 -0.41 1.54 -1510.60 2259
dealer, grcomp 0.20 0.21 1.00 0.08 0.07 -0.38 0.01 1.39 -1511.45 2259






220.58 753.41 -13.37 -73.12
0.00 -1490.90 2239
female, college, ms 15.00 2.41 3.81 1.88 -5.16 -7.14 -2.56 -5.34 0.00 -1478.10 2239
female, college, dealer 0.10 0.18 1.26 0.03 0.00 -0.13 0.02 -0.32 2.59 -1496.02 2239
female, college, dealer.coins 15.00 -2.71 5.25 -5.51 0.25 -4.79 -2.85 -7.98 0.00 -1499.91 2239








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, single, ms 15.00 -3.71 -3.27 3.05 6.02 7.29 -7.82 -3.25 0.00 -1492.03 2239
female, single, dealer 1.05 0.24 12.77 0.90 0.17 -0.75 0.83 -1.23 0.98 -1490.39 2239
female, single, dealer.coins 14.98 -5.07 4.19 -5.04 0.09 -2.51 -4.55 -7.72 0.00 -1493.60 2239
female, single, grcomp 13.87
-11.98
1.67 5.66 14.73 14.35 -7.29 -1.31 0.00 -1491.28 2239
female, ms, dealer 0.06 0.20 1.22 0.05 0.00 -0.11 0.07 -0.35 2.44 -1495.80 2239
female, ms, dealer.coins 2.79 1.05 2.01 -0.17 -1.61 -1.69 -1.56 -0.94 24.32 -1501.80 2239
female, ms, grcomp 14.98 4.64 2.70 -3.25 -9.12 -6.12 -5.99 -3.33 6.08 -1491.62 2239
female, dealer, dealer.coins 0.08 0.47 1.08 0.04 0.01 -0.11 -0.30 -0.29 2.60 -1495.46 2239
female, dealer, grcomp 0.13 0.18 1.35 0.07 0.00 -0.14 -0.35 0.05 2.45 -1495.72 2239
female, dealer.coins, grcomp 14.99 -2.92 4.48 -2.34 -5.48 -9.45 0.37 -5.69 0.91 -1502.84 2239
college, single, ms 15.28 3.55
-10.01
2.38 5.35 -0.11 -7.91 -3.18 0.00 -1511.74 2259
college, single, dealer 15.00 -6.57 3.71 -4.20 0.27 -1.99 -3.90 -4.69 0.00 -1510.86 2259
college, single, dealer.coins 14.90 -4.98 -0.21 -4.73 3.24 3.41 -4.87 -5.15 0.00 -1510.67 2259
college, single, grcomp 9.13 -3.03 5.57 0.10 5.67 -3.62 2.07 -5.56 0.00 -1499.78 2259
college, ms, dealer 15.00 -3.92 -4.50 -9.27 -2.03 6.74 2.82 -4.12 0.00 -1507.90 2259
college, ms, dealer.coins 15.00 6.82
-14.89
-9.05 -2.04 6.47 2.25 -3.67 0.00 -1507.65 2259








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
college, dealer, dealer.coins 0.13 0.63 0.97 0.06 0.07 0.03 -0.33 -0.46 1.62 -1510.41 2259
college, dealer, grcomp 11.46 -3.62 7.17 0.03 7.28 -4.26 0.00 -7.23 0.00 -1500.75 2259
college, dealer.coins, grcomp 12.95 0.10 11.66 -4.97 7.35 -6.02 -5.55 -6.97 0.00 -1487.78 2259
single, ms, dealer 15.00 3.23 -9.63 2.27 5.50 -7.76 -3.11 -0.41 0.00 -1509.29 2259
single, ms, dealer.coins 14.93 2.99 -9.77 2.08 5.69 -7.00 -3.22 -0.67 0.00 -1508.98 2259
single, ms, grcomp 13.91 -2.88 -0.32 -3.46 -1.13 -4.85 -2.40 -3.65 0.00 -1502.44 2259
single, dealer, dealer.coins 0.15 0.62 0.91 0.07 0.07 0.02 -0.34 -0.42 1.52 -1510.56 2259
single, dealer, grcomp 0.21 0.22 0.94 0.09 0.08 0.03 -0.39 -0.01 1.34 -1511.41 2259
single, dealer.coins, grcomp 14.49 -3.11 4.58 -3.78 2.27 -7.28 -8.45 -2.33 0.00 -1507.77 2259
ms, dealer, dealer.coins 0.05 0.70 0.97 0.06 0.04 0.13 -0.37 -0.49 1.60 -1509.84 2259
ms, dealer, grcomp 0.09 0.22 1.07 0.07 0.04 0.14 -0.41 0.01 1.46 -1510.83 2259
ms, dealer.coins, grcomp 0.11 0.54 0.87 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.56 0.01 1.48 -1527.26 2259
dealer, dealer.coins, grcomp 0.15 0.61 0.96 0.06 0.06 -0.33 -0.41 0.01 1.55 -1510.59 2259
female, college, single, ms 19.10 2.92 4.99 2.28 -6.65 -9.01 -3.26 1.70 -7.06 0.00 -1477.37 2239
female, college, single, dealer 15.00 1.20
-10.27 -10.01













constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, college, single, grcomp 9.56
-14.23
8.90 11.24 7.33 12.48 7.08 -6.26 5.13 0.00 -1465.28 2239
female, college, ms, dealer 18.50 2.60 5.29 0.76 -6.84 -8.94 -2.59 -7.02 1.46 0.00 -1468.45 2239
female, college, ms,
dealer.coins
15.00 3.50 1.97 2.10 -4.40 -6.60 -3.86 -4.58 -3.61 0.00 -1474.32 2239




-4.58 0.00 -1476.05 2239
female, college, dealer,
dealer.coins
0.02 0.53 1.12 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.04 -0.28 -0.39 3.26 -1495.09 2239
female, college, dealer, grcomp 13.89 -4.44 8.77 0.03 8.88 -0.00 -5.09 -0.00 -8.84 0.00 -1486.82 2239
female, college, dealer.coins,
grcomp
6.35 6.30 4.74 -1.45 3.95 -0.35 -2.65 -8.50 -3.58 0.00 -1474.82 2239
female, single, ms, dealer 14.54
-11.58
-0.28 6.47 12.12 13.09 -7.77 -1.37 13.55 0.00 -1488.27 2239
female, single, ms, dealer.coins 15.00 -2.06 -8.06 2.34 -2.63 7.55 -4.75 -2.48 7.03 0.00 -1484.56 2239
female, single, ms, grcomp 15.00 -4.81 -0.33 2.05 4.44 14.20 -9.31 -2.61 -4.37 0.00 -1483.94 2239
female, single, dealer,
dealer.coins
8.80 -8.00 0.20 3.33 4.93 4.25 -4.16 -8.74 8.24 0.28 -1481.24 2239
female, single, dealer, grcomp 4.16 0.26 5.52 4.03 0.23 -3.90 4.11 -4.26 -0.15 0.70 -1488.98 2239
female, single, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
12.98 -9.64 3.27 5.57 14.73 14.35 -8.64 0.28 -3.04 0.00 -1487.87 2239
female, ms, dealer, dealer.coins 0.01 0.58 1.06 0.04 0.01 -0.09 0.09 -0.33 -0.40 2.66 -1495.07 2239








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, ms, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
14.96 4.47 2.80 -3.36 -9.17 -6.05 -5.93 0.38 -3.45 6.07 -1491.62 2239
female, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
0.08 0.45 1.17 0.06 0.01 -0.12 -0.32 -0.27 0.04 2.63 -1495.21 2239
college, single, ms, dealer 14.74 -3.49 -4.48 -8.63 -1.24 6.97 -0.70 2.54 -3.73 0.00 -1505.17 2259
college, single, ms, dealer.coins 16.66 6.30
-14.17 -10.64
-1.85 6.77 -0.20 2.05 -4.91 0.00 -1506.62 2259
college, single, ms, grcomp 9.23 -3.01 5.57 0.16 5.66 -3.52 2.07 -0.25 -5.50 0.00 -1498.60 2259
college, single, dealer,
dealer.coins
0.13 0.65 0.92 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.03 -0.34 -0.47 1.59 -1510.35 2259
college, single, dealer, grcomp 9.71 -3.05 6.21 0.11 6.31 -3.55 2.08 0.00 -6.20 0.00 -1498.01 2259
college, single, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
5.33 0.14 4.07 -1.20 3.51 -2.24 9.30 -1.77 -3.13 0.00 -1486.53 2259
college, ms, dealer, dealer.coins 15.81 5.17
-13.43
-9.59 -2.08 7.06 2.09 2.56 -6.09 0.00 -1507.28 2259
college, ms, dealer, grcomp 13.84
-13.04
4.32 -6.98 3.14 3.04 8.14
-11.04
2.59 0.01 -1493.92 2259
college, ms, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
12.74 0.06 11.57 -4.89 7.33 -5.96 0.13 -5.48 -6.96 0.00 -1487.43 2259
college, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
6.60 0.16 5.42 -1.78 4.29 -2.92 0.35 -2.71 -3.91 0.00 -1484.79 2259
single, ms, dealer, dealer.coins 13.85 -2.99 -0.33 -4.07 0.10 -3.78 -2.68 7.68 -9.42 0.00 -1496.71 2259
single, ms, dealer, grcomp 14.32 -2.91 -0.33 -3.71 -0.92 -4.91 -2.47 -0.55 -3.22 0.00 -1497.42 2259
single, ms, dealer.coins, gr-
comp








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
single, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
15.90 -4.14 4.14 -3.65 3.18 -7.78 0.34 -8.24 -3.24 0.00 -1506.20 2259
ms, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
0.05 0.70 0.99 0.07 0.04 0.14 -0.37 -0.50 0.01 1.62 -1509.82 2259







6.54 0.00 -1467.32 2239
female, college, single, ms,
dealer.coins
23.07 6.22 1.20 3.87 -6.35
-10.26
-6.16 -1.53 -6.75 -6.23 0.00 -1470.11 2239




8.83 11.12 7.55 13.95 7.20 -6.06 -0.39 5.35 0.00 -1459.81 2239
female, college, single, dealer,
dealer.coins
6.56 -5.85 0.17 2.80 4.38 3.67 0.07 -3.56 -6.54 6.09 0.29 -1480.51 2239









8.50 10.79 7.65 16.15 7.44 -6.13 0.06 4.82 0.00 -1464.67 2239
female, college, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins
21.73 6.28 1.20 0.82 -6.41 -9.22 -5.80 -6.81 2.31 -8.65 0.00 -1464.57 2239
female, college, ms, dealer, gr-
comp
22.01 1.55 6.53 -1.23 -9.03 -9.52 -3.30 -7.21 1.96 -2.03 0.00 -1467.39 2239
female, college, ms,
dealer.coins, grcomp
6.89 -6.08 5.23 -7.89 12.89 13.06 3.29 9.10
-11.93
2.52 0.00 -1470.58 2239
female, college, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
5.90 6.38 4.45 -1.31 3.80 -0.21 -2.49 0.14 -8.43 -3.42 0.00 -1474.40 2239
female, single, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins
9.03 -7.97 0.04 3.45 4.94 4.19 -4.10 -0.46 -8.49 8.30 0.25 -1474.32 2239
female, single, ms, dealer, gr-
comp








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, single, ms, dealer.coins,
grcomp
15.00 -4.81 -0.32 2.02 4.46 14.20 -9.29 -2.60 -0.07 -4.37 0.00 -1483.60 2239
female, single, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
9.06 -8.23 0.26 3.21 4.58 4.30 -4.01 -8.80 8.45 -0.27 0.14 -1476.01 2239
female, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
14.95 4.48 2.80 -3.35 -9.15 -6.07 -5.94 0.06 0.32 -3.46 6.20 -1491.35 2239













4.18 -7.16 3.42 3.40 -0.82 7.19
-10.99
3.02 0.02 -1488.15 2259
college, single, ms,
dealer.coins, grcomp
11.89 -7.42 -0.29 -6.03 -0.86 7.40 -3.22 5.08 -3.13 -5.92 0.00 -1485.74 2259
college, single, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
5.50 0.22 4.31 -1.27 3.69 -2.42 3.05 0.35 -2.20 -3.31 0.00 -1482.72 2259
college, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
5.52 0.13 4.27 -1.20 3.73 -2.44 0.05 0.35 -2.12 -3.35 0.00 -1484.69 2259
single, ms, dealer, dealer.coins,
grcomp
13.87 -3.00 -0.30 -4.06 0.10 -3.81 -2.71 7.68 -9.42 -0.00 0.00 -1496.70 2259
female, college, single, ms,
dealer, dealer.coins
21.56 5.87 1.19 0.66 -6.05 -9.29 -5.92 -1.46 -6.39 2.95 -8.88 0.00 -1460.23 2239




8.85 11.14 7.60 13.95 7.30 -5.99 -0.48 0.22 5.27 0.00 -1454.46 2239




8.84 11.13 7.53 13.95 7.25 -6.01 -0.60 0.24 5.23 0.00 -1454.28 2239




8.64 10.95 7.56 16.28 7.36 -6.39 0.08 -0.02 4.82 0.00 -1464.56 2239
female, college, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, single, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
9.08 -7.99 0.08 3.43 4.77 4.38 -4.09 -0.43 -8.40 8.31 -0.26 0.15 -1469.88 2239
college, single, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
5.55 0.25 4.34 -1.30 3.68 -2.42 3.05 -0.07 0.35 -2.23 -3.30 0.00 -1482.58 2259




8.82 11.22 7.66 13.91 7.32 -5.97 -0.70 0.14 0.21 5.04 0.00 -1453.13 2239
TI only female -0.02 0.20 0.90 -0.18 -0.10 3.91 0.00 -1519.34 2239
female female 0.60 0.07 0.74 -0.13 -0.16 -1.96 0.21 >100 -1506.54 2239
college female -0.06 0.20 1.05 -0.19 -0.11 0.03 4.78 0.00 -1519.11 2239
single female 11.64
-10.35
0.99 3.31 12.63 -4.31 0.00 >100 -1501.33 2239
ms female -0.06 0.19 0.99 -0.21 -0.14 0.06 4.66 0.00 -1518.77 2239
dealer female 0.17 0.22 1.01 0.07 0.07 -0.38 1.63 0.00 -1498.06 2239
dealer.coins female -0.01 0.56 0.93 -0.12 -0.02 -0.57 2.82 0.00 -1512.32 2239
grcomp female 6.99 8.44 -0.87 -7.15 -7.08 -7.19 3.17 0.00 -1515.45 2239
female, college female 0.45 0.11 0.81 -0.15 -0.14 -2.54 0.05 0.34 >100 -1506.06 2239
female, single female 14.67
-13.32
1.06 6.51 14.38 9.09 -7.57 0.00 >100 -1501.25 2239
female, ms female 1.44 0.16 1.36 -0.14 -0.43 -2.01 -0.38 0.06 >100 -1500.20 2239
female, dealer female 0.43 0.14 0.85 0.01 -0.03 -1.11 -0.26 0.39 95.54 -1491.27 2239
female, dealer.coins female 14.79 10.99 -0.48 -9.47 -9.36 -6.73
-11.41








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, grcomp female 15.00 -2.12 3.68 -1.57 -3.90
-11.04
-4.12 0.00 0.92 -1501.13 2239
college, single female 30.41
-22.25
8.05 12.42 22.23 -3.50
-20.25
0.00 >100 -1490.91 2239
college, ms female 1.51 8.27 -7.94 -4.87 -4.92 3.48 3.64 0.29 >100 -1503.48 2239
college, dealer female 0.21 0.18 1.07 0.09 0.09 0.04 -0.42 1.54 0.00 -1497.96 2239
college, dealer.coins female 0.01 2.68 -3.29 -0.23 -0.64 1.01 2.50 40.83 >100 -1508.64 2239
college, grcomp female 7.20 -2.15 4.65 0.25 4.69 -2.75 -4.49 0.00 0.04 -1479.88 2239
single, ms female 12.25 -7.41 -0.27 3.00 4.96 -5.47 -2.12 0.00 >100 -1485.93 2239
single, dealer female 14.48 -3.86 2.65 -3.21 4.05 -7.09 -7.62 0.00 2.01 -1495.98 2239
single, dealer.coins female 11.81
-10.80
0.44 3.67 4.72 -4.44 -0.27 0.02 >100 -1499.47 2239
single, grcomp female 11.62 -9.73 1.67 4.32 12.63 -5.95 -1.31 0.00 >100 -1491.28 2239
ms, dealer female 0.01 0.23 1.09 0.05 0.03 0.16 -0.39 2.07 0.00 -1497.24 2239
ms, dealer.coins female -0.06 0.58 0.95 -0.13 -0.04 0.04 -0.59 3.15 0.00 -1512.10 2239




4.41 0.00 -1513.09 2239
dealer, dealer.coins female 0.10 0.64 0.97 0.05 0.06 -0.32 -0.44 1.94 0.00 -1497.12 2239
dealer, grcomp female 0.17 0.22 1.03 0.07 0.07 -0.38 0.01 1.64 0.00 -1498.05 2239
dealer.coins, grcomp female -0.01 0.55 0.95 -0.12 -0.03 -0.57 0.01 2.81 0.00 -1512.31 2239
female, college, single female 14.99 8.46
-11.41 -13.90








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259




0.00 0.00 -1477.19 2239
female, college, dealer female 0.37 0.12 0.94 -0.02 -0.02 -1.34 0.06 -0.25 0.46 >100 -1490.42 2239




0.00 >100 -1483.17 2239
female, college, grcomp female 11.32 -3.58 7.34 0.27 7.37 -0.33 -4.04 -7.15 0.00 0.02 -1478.25 2239
female, single, ms female 14.94 -8.63 -0.33 2.72 5.29 -3.32 -5.85 -2.85 0.00 >100 -1483.16 2239
female, single, dealer female 13.28 -4.99 2.86 -4.02 0.75 -4.09 -4.01 -5.30 0.00 1.27 -1482.38 2239






0.00 0.00 -1489.97 2239
female, single, grcomp female 13.87
-11.98
1.67 5.66 15.73 15.35 -7.29 -1.31 0.00 0.00 -1491.28 2239
female, ms, dealer female 0.39 0.15 0.85 0.01 -0.02 -1.09 0.02 -0.27 0.41 99.71 -1491.22 2239
female, ms, dealer.coins female 0.89 0.20 0.56 -0.08 -0.09 -2.21 -0.10 -0.34 0.07 >100 -1494.32 2239
female, ms, grcomp female 14.76 3.89 3.32 -2.91 -8.64 -6.41 -5.84 -3.00 0.53 6.50 -1491.40 2239
female, dealer, dealer.coins female 0.38 0.30 0.77 -0.01 -0.01 -1.20 -0.22 -0.19 0.42 >100 -1490.40 2239
female, dealer, grcomp female 0.43 0.14 0.94 0.03 -0.03 -1.17 -0.28 0.04 0.39 >100 -1491.00 2239
female, dealer.coins, grcomp female 5.46 0.53 2.10 -1.40 1.52 -4.72 -3.88 -1.51 0.00 38.88 -1483.18 2239
college, single, ms female 12.50 -7.16 -0.13 2.64 4.99 -0.21 -5.21 -2.51 0.00 >100 -1479.76 2239
college, single, dealer female 14.82 5.85
-14.99
-9.84 -5.97 8.30 4.28 -1.13 0.00 >100 -1485.52 2239
college, single, dealer.coins female 14.60 2.42
-10.94 -11.09








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
college, single, grcomp female 9.44
-12.17
4.41 6.73 4.13 3.93 -3.71 3.24 0.00 >100 -1476.36 2239
college, ms, dealer female 12.07 0.46 -7.19 -7.24 -1.69 5.81 2.03 -2.41 0.00 >100 -1487.74 2239
college, ms, dealer.coins female 13.17 8.97
-13.78 -14.84
-3.28 11.16 6.61 -7.76 0.00 >100 -1479.51 2239
college, ms, grcomp female 9.40 -2.83 6.01 0.47 5.89 -3.47 -0.38 -5.58 0.00 0.04 -1474.55 2239
college, dealer, dealer.coins female 0.09 0.66 1.00 0.06 0.06 0.03 -0.32 -0.49 2.01 0.00 -1496.94 2239
college, dealer, grcomp female 16.25 -5.22 10.63 0.28 10.64 -5.86 0.00
-10.43
0.00 0.00 -1478.13 2239
college, dealer.coins, grcomp female 6.65 11.47 5.29 -1.72 4.24 -2.83
-13.79
-3.86 0.00 0.00 -1477.37 2239
single, ms, dealer female 15.48 -7.88 -0.29 2.02 5.29 -6.50 -2.84 -0.69 0.00 >100 -1482.13 2239
single, ms, dealer.coins female 15.48 -7.88 -0.29 2.02 5.29 -6.50 -2.84 -0.69 0.00 >100 -1482.13 2239
single, ms, grcomp female 12.98 -7.61 -0.33 2.88 5.02 -5.63 -2.30 -0.07 0.00 >100 -1484.77 2239
single, dealer, dealer.coins female 10.40 -0.58 -9.70 2.04 0.15 -2.15
-10.48
13.61 0.59 >100 -1490.50 2239
single, dealer, grcomp female 14.92 -6.09 3.54 -1.39 3.18 -7.18 -4.97 -3.25 0.00 8.67 -1482.03 2239
single, dealer.coins, grcomp female 11.71 -9.65 1.94 4.24 12.63 -6.02 0.20 -1.66 0.00 >100 -1489.34 2239
ms, dealer, dealer.coins female -0.04 0.77 1.01 0.04 0.03 0.15 -0.35 -0.56 2.39 0.00 -1496.03 2239
ms, dealer, grcomp female 0.01 0.23 1.10 0.05 0.03 0.16 -0.39 0.00 2.07 0.00 -1497.23 2239
ms, dealer.coins, grcomp female 14.20 -9.28 4.93 2.03 5.37 -0.96 0.96 -4.47 0.00 >100 -1508.16 2239








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259




0.00 0.00 -1477.19 2239
female, college, single, dealer female 22.36 -7.70 6.49 -7.15 0.27 -7.40 -0.05 -7.18 -7.99 0.00 2.40 -1480.24 2239
female, college, single,
dealer.coins
female 15.00 1.91 -7.67
-11.87
-4.55 -6.27 9.28 2.76 -4.98 0.00 >100 -1463.01 2239
female, college, single, grcomp female 12.40
-17.37
9.11 11.41 8.14 10.92 7.89 -6.16 5.45 0.00 0.00 -1464.90 2239




2.00 0.00 0.00 -1467.39 2239
female, college, ms,
dealer.coins
female 15.76 4.32 1.25 2.12 -4.49 -6.71 -4.43 -4.68 -4.43 0.00 0.00 -1474.28 2239











0.00 >100 -1482.87 2239
female, college, dealer, grcomp female 16.24 -5.24 10.58 0.21 10.63 -0.09 -5.80 -0.06
-10.40
0.00 0.00 -1477.96 2239
female, college, dealer.coins,
grcomp
female 5.82 5.11 12.05 -4.46 4.39 -5.01 4.27
-14.18
3.76 0.00 >100 -1466.97 2239
female, single, ms, dealer female 13.59 -5.24 3.01 -4.17 0.76 -4.34 -4.19 0.33 -5.56 0.00 1.58 -1480.62 2239
female, single, ms, dealer.coins female 15.48 -7.88 -0.29 2.02 5.29 -0.00 -6.50 -2.84 -0.69 0.00 >100 -1482.13 2239





0.21 4.28 5.81 4.71 -5.09
-11.51
11.05 0.22 2.25 -1480.35 2239








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, single, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 5.42 0.52 2.06 -1.36 1.53 -4.70 0.12 -3.83 -1.52 0.00 30.46 -1482.06 2239
female, ms, dealer, dealer.coins female 0.34 0.32 0.78 -0.01 -0.01 -1.19 0.02 -0.23 -0.20 0.45 >100 -1490.35 2239
female, ms, dealer, grcomp female 0.41 0.14 0.94 0.03 -0.02 -1.15 0.02 -0.28 0.04 0.41 >100 -1490.97 2239
female, ms, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 14.75 6.52 -2.89 -2.50 -4.64
-10.40
-2.26 -6.92 -2.59 0.00 7.03 -1482.04 2239
female, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 5.44 0.54 2.07 -1.37 1.53 -4.74 0.08 -3.94 -1.52 0.00 37.78 -1482.70 2239
college, single, ms, dealer female 12.33 -7.28 -0.13 2.66 5.11 -0.21 -4.98 -2.48 0.34 0.00 >100 -1477.15 2239
college, single, ms, dealer.coins female 13.32 4.76
-11.00 -15.48
-2.71 13.73 0.58 7.87 -8.25 0.00 >100 -1472.31 2239
college, single, ms, grcomp female 8.98
-12.19





-6.62 9.55 4.82 2.00 -3.22 0.00 >100 -1480.30 2239
college, single, dealer, grcomp female 10.93
-13.66
7.39 9.69 7.68 6.12 -6.69 -0.02 3.23 0.00 >100 -1466.93 2239




7.38 9.66 7.44 6.07 -6.60 -0.02 3.29 0.00 >100 -1466.87 2239
college, ms, dealer, dealer.coins female 13.32 4.49 -9.88
-16.68
-2.23 14.03 8.77 0.46
-10.50
0.00 >100 -1477.36 2239
college, ms, dealer, grcomp female 22.96 -7.56 18.26 0.91 14.73 -8.04 -0.68 0.36
-14.47
0.00 0.00 -1468.64 2239
college, ms, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 6.03 -5.11 4.69 -7.47 8.02 3.52 9.20
-12.15
2.50 0.00 >100 -1464.79 2239
college, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 5.79 11.58 4.41 -1.22 3.85 -2.54 0.35
-13.68








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
single, ms, dealer, dealer.coins female 5.29 2.92 -7.51 1.88 0.11 -2.21 -0.53 -4.75 7.92 0.38 >100 -1479.67 2239
single, ms, dealer, grcomp female 15.43 -6.41 3.60 -1.60 3.23 -7.28 0.17 -5.29 -3.29 0.00 2.41 -1481.33 2239
single, ms, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 15.48 -7.88 -0.29 2.02 5.29 -6.50 -2.84 -0.69 0.00 0.00 >100 -1482.13 2239
single, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female 14.92 -6.18 3.50 -1.39 3.14 -7.09 -4.89 -0.03 -3.21 0.00 2.63 -1481.94 2239
ms, dealer, dealer.coins, gr-
comp
female -0.04 0.77 1.02 0.04 0.03 0.15 -0.36 -0.56 0.01 2.40 0.00 -1496.02 2239








6.47 0.00 0.00 -1467.32 2239
female, college, single, ms,
dealer.coins
female 18.48 1.23 -8.93
-13.95
-4.74 -8.37 9.14 2.42 0.74 -5.07 0.00 >100 -1458.51 2239




8.78 11.07 7.55 14.03 7.20 -5.98 -0.42 5.43 0.00 0.00 -1459.78 2239
female, college, single, dealer,
dealer.coins
female 17.14 2.01 -8.58
-12.44
-3.67 -8.21 8.95 1.87 3.68 -8.62 0.00 >100 -1458.92 2239
female, college, single, dealer,
grcomp
female 11.94 1.88 -0.40 -2.94 -2.23
-10.96
5.49 10.60 -5.04 -8.17 0.00 >100 -1462.91 2239
female, college, single,
dealer.coins, grcomp
female 10.80 2.11 6.43 -8.83 3.32 -4.90 3.10 1.95
-14.95
2.50 0.00 >100 -1446.61 2239
female, college, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins
female 21.63 6.45 1.24 0.82 -6.61 -9.00 -5.80 -6.90 1.82 -8.36 0.00 0.00 -1464.55 2239
female, college, ms, dealer, gr-
comp




2.16 -0.38 0.00 0.00 -1467.33 2239
female, college, ms,
dealer.coins, grcomp
female 8.22 3.03 3.82 -6.40 3.33 -5.34 3.12 -0.36
-12.92








constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, college, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp




3.88 0.00 >100 -1465.89 2239
female, single, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins
female 9.03 -7.97 0.04 3.45 4.94 4.19 -4.10 -0.46 -8.49 8.30 0.25 0.00 -1474.32 2239
female, single, ms, dealer, gr-
comp
female 18.12 -6.49 5.02 -5.91 0.18 -5.91 -5.72 0.34 -6.73 -0.25 0.00 1.39 -1477.59 2239
female, single, ms, dealer.coins,
grcomp





0.28 6.26 7.54 6.74 -7.04
-11.11
10.79 -0.30 0.10 2.32 -1474.36 2239
female, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
female 39.48 6.42 -3.50 -3.04 -4.46
-35.30
-1.57 0.12 -9.43 -3.17 0.00 6.71 -1481.02 2239




-3.19 16.25 0.48 10.61 0.46
-12.20
0.00 >100 -1470.32 2239































23.51 0.00 >100 -1463.74 2239
single, ms, dealer, dealer.coins,
grcomp
female 9.31 -2.82 -5.64 1.97 -0.06 -2.35 -0.53 -8.45 11.80 -0.40 0.17 >100 -1475.61 2239
female, college, single, ms,
dealer, dealer.coins
female 19.01 1.48 -9.16
-15.19
-4.56 -8.49 9.66 2.27 1.73 0.56 -6.72 0.00 >100 -1453.88 2239












constant coins ungraded skewLO skewHI female college single ms dealer dcoins grcomp constant female LL N
Full Model (original estimates) female 0.95 -0.16 3.75 0.76 0.14 -1.26 0.04 0.84 0.03 -0.98 0.39 -0.12 0.41 12.54 -1486.29 2259
female, college, single, ms,
dealer.coins, grcomp
female 10.32 2.42 6.18 -8.96 3.93 -5.07 3.46 1.10 0.50
-15.27
2.54 0.00 >100 -1439.93 2239
female, college, single, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
female 11.44 1.55 6.93 -9.70 3.88 -4.75 3.47 4.87 0.36
-15.39
2.53 0.00 >100 -1440.04 2239
female, college, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp




2.55 0.00 >100 -1447.77 2239
female, single, ms, dealer,
dealer.coins, grcomp
female 9.08 -7.99 0.08 3.43 4.77 4.38 -4.09 -0.43 -8.40 8.31 -0.26 0.15 0.00 -1469.88 2239




8.02 10.30 7.65 7.13 -6.02 -1.85 0.50 0.04 4.09 0.00 >100 -1450.49 2239
Full Model (best estimates) 10.18 2.31 6.04 -8.98 3.94 -5.11 3.56 1.11 0.52 0.37
-15.52
2.71 0.00 >100 -1438.88 2239
Each row shows the parameter vector with the highest log-likelihood amongst those found using the methods described in Section 1.A4. Cells with parameters determining r shaded gray if parameter is larger than
3 in absolute value.
Table 1.A2: Results of numerical maximization for all possible specifications using the set of covariates used by HLT
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1.A5 Additional issues
The econometric analysis of HLT contains a few additional issues not mentioned
in the main body of this Comment. They are listed below.
Prospect Theory
In addition to the CRRA expected utility + Fechner error model that is the sub-
ject of the main text of this Comment HLT also estimate a classical (i.e. non-
cumulative) prospect theory model on their data. HLT report (emphasis in the
original):
The prospect theory specification mitigates the quantitative effects of
the treatments, but does not change the main qualitative conclusions.
For parsimony, we only summarize the results here. The probability
weighting parameter γ is estimated to be 0.83, which is significantly
less than 1 and consistent with previous estimates from laboratory ex-
periments. The effect of the graded coins treatment on risk aversion is
again statistically insignificant, after controlling for the same character-
istics used in Table II. The CRRA parameter α increases by 0.65 with
graded coins, but has p-value of 0.86. On the other hand, α increases
by 0.59 with ungraded coins, and has a standard error of only 0.18
and a p-value of 0.001. The 95% confidence interval on this effect from
background risk is between +0.24 and +0.94, so the treatment effect
magnitude is much smaller than under EUT, but we find qualitatively
similar insights.
None of these results are to be found in the log file in the paper’s supporting
material (see Listing 1.2 for the relevant excerpt. Note that the log-likelihood
of this model, a model in which HLT’s baseline specification is nested, is lower
than that of HLT’s baseline specification) nor have I been able to reproduce them.
Indeed, attempts to try to reproduce them yield slightly higher likelihoods than
the baseline model but point estimates for γ which are larger than one (albeit not
statistically significantly differently so), for a probability weighting function that
is s-shaped rather than inverse s-shaped.
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Number of obs = 2239
Wald chi2(6) = .
Log pseudolikelihood = -1510.9798 Prob > chi2 = .
(Std. Err. adjusted for 112 clusters in id)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| Robust
| Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
crra |
coins | .9284791 .1856117 5.00 0.000 .5646869 1.292271
ungraded | 1.203079 .7054548 1.71 0.088 -.1795867 2.585745
skewLO | 9.316468 . . . . .
skewHI | .2497722 . . . . .
female | .3728553 . . . . .
college | .212427 .3683002 0.58 0.564 -.5094282 .9342822
single | -.1756582 .1483901 -1.18 0.237 -.4664976 .1151811
ms | 1.302932 4.758075 0.27 0.784 -8.022724 10.62859
dealer | -3.63777 .3345559 -10.87 0.000 -4.293488 -2.982053
d_coins | -.7240507 . . . . .
grcomp | -.2091023 . . . . .
_cons | 2.366453 4.944522 0.48 0.632 -7.324633 12.05754
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
gamma |
_cons | 1.251066 .4030218 3.10 0.002 .4611582 2.040975
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
noise |
female | 6.967949 29.98527 0.23 0.816 -51.80211 65.738
_cons | 46.31619 . . . . .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Listing 1.2: Estimation results for the Prospect Theory model. Excerpt from
coins.log, lines 1961 – 1990
Numerical instability
The do-files in Harrison et al.’s supplementary material do not allow for exact repli-
cation for many of the results given in the paper (even the numbers in the original
48
log-file that is part of the paper’s supplementary material often do not exactly
match those reported in the paper) though results are often similar. Strangely, in
some cases this seems to be caused by a numerical instability that is due to some
interaction between the weak identification of some parameters and the sorting of
the data set.
In coins_ml.do, line 16 the data set is sorted on a variable that codes for the
skewness frame and the index for the decisions in the multiple price list:
sort frame decision
This combination of variables does not uniquely determine the sorting of the
data set since multiple participants got to see the same skewness frame. Since
Stata’s sorting algorithm is a random sort, all ties are resolved randomly. And
since the state of the random number generator which governs this sort will differ
in successive runs so will the sorting of the data set. How exactly the data is sorted
then influences the precise numerical value the log-likelihood function, which is
just a sum of individual likelihoods, returns since in floating point arithmetic the
results of addition may be different depending on the order of the summands, as
the following Stata code example demonstrates:
. di %25.0g 0.3+0.6+0.1
.999999999999999889
. di %25.0g 0.3+0.1+0.6
1
These differences in the calculated log-likelihood are often minuscule but because
the log-likelihood is so flat around the estimated coefficient for the Ungraded coins
as Final Outcomes treatment dummy these small differences can be mirrored in
some fairly sizable differences in the Ungraded coins as Final Outcomes coefficient.
The instability is likely what is behind the difference between the parameter value
reported in the paper and the value in the log-file included in the supplementary
material.
Making the sort unique by replacing the line above with
sort frame decision id
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eliminates the difference between successive runs as does fixing the seed that
governs the sort via set sortseed or executing the script on a fresh Stata session
(since the random number generator is always initialized with the same sortseed
of 1001). It does not, however, eliminate the root cause of the issue, the weak
identification of one of the parameters to be estimated.
A miscoded observation
The coding of the indicator variable which codes for whether or not a subject is
“single” leads to an observation (id = 60) whose marital status (“marital”) is
missing in the raw data set to be coded as not single. From coins_data.do, lines
227–228:
gen single=0
replace single=1 if marital==1
This miscoding does not much matter if the set of variables included in the
model is sufficiently small. HLT’s original model estimates, however, are sensitive
to the coding of this single observation. Changing the variable to missing (which
removes it from the subsequent analysis) or, alternatively, changing it to 1 leads
to the pathology described in Section 1.2.2: The constant is estimated to be more
than 5, the treatment effect of using coins instead of monetary prizes is sharply
negative and the treatment effect of using ungraded instead of graded coins grows
even larger than in the original specification. A closer look reveals that this is
driven almost entirely by a single subject (ID = 64) who chooses the comparatively
risky option B throughout, whose CRRA parameter is therefore unbounded below
and who gets separated after the recoding. Reducing the set of covariates to the
ones in the reduced specification remove this instability.

2 The Standard Portfolio Choice Problem in Ger-
many
based on work with Steffen Huck & Georg Weizsäcker
We report on an artefactual field experiment that examines investment behav-
ior in a representative sample of the German population. The experiment uses
households from the Socio-Economic Panel’s “Innovation Sample” (SOEP-IS) as
respondents. They act as investors who face a standard portfolio choice problem,
allocating a fixed budget between a safe and a risky asset. No other investments
are possible and the investment horizon is fixed. Despite its drastic simplification,
the standard portfolio choice problem is widely viewed as capturing one of the
main tradeoff in financial decision making. We regard its relevance as an empirical
question and examine both its internal consistency and external validity for the
German general population. Regarding external validity, behavior in our artefac-
tual investment task is robustly correlated with actual stock market participation,
even after controlling for many of the correlates of participation that the existing
literature has identified. The average stock market participation rate is 18% in our
representative sample of households; and a one-standard-deviation increase in the
experiment’s investment in the risky asset is associated with an increase in stock
market participation by 6 percentage points. Regarding internal consistency, we
find that investments in the risky asset are correlated with measures of beliefs
about the asset’s return, lending further credibility to the story that the standard
portfolio choice model sets out to tell. However, the data also shows how severely
respondents’ cognitive limitations and financial skills affect decisions. We exoge-
nously vary the returns of the risky asset across treatment groups, by paying some
groups a fixed percentage over and above the stock market return and some groups
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a fixed percentage below the stock market return, and find that only a subsample
of relatively well-educated respondents reacts to such changes in incentives. For
all other respondents, the opportunity to earn additional money is lost.
Alongside the artefactual field experiment, we also present a laboratory study
in which we use the same protocol on a convenience sample of university students.
The results are largely congruent between the two settings, with one notable differ-
ence: unlike the general population, university students do react to the variation
in incentives.1
The above evidence points at an important role of task complexity for financial
decision making. It is plausible that university students understand the incentive
structure better and that this induces them, but not the typical German house-
hold, to react to the incentive change. That is, the perceived complexity of the
incentive change may be higher for some people than for others. We also examine
another channel. The two assets in the standard portfolio choice problem differ in
nature, one being characterized by just a single number, the other by a (subjec-
tive) probability distribution. An investor may find it easier to appreciate a shift
in the single number than in the probability distribution.
We test this new hypothesis in an additional laboratory experiment where eco-
nomically equivalent incentive shifts come in two guises—once as a shift in the
return of the risky asset and once as a shift in the safe return. The experimen-
tal design ensures that both incentive variations are equally easy to understand2
and each participant faces both kinds of manipulations. The experimental re-
sults confirm that the reaction to changes in the safe asset is indeed significantly
stronger than the reaction to changes in the risky asset. This pattern has not
yet been observed in the literature, to our knowledge, and cannot be explained
by standard theories of decision-making under uncertainty.3 It has, potentially,
important consequences for the optimal design of tax incentives for investments
1Notice, however, that the students, just as the SOEP participants, exhibit too mild a change
in beliefs in response to incentive changes.
2 The experiments involve incentive shifts for both assets, presented in the same format. A
controlled variation of the shift sizes and a simultaneous variation of an illiquid asset generates
the isomorphy within pairs of incentive shifts.
3One possible way of rationalizing the pattern is to posit that the manipulation of the as-
sets affects the perceived source of uncertainty (in the sense of Fox and Tversky (1995), and
Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2010)).
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and other regulatory measures.
Relation to existing literature. Our experimental design builds on the sizable liter-
atures on stock market participation, belief elicitation and experiments on choice
under uncertainty. Our results are mostly, but not in all cases, consistent with
these literatures and we emphasize some of the relevant comparisons.
The observation that stock market participation is puzzlingly low is widely cred-
ited to Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) who find that not only do relatively few
members of the middle class invest in stocks, but even amongst the rich, where
classical rationales for non-participation are unlikely to hold, participation is far
from universal. Germany is a strong case for this puzzle, with its low percent-
age of stockholders. “Behavioral” explanations of the puzzle are common in the
literature4 and observational or experimental findings on financial literacy and
subjective expectations abound (for survey evidence on financial literacy and its
correlates in the German population, see Bucher-Koenen & Lusardi, 2011).
A growing literature measures the subjective beliefs of the general public about
stock returns. The earliest survey questions asked for a measure of central ten-
dency only (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2004). Questions to elicit entire distributions have
more recently been added to many surveys.5 These questions ask for statements
about the probabilities of the market returns lying above given thresholds.6 The
broad picture emerging from this literature is that expectations are extremely het-
erogeneous, often lie far away from actual returns (Hurd et al., 2011)7 and show
4 Frequently mentioned explanations are education, cognitive skills (Grinblatt, Keloharju, &
Linnainmaa, 2011) and financial literacy (van Rooij, Lusardi, & Alessie, 2007), transaction
cost and availability of information, and ambiguity aversion (Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell,
& Peijnenburg, 2013).
5 See the Survey of Economic Expectations (Dominitz & Manski, 2011), the Michigan Survey of
Consumers (Dominitz & Manski, 2011), the American Life Panel (Hurd & Rohwedder, 2012),
the French ‘Mode de vie des Français’ panel (Arrondel, Calvo-Pardo, & Tas, 2012) and the
Dutch CentER panel (Hurd, van Rooij, & Winter, 2011).
6 In the Health and Retirement Survey respondents are asked for the “chance that mutual fund
shares invested in blue chip stocks like those in the Dow Jones Industrial Average will be
worth more than they are today” and the “chance they will have grown by 10 percent or more”
(Dominitz & Manski, 2007). Assuming no measurement error these two questions yield two
points on the CDF and, if one is willing to make distributional assumptions, allow fitting an
entire distribution for every individual.
7 For example, Kézdi and Willis (2009) find that in 2002 the average subjective probability of
a stock market gain was just 49% compared to a historical frequency of 73%. Dominitz and
Manski (2011) report that from 2002 to 2004, the average subjective probability of a gain was
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positive predictive power for stock market investments.
One drawback of these methods is that responses are often internally inconsistent
(Binswanger & Salm, 2013).8 Instead of asking for probabilities of a return lying
above a threshold, we use a histogram elicitation method pioneered by Delavande
and Rohwedder (2008) in which respondents are asked to distribute a fixed number
of items that jointly represent a probability mass of 1 into a number of bins. The
method allows using all available data instead of focusing on consistent sets of
responses. The method also has the advantage of being easy to understand; it has
been successfully used even with respondents with little formal education and low
numerical and statistical skills (Delavande, Giné, & McKenzie, 2011).9
In contrast to previous findings, the respondent in our sample report beliefs
that accurately capture the historical market return distribution, at least in the
aggregate. This is detailed in Appendix 2.A1. A further notable difference is
that while experimental investments have high external validity in our sample,
the elicited beliefs have much less predictive power for stock market participation.
This may in part be due to our comparatively small sample size as well as to the
different parts of the sample which enter into the econometric analysis (previous
studies often discard the sizeable numbers of respondents who report internally
contradictory beliefs). But there is further evidence suggestive of a systematic
difference between the German sample and others: the subjective probability of
the relevant stock market index making a gain varies significantly less between
stockholders and non-stockholders in our data than it does in the other studies.10
While there is a large literature on how people make risky choices11 and on the
46.4%.
8 In the Health and Retirement Survey 41% of respondents give the same answer to both the
question about the likelihood of a positive return and the question about a return above 10%,
and a further 15 % violate monotonicity outright.
9We additionally ask respondents for a simple numerical expectation, which yields very similar
results in most parts of the analysis.
10 In each of Hurd et al. (2011), Dominitz and Manski (2011) and Arrondel et al. (2012), the
stockholders assign about ten percentage points more probability mass to the event that the
relevant index makes a gain. In our data, this probability differs between stockholder and
non-stockholders only by 2.3 percentage points.
11 For evidence on choice patterns in representative samples, see, e.g. Andersen, Harrison, Lau,
and Rutström (2008), Rabin andWeizsäcker (2009), von Gaudecker, van Soest, andWengström
(2011), Huck and Müller (2012) or Choi, Kariv, Müller, and Silverman (2014).
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relevant correlates12, there are no existing studies that we know of that examine
whether risky choices in simple lab-style portfolio problems help to predict stock
holdings. But while our finding of a strong correlation between an experimental
investment and real-life stock market participation is new, the idea is not. In the
working paper version of Dohmen et al. (2011) the authors report on an investment
experiment that was also done in a German household survey but is simpler than
ours. Dohmen et al. make the important observation that domain-specific risk
attitudes are better predictors of real-world behavior than general risk attitudes.
This is consistent with our finding that a choice framed in the context of financial
markets is a better predictor for real-life stock holdings than, for example, the
respondents’ general risk tolerance.
There is also a growing literature on how the complexity of the choice environ-
ment can produce suboptimal choices and muted reactions to changes in incentives.
Wilcox (1993) and Huck and Weizsäcker (1999) present laboratory experiments
showing that complexity of simple lotteries affects lottery choices. Chetty, Looney,
and Kroft (2009) show that consumers react to the inclusion of sales taxes on price
tags even when the after-tax price of goods does not change and react more weakly
to changes in taxes that are applied at the register instead of being posted on the
price tag. Abeler and Jäger (2015) find much the same thing in a laboratory
real-effort task in which earnings are taxed either according to a straightforward
schedule or a more complex schedule, which is described by 30 rules. Though both
schedules yield the same optimal work effort in theory, subjects who face the com-
plex schedule are further away from the optimal solution. Moreover, and similar
to our findings, participants with comparatively low cognitive abilities react less
strongly to the imposition of new tax rules under the complex schedule.13
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.1 we describe
12 For example, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008) show with Dutch household panel data how
general trust correlates with stock holdings.
13We note that given the lack of response to stark variations in incentives that we observe in our
study, it is perhaps not surprising that, elsewhere, investors are found to react to extraneous
information such as advertisements for standard financial assets (like individual stocks) or
photos of financial advisors (Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, Shafir, & Zinman, 2010). This
is also consistent with the findings of Binswanger and Salm (2013) who argue that large
subsamples of the population may not think probabilistically about stock market returns at
all.
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the experimental design and procedures for both the household panel and the
laboratory. In Section 2.2 we focus on the experimental data and study the relation
between beliefs about returns and investments in the experiment. In Section 2.3 we
turn to the validity questions that relate the experimental data to socioeconomic
data from the household panel, and in Section 2.4 we examine the treatment effects.
Section 2.5 presents the additional experiment comparing the return manipulation
between safe and risky assets, and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.1 Experimental Design and Procedures
2.1.1 Survey module
Our experimental module was part of the 2012 wave of the German Socioeconomic
Panel’s Innovation Sample (SOEP-IS). The SOEP is a nationally representative
sample of the German population and the SOEP-IS is its sister survey which is used
to trial new questions and modules (see Richter & Schupp, 2012, for details). Its
sampling of households follows the same procedure as the SOEP does and renders
the SOEP-IS representative of the German population. The module was presented
to 1146 respondents in 700 households, all of which were added to the SOEP-IS
sample in 2012. All households completed the SOEP baseline questionnaire on the
same day as our experimental module. Trained interviewers collected responses via
computer-aided personal interviewing (CAPI) at the respondents’ homes. In the
data analysis, we will only use the responses from the “head of household”, whom
we take to be the household member who responds to the household questionnaire
in addition to the personal questionnaire that every household member answers.
Our module contains a regular survey component that we use to elicit several
aspects of respondents’ asset portfolio (liquid assets, debt, retirement savings)
as well as financial literacy and attitudes towards savings and risk. The core
component of the module is the interactive experiment modeled on the standard
portfolio choice problem that we describe in the following.1415
14 To minimize interviewer influence, the CAPI-notebooks are placed in front of the respondents
and they themselves get to enter their responses. Interviewers are instructed to intervene only
if respondents show visible difficulties with the task or explicitly ask for help.
15A complete set of instructions is available in the Supplementary Material.
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The first screen of our experiment shows respondents a summary description of
the investment decision. They are asked to imagine owning e50,000 that they will
invest for the duration of one year. The two available assets are a safe asset that
pays 4% and is framed as a German government bond, and a risky asset, referred
to as the “fund”. The fund is based on the DAX, Germany’s prime blue chip stock
market index. Respondents receive a one-sentence description of the DAX and
learn that, depending on the treatment, the fund pays a return equal to a DAX
return drawn from the historical distribution plus a percentage point shifter. There
are five treatments that differ in the value of the shifter, with possible values in the
set {−10,−5, 0, 5, 10}. Respondents are randomly allocated to treatments. If their
shifter value is 0, then the shifter is not mentioned (for simplicity). Otherwise the
first screen indicates the absolute size of the shifter but not its sign. For example, a
respondent would learn that the fund pays either 5 percentage points less than the
DAX or 5 percentage points more than the DAX and that she will subsequently
learn which of the two values applies. The respondents also learn that they will
be paid in cash on a smaller scale at the end of the survey.
On the second screen, respondents receive more detailed explanations about
the determination of payments including (in bold letters) the information of the
shifter’s sign that “the computer has determined through a random draw”. We
use this two-step revelation of the shifter’s random draw in order to maximize
the respondent’s appreciation that the shifter is random with zero mean, carrying
no information about the underlying DAX return. Since each respondent is only
confronted with one realized shifter value in their choice problem, showing the
mirrored value makes it salient that the shifter carries no information. The proce-
dure also ensures that the instructions of the laboratory replication are identical
despite the fact that only two shifter values are possible there (see Section 2.1.2
below).
The text on the second screen also gives some numerical examples and specifies
that the fund’s return depends on a draw from historical DAX returns from 1951
to 2010 and that actual payments are scaled down by a factor of 2000.16
16 For all years since the DAX’s origination in 1988 we use the actual yearly returns on the index.
For all previous years we make use of the yearly return series from Stehle, Huber, and Maier
(1996) and Stehle, Wulff, and Richter (1999), who impute the index going back all the way
to 1948. All returns are nominal. In contrast to e.g. the S&P 500 the DAX is a performance
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Upon reading these short instructions the respondents make their investment
decision on the third screen. Respondents who invest their entire endowment in
the riskless asset would receive a certain payment of e26. Investing the entirety in
the risky asset could yield a payment anywhere from e11.52 to e56.52 depending
on the treatment and the randomly drawn year. No information on historical
returns is made available to the respondents during the experiment. Under the
assumptions of rational expectations, EU-CRRA and usual degrees of risk aversion,
one can generate the approximate prediction that in treatments with non-negative
shifters, all respondents with degree of relative risk aversion below 3 should invest
their entire endowment in the risky asset; those with a shifter of -10 should invest
very little whereas those with -5 should invest intermediate amounts.17
On the fourth screen we elicit respondents’ beliefs about the return of the fund,
using the histogram elicitation method pioneered by Delavande and Rohwedder
(2008) and refined by Delavande et al. (2011) and Rothschild (2012).18 A screen-
shot of the interface can be found in Appendix 2.A4. Respondents have to place
20 “bricks”, each representing a probability mass of 5%, into seven bins of possi-
ble percentage returns. The set of available bins is {(-90%,-60%),(-60%,-30%),(-
index, which means that dividend payments are included in the return calculations.
17 These statements hold in a classic two-period two-asset portfolio choice model with log-normal
asset returns and CRRA utility over wealth in the second period (i.e. a simplified version of
Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969); see also Campbell and Viceira (2002)). In this model
the optimal stock investment share α can be approximated by
α =
µr − rf + σ2r/2
ρ · σ2r
,
where µr is the expected log return, σ2r is the variance of returns, rf is the natural logarithm
of the risk-free rate and ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Over the payoff-relevant
period 1951-2010 the log-normality assumption was approximately correct for year-on-year
returns on the DAX (Shapiro test p-value: 0.6), the mean log-return was 0.11 and the variance
of returns was 0.1. The riskless asset in the experiment paid 4%. The predictions made
in the main text readily result under rational expectations. For respondents with log-utility
(ρ ≈ 1) the optimal stock investment share in Treatment 0 is 1, in Treatment -5 it is 0.74 and
in Treatment -10 it is 0.22. Under the same assumptions positive shifters have no effect on
stock investment, which remains at the corner solution. However, given that stock investments
observed in reality are often much lower than those predicted by the model and that most of
the finance literature estimates risk aversion to be substantially higher we decided to also
include positive shifters.
18 For an overview of studies which have used this or similar methods see Goldstein and Rothschild
(2014) and references therein.
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30%,0%),(0%,30%), (30%,60%),(60%,90%),(90%,120%)}. The bins are, hence,
wide enough to allow responses over the entire historical support of DAX returns19
and, more generally, allow for a large set of possible subjective beliefs. In addi-
tion, on the fifth screen, respondents enter the “average return [they] expect for
the fund”. For both the histogram elicitation of beliefs and for the stated beliefs, it
is straightforward to formulate the rational prediction of treatment differences: no
matter the distribution of beliefs in the population, the shifter should move beliefs
one-to-one. For example, between the -10 shifter and the +10 shifter treatments
reported beliefs should differ by 20 percentage points.
Like all previous surveys on beliefs about stock market returns we decided not to
incentivize either of these belief measures. Properly incentivizing subjects would
have required a payment mechanism whose explanation would have strained the
attention span of our respondents (see Allen, 1987, for an example of such a mech-
anism) and taken up valuable survey time for very little gain.20
On the sixth and seventh screens, respondents report how confident they are of
their belief statements, on a scale from 0 (“not at all”) to 10 (“very sure”), and
answer a few understanding questions. The eighth screen elicits the respondents’
beliefs about next year’s DAX return using the same histogram interface that was
used before. Finally, on the ninth and last screen of the experimental module
respondents were told which of the years between 1951 and 2010 had been drawn
and received a detailed calculation for their payment. Respondents were paid in
cash, with amounts rounded up to the nearest euro, at the end of the entire survey
interview. On average respondents received e27.16 (min: e17, s.d.: e3.43, max:
e48).
Before respondents are presented with the experimental module and its instruc-
tions, they have a choice whether or not to participate. The participation rate is
19 The lowest return on the DAX in the payoff-relevant period was -43.9% in 2002. The highest
return was 116.1% in 1951. The lowest bin was included for reasons of rough symmetry and
to keep subjects from anchoring their reports on the lowest possible return displayed in the
interface.
20 Both Armantier and Treich (2013) and Trautmann and van de Kuilen (2015) show that the
wrong scoring rule can induce bias in the responses. In contrast, not incentivizing the elicitation
of beliefs does not yield biased answers in these studies but merely noisier answers. A further
concern with incentives is the introduction of possible motives for attempted hedging between
tasks (see e.g. Karni & Safra, 1995).
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Dependent variable: Participation in the Experiment
Female −0.001 (0.030)
Born in the GDR 0.028 (0.038)
Abitur 0.043 (0.058)
University Degree −0.001 (0.070)
Household Size −0.018 (0.019)
Number of Children in Household 0.019 (0.034)
Employed 0.017 (0.038)
Financially Literate 0.028 (0.030)
Interest: < 250 Euros −0.028 (0.035)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.027 (0.049)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.096 (0.093)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.120 (0.240)
Interest: refused to answer −0.076 (0.087)
Stock Market Participant 0.025 (0.046)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.029 (0.033)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.027 (0.041)
Age bracket 31-40 0.032 (0.077)
Age bracket 41-50 −0.083 (0.059)
Age bracket 51-60 −0.084 (0.057)
Age bracket 61-70 −0.064 (0.060)
Age bracket > 70 −0.200∗∗∗ (0.059)
N 692
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors are bootstrapped with 1000 replicates
Table 2.1: Selection into the experiment: Probit marginal effects
80%. Those who decline primarily cite old age and problems with using computers
but also a lack of interest in financial matters or ethical or religious reservations
against any sort of financial “gambling”. The probit regression shown in Table 2.1
mirrors these answers from the open-ended question about the reasons for non-
participation. The most potent predictor, indeed the only predictor, of selection
into the experiment is age. Respondents over the age of 40 are somewhat less likely
to participate and respondents above the age of 70 are significantly less likely to
participate though almost two thirds in this age group still participate. All other
observable characteristics play no role in the selection into the experiment. A
Wald-test for the joint significance of all variables other than the age brackets
cannot reject the null of no effect (χ2(18) = 19.41, p = 0.37).
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2.1.2 Laboratory Experiment
Upon completion of the field data collection in the SOEP-IS, we used the iden-
tical experimental module for a set of 198 university students in the WZB-TU
Berlin decision laboratory. Recruitment into the laboratory sample followed stan-
dard procedures.21 The instructions and sequence of informational displays on
the computer screens in the laboratory were as close to the CAPI environment as
we could produce them, so that the potential practical difficulties with the format
would affect both populations. The experimental participants’ payments were also
scaled by the same factor as payments to SOEP participants. The only relevant
difference in experimental design and procedures are that (i) the experimental par-
ticipants do not have to fill out the long SOEP questionnaire, and (ii) we conducted
only two treatments with return shifters -10 and 10, in the laboratory, focusing on
the strongest treatment difference in incentives. Since the SOEP respondents who
happened to be in either of these two treatments were only informed about the ex-
istence of these two treatments, we could leave the instructions entirely unchanged
between survey and lab environments.
2.2 Experimental Data
2.2.1 Beliefs and Investments
We start with a summary description of investments and elicited beliefs. We will
call the share of wealth a respondent invests in the fund “equity share” hereafter.
In both samples the distributions of equity shares have relatively wide supports
and few people invest all or nothing. Summing over all treatments, the means
(and standard deviations in parentheses) of the equity share are 0.37 (0.25) in
the SOEP sample and 0.46 (0.31) in the laboratory sample. The proportions of
respondents investing all, exactly half, or nothing in the risky asset are 0.03, 0.2
and 0.18 in the SOEP sample and 0.12, 0.05 and 0.09 in the laboratory sample.
A description of the beliefs about the fund’s return is more involved, since each
belief report consists of an entire histogram. A clear difference between the SOEP











Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D N
Overall 0.37 (0.25) 12.53 (20.59) 23.96 (16.54) 8.27 (17.84) 562
Age Bracket
<30 0.41 (0.27) 12.16 (16.06) 30.25 (16.07) 8.74 (16.64) 82
31-40 0.39 (0.22) 13.85 (15.73) 25.60 (17.13) 12.02 (16.54) 76
41-50 0.40 (0.23) 12.57 (24.70) 26.36 (16.75) 7.12 (18.65) 107
51-60 0.37 (0.26) 13.24 (21.86) 22.72 (16.46) 8.43 (19.41) 107
61-70 0.34 (0.26) 10.02 (19.63) 20.46 (15.88) 6.22 (17.27) 111
>70 0.32 (0.28) 14.13 (22.49) 19.19 (14.77) 8.36 (17.63) 79
Gender
female 0.35 (0.24) 9.72 (22.29) 25.60 (17.20) 7.86 (21.59) 271
male 0.39 (0.26) 15.14 (18.52) 22.43 (15.78) 8.65 (13.46) 291
Born in
West Germany 0.37 (0.26) 12.11 (20.97) 23.34 (15.60) 7.40 (17.38) 379
East Germany 0.34 (0.23) 12.87 (21.96) 22.47 (17.46) 7.75 (17.69) 116
abroad 0.42 (0.28) 14.95 (15.44) 29.74 (19.10) 14.66 (17.35) 54
Abitur
yes 0.37 (0.28) 10.74 (19.51) 26.70 (14.83) 6.40 (13.47) 122
no 0.37 (0.25) 13.02 (20.87) 23.20 (16.93) 8.78 (18.85) 440
University Education
yes 0.35 (0.28) 11.54 (21.78) 26.95 (15.40) 5.55 (16.46) 72
no 0.37 (0.25) 12.67 (20.42) 23.52 (16.67) 8.67 (18.01) 490
Employed
yes 0.39 (0.25) 13.64 (20.70) 24.38 (16.13) 8.98 (16.13) 297
no 0.35 (0.26) 11.27 (20.42) 23.49 (17.01) 7.47 (19.58) 265
Financially Literate
yes 0.36 (0.25) 14.13 (20.80) 24.02 (15.98) 8.08 (17.68) 283
no 0.38 (0.26) 11.05 (20.27) 24.00 (17.14) 8.47 (18.09) 277
Stock Owner
yes 0.45 (0.29) 12.79 (18.20) 22.66 (14.55) 8.95 (13.82) 107
no 0.35 (0.24) 12.50 (21.13) 24.29 (16.99) 8.11 (18.69) 454
“Financially Literate” is an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either “good” or “very good”
with financial matters. For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix 2.A8.
Table 2.2: Experimental Responses in the SOEP by subgroup
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and the lab is that the laboratory participants use more bins than the representa-
tive respondents.22 The median number of bins that contain at least one brick is
6 in the laboratory while it is only 3 in the SOEP where 28% of respondents use
only a single bin and a further 14% only use two bins.23
In the analysis below we repeatedly use summary statistics that we compute
from the reported histograms. To compute statistics like the expectation or the
standard deviation of returns from the underlying belief distribution we take the
8 points on the CDF, interpolate between them using a cubic spline and then
calculate the statistics numerically.24 Using these imputed distributions, we find
that the average of the SOEP respondents’ mean expected return of the fund
is 12.5% and the average standard deviation of the fund’s return distribution is
24.0%. For the laboratory sample, the average mean belief about the fund’s return
is 11.6% and the average standard deviation is 35.6%.
As described in the previous section, we also elicited scalar belief reports by
asking for the “expected” fund return. In the SOEP sample, this variable has a
mean of 8.3% and a standard deviation of 17.8%. In the laboratory sample, the
mean is 11.0% and the standard deviation is 19.1%. Stated expectations are highly
correlated with expectations inferred from belief distributions (Pearson correlation
coefficient: 0.5 for the SOEP and 0.31 for the lab sample). Table 2.2 collects key
descriptives for the main experimental variables for different subgroups of the
SOEP sample (a similar table for the lab sample is omitted because the student
population is very demographically homogeneous).
We now investigate the extent to which equity share and beliefs are correlated.
Figure 2.1 contains a scatter plot of equity shares and the belief measures for both
the SOEP and the lab sample. The figure shows pronounced positive relationships
between belief and investment overall. At the mean of the data an increase in the
expected return by one percentage point is associated with a one third percentage
point increase in the equity share (see Table 2.A3 in the Appendix for OLS re-
22Appendix 2.A6 contains examples of the raw data of elicited histograms from both samples.
23Relative to comparable studies that use similar methods, the mentioned frequencies are on
the low side. Delavande and Rohwedder (2008) report that 73% of their subjects used two or
fewer bins.
24 This method is due to Bellemare, Bissonnette, and Kröger (2012). A more detailed description
of the interpolation procedure can be found in Appendix 2.A7.
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gressions). This relationship holds for both our belief measures and is roughly the
same in the laboratory. This evidence of a positive association between beliefs and
investments is consistent with many studies in the belief elicitation literature (see,
for example, Naef and Schupp (2009) and Costa-Gomes, Huck, and Weizsäcker























































Overlapping observations are aggregated, with the dot’s size being proportional to the number of observations thus aggregated.
Model fit comes from a polynomial regression in which investments are a cubic function of expected return (Models 2, 5, 8 and 10
in Table 2.A3 in the Appendix, which also contains alternative specification that e.g. control for personal characteristics but all
show results that are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.). 95% confidence interval in light gray.
Figure 2.1: Equity Share and Beliefs
Notice that the data also show patterns that are hard to square with the predic-
tions of the standard model. As in Merkle and Weber (2014) there is a substantial
fraction of participants who expect a negative excess return for the experimental
asset and yet invest positive amounts. But altogether, the statistical connection
between belief data and investment decisions can be regarded as supporting the
basic implication of the standard portfolio choice model: higher expected returns





1st 2nd 3th 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Household Income 7% 7% 3% 21% 14% 17% 20% 19% 26% 46%
Liquid Wealth 0% 2% 2% 2% 5% 13% 11% 39% 43% 56%
Table 2.3: Stock-market participation rate by income and wealth deciles
2.3 External validity: Stock market participation
We now turn to the important question whether our response variables are in-
dicative of real-life investments. Specifically, we test the external validity of our
data by comparing elicited behavior in the experiment with survey responses to the
question “Do you own any stock market mutual funds, stocks or reverse convertible
bonds (“Aktienanleihen”)?”
18% of all households answered this question in the affirmative, which is in
line with other evidence on the German stock market participation.25 Splitting
the participation rate by deciles of both household income and a proxy for liquid
wealth26 Table 2.3 also shows that stock market participation increases in both
variables but stays well below 100%.
Figure 2.2 displays a correlogram, a visualization of the correlation matrix for
several survey and experimental variables. Starting from the vertical, positive
correlations are displayed as wedges that are shaded clockwise while negative cor-
relations are shaded counter-clockwise. The higher the correlation, the larger the
wedge and the darker the shade of the wedge.
The correlogram shows that only a handful of variables are reliable predictors of
stock market participation. Most of the significant correlations have been observed
in the previous literature. For example, household size is known to be a significant
25Most other surveys provide numbers only for the percentage of individuals who hold stocks.
In our data this percentage stands at 15.4% (S.E.: 1.1%) while a 2012 survey by Deutsches
Aktieninstitut (2012) puts it at 13.7%.
26 The SOEP question about interest earned on investments over the previous year is answered
by far more people than more detailed questions about the amounts of wealth held in the form
of various assets. We therefore use this variable as a proxy for liquid wealth. The alternative
measure, the sum over all asset classes, yields broadly similar results. For details on these


















The correlogram above visualizes the pairwise (Pearson) correlation coefficients of the variables.
E(DAX) is the imputed expected return on the DAX going forward while SD(DAX) is the imputed standard deviation of the
reported return distribution. P(DAX>0) is the reported probability that the DAX will make a gain over the next year.
Figure 2.2: Correlogram
correlate of stock market holdings. Likewise, household income and Abitur—the
highest form of secondary education in Germany and the only form that grants
access to the university system—are well-known and entirely unsurprising predic-
tors of stock ownership. Notice that equity share is the only experimental variable
that has predictive power for stock holdings (correlation: 0.14, p-value: < 0.001).
Of course, the correlograms only show bivariate relations. In order to gain
a broader picture we investigate whether the correlations change if we control
for other variables.27 We find that equity share has explanatory power over and
27 This is similar to the approach taken by Guiso et al. (2008) who study the co-variation of stock
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above the other variables, see Table 2.4. Even after including all relevant controls,
which drives up the R2 to around 30%, the coefficient for equity share remains
both economically important and statistically significant and is robust to differ-
ent specifications. Back-of-the-envelope calculations yield the result mentioned in
the introduction, that an increase in equity share by one standard deviation is
associated with an increase in stock market participation of six percentage points.
The fact that equity share helps to explain stock holdings even if we control for all
other variables that are known to be good predictors of stock market participation
is important for two reasons. First, it establishes external validity. Investment
behavior in the experiment is strongly related to investment behavior outside of the
experiment. Second, the result gives hope that the simple experimental portfolio
choice problem can be used as a wind tunnel: it allows the controlled manipulation
of a behavioral variable that has a close connection to stock market particpation,
both in terms of economic theory and in terms of empirical correlation. Hence,
there is hope that interventions, for example, to encourage stock ownership, could
be pre-tested in laboratory or artefactual field experiments such as ours.
market participation with generalized trust and other variables.
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Dependent variable: Stock Market Participant
(1) (2) (3)












University Degree 0.049 −0.003
(0.078) (0.072)
Household Size 0.039∗∗ −0.004
(0.019) (0.022)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.020 0.034
(0.037) (0.035)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.008 0.058
(0.044) (0.043)
Imputed expectation of DAX 0.001 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Imputed S.D. of DAX −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Gain Probability of DAX −0.003 0.039
(0.088) (0.085)




Financially Literate 0.140∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.031)
Interest: < 250 Euros 0.061∗
(0.033)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.270∗∗∗
(0.057)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.430∗∗∗
(0.086)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.310∗∗∗
(0.110)
Interest: refused to answer 0.150
(0.100)
Household Income (missing=0) 0.023
(0.018)
Household Income: missing 0.210∗∗
(0.084)
Constant 0.110∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.130
(0.029) (0.140) (0.140)
N 561 560 560
R2 0.021 0.150 0.280
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.130 0.250
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Household income is in thousands of Euros
Household income is set to zero where missing (48 cases). Moreover, a dummy variable is added to the regression which is 1 for
the observations with missing household income.
Table 2.4: Predicting real-world stock-market participation
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2.4 Treatment effects
Recall that we implement five exogenous treatments that shift the historical return
of the DAX. The shifts are sizable, ranging from -10 percentage points to +10
percentage points. Table 2.5 documents that by and large there is, surprisingly,
no effect of the return shifter on equity share in the SOEP sample. The lack of
response can hardly be explained by small incentives. In terms of the nominal
framing of the e50,000 investment, the difference in returns between Treatments
-10 and 10 amounts to a difference in returns of up to e10,000. In terms of the real
monetary value of the experimental investment, the variation in return amounts to
a difference of up to e5. This difference is large enough for the typical participant
in an experiment (even in representative samples) to react. The overall lack of
response therefore suggests that many respondents find it difficult to incorporate
the shift appropriately in their investment choice.
However, this result is not universal. Instead we notice an important difference
between the SOEP and the laboratory sample. While SOEP participants appear to
ignore the shifter on average, there is a strong and statistically significant reaction
of investments to the treatment in the laboratory. There, the equity share rises
from 0.30 to 0.63 in response to improving the return of the fund by 20 percentage
points.
Similar results hold for those parts of the SOEP sample that are plausibly more
financially savvy, those who are more educated, those who have more liquid assets
(or refuse to answer the question about how much interest they obtain from liq-
uid assets) and those who answer the standard financial literacy question about
compound interest correctly. Hence, it appears that the main difference between
SOEP and lab is driven by selection on educational covariates and wealth.28
The beliefs about the fund’s return, however, do not respond to the shifter in
the way they should, no matter what measure of beliefs we use and no matter
whether we consider the SOEP data or the laboratory data and no matter how
we slice the data. While there is a statistically significant effect in the laboratory
sample, it is much smaller than the 20 percentage points predicted by probabilistic
28 For details of differences between subsamples, see Appendix 2.A3.
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Setting Variable -10 -5 0 5 10 ANOVA Kruskall-Wallis
SOEP Equity Share 0.40 (0.02) 0.34 (0.02) 0.32 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.39 (0.02) 0.106 0.135
Imputed Beliefs 13.14 (1.97) 10.58 (1.81) 9.38 (1.85) 14.48 (1.83) 14.45 (2.18) 0.232 0.326
Stated Beliefs 8.55 (1.71) 7.68 (1.70) 6.60 (1.98) 9.28 (1.43) 8.93 (1.66) 0.810 0.990
Probability of a Gain 0.68 (0.03) 0.67 (0.03) 0.67 (0.03) 0.74 (0.02) 0.69 (0.03) 0.323 0.313
Lab Equity Share 0.30 (0.03) 0.63 (0.03) 0.000 0.000
Imputed Beliefs 10.05 (1.71) 13.37 (1.57) 0.156 0.016
Stated Beliefs 9.87 (2.28) 12.30 (1.38) 0.374 0.004
Probability of a Gain 0.59 (0.02) 0.65 (0.01) 0.029 0.009
Table 2.5: Mean levels by treatment
sophistication, and there is no effect at all in the SOEP sample. In both samples
and regardless of whether we consider imputed beliefs or stated beliefs, we can
strongly reject the rational prediction that the shifter moves the mean of beliefs
one-to-one.
We tentatively conclude from this evidence that it is much harder to manipulate
beliefs than to elicit them. As we show in Appendix 2.A1 subjects’ beliefs about
past DAX returns are surprisingly accurate. Within each of the seven histogram
bins, the population-average belief of DAX returns falling in the bin is within just
few percentage points of the historical frequency. But just like the investments,
the beliefs do not react strongly enough to the experimental manipulation. This
also raises the question how well the respondents understand the manipulation,
despite our long and intense efforts for clarity in the instructions. The next section
investigates the possibility that the weak reaction to the manipuation may be
driven by factors beyond the understanding of the experimental instructions.
2.5 Asset Complexity and Reactions to Changes in
Incentives
In this section we investigate the role of complexity with an additional laboratory
experiment. We introduce manipulations of both the risky asset and the safe
asset that are economically equivalent and described in identical terms. Yet, the
experiment shows that the reaction to an increase in the risky asset’s return is
weaker than the reaction to an increase in the safe asset’s return. This effect is
largely consistent with the available evidence on reactions to tax incentives as,
e.g., in Chetty et al. (2009) and Abeler and Jäger (2015).
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In the additional experiment, the excess return of the risky asset is varied in
two ways: either a shift of ∆ in the risky asset’s return, or a shift of −∆ in the
safe asset’s return. To make the two shifts economically equivalent, we modify
the decision maker’s exogenous income level, as detailed in the next subsection.
However, before proceeding to the details, two remarks are in order: First, we
designed this section’s experiment after we observed the results from the exper-
iments described in Section 2.1.2—hence the separate presentation. Second, the
fact that we could run the complexity experiment only in a laboratory format also
means that we cannot investigate the present research question for the subsamples
that show the weakest reaction to incentive shifts. We suspect, but have no proof,
that these subsamples would exhibit even larger differences in their reactions to
different shifts.
2.5.1 Experimental Design
The design follows the same format as the paper’s main experiment, implementing
the standard portfolio choice problem. In the new experiment (i) each participant
makes eight investment decisions, allowing a within-subject analysis, and (ii) each
participant receives a task-specific fixed income in addition to the earnings from
the portfolio choice.
The participants are endowed with an illiquid asset that generates the fixed
income WI , and with liquid wealth WL that they can allocate among a safe asset
and a risky asset. The risky asset pays a rate of return r whereas the safe asset
pays a rate of return rf .
Now consider an increase in the risky return r by an amount ∆, analogous to
the exogenous return manipulation of the paper’s main experiment. Under this
manipulation, a decision maker who invests α in the risky asset earns a random
payoff given by:
π(α) = αWL(1 + r +∆) + (1− α)WL(1 + rf ) +WI
For a framing variation of this manipulation by ∆, we can alternatively induce
a simultaneous shift in rf by amount −∆ and in WI by amount ∆WL, yielding
the same payoff from investing a share α in the risky asset:
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π(α) = αWL(1 + r) + (1− α)WL(1 + rf −∆) + (WI +∆WL)
From the fact that π(α) is identical between both treatments and for all α,
we conclude that the same risks are available between the two manipulations.
Consequently, expected utility theory, and any other theory that employs a stable
mapping from a constant set of uncertainty states into the risky asset’s return
rate, predict an identical choice by the decision maker. The same statement is
true if both the safe and the risky assets’ returns are additionally shifted by a
constant amount ∆′. The experiment’s null hypothesis is thus that participants
react equally between the equivalent manipulations of incentives applying to the
safe asset or the risky asset.
To ensure that the results are not driven by an asymmetry between positive
shifts and negative shifts, we formulate the entire experiment such that only pos-
itive shifts occur. This is achieved by adding an appropriate return shift ∆′ to
both assets.29 The parameters for the eight choice problems are displayed in Ta-
ble 2.7. The collection of equivalent variations is the following: Problems 1 and 3
are economically equivalent, Problems 2 and 4 are economically equivalent, Prob-
lems 5 and 7 are economically equivalent, and Problems 6 and 8 are economically
equivalent. Problems 1 and 2 differ only in the risky asset’s return; Problems 3
and 4 differ in the shifter applied to the riskless asset (and a compensatory change
in the illiquid endowment), in the described way. But the difference in incentives
is the same between 1 and 2 as between 3 and 4. Thus, expected utility and most
of its generalizations predict that the difference in investments is identical. Analo-
gously, the difference between 5 and 6 is predicted to be identical to the difference
in investments between 7 and 8. As described above, our main hypothesis in this
experiment is that shifts in safe return generate a stronger reaction: investments
29We also ran three pilot sessions but do not use the data gathered in these sessions here. In
the first pilot session subjects were presented with both “bonuses” and “fees” on the two assets
and displayed aversive reactions to any asset to which a fee was applied. Since the effect of
gain/loss framing was not the subject of this study we therefore ran two sessions with bonuses
only but found that up to 42% of subjects chose investments at the lower boundary of the
budget set. Since this much truncation presents problems both in terms of power and in terms
of the distributional assumptions one is required to make to deal with it, we therefore changed
the magnitude of the bonuses to arrive at the valued reported here, values that yield much
fewer truncated responses. Note, however, that the responses in all pilots were also indicative










1 9.00 5.90 16000 50000
2 2.65 5.90 16000 50000
3 5.90 2.80 17550 50000
4 5.90 9.15 14375 50000
5 9.10 6.05 14275 50000
6 3.10 6.05 17275 50000
7 6.05 3.00 15800 50000
8 6.05 9.00 15800 50000
Table 2.7: Treatment parameters
may differ more between 3 and 4 than between 1 and 2, and more between 7 and
8 than between 5 and 6.
76 participants were recruited into 4 experimental sessions at WZB-TU Berlin
laboratory in the spring of 2014, using identical procedures as in the study de-
scribed in Section 2.1.2. Similar to the first lab study we take a fixed-interest
German government bond (here, yielding 2 % per annum) as the safe asset and
the return on the DAX in a year randomly drawn from 1951 to 2010 as the risky
asset. Treatments were presented in random order so as to avoid confounds from
learning or contrast effects. One of the eight tasks was randomly selected and paid
out at the end of the experiment, ensuring incentive compatibility for each task.
2.5.2 Results
Figure 2.3 displays the differences in average equity shares (the percentage of the
liquid endowment invested in the risky asset) for each of the four treatment pairs.
A weaker reaction to changes in the risky asset return is immediately visible.
Treatments 1 and 2 vary the risky asset return by 6.35 percentage points while
holding the riskless asset return constant. This causes a change in mean equity
share from 0.28 when the bonus on the risky asset is 2.65 percentage points to 0.62
when the bonus on the risky asset is 9 percentage points for a difference of 0.34.































Error bars show 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 2.3: Investments in the risky asset by treatment
change in the equity share. While the mean equity share in treatment 3 is 0.61,
almost identical to that in treatment 1, the mean equity share in treatment 4 is
0.21, lower than that in treatment 2. This yields a difference of 0.4. The same
pattern of responses hold analogously for treatments 5 to 8.30
Given the comparatively small sample size, each of these mean responses is sub-
ject to considerable sampling error. In order to formally test our main hypothesis
we therefore pool the data from all treatments. We compute the difference in
differences for treatments 1 to 4 and add to this the difference in differences for
treatments 5 to 8. Under the null of rational, equal-sized responses to changes in
either the risky and riskless asset returns this sum should be zero. Instead, we find
it to be 0.10, positive and statistically significantly so (two-sided Wilcoxon rank
sum test p-value = 0.03, two-sided t-test p-value = 0.09).31
30A graph of the raw responses is available in Appendix 2.A10.
31Over all treatments about 11% of responses are truncated below at zero. The percentage of
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2.6 Conclusion
The paper at hand describes a simple portfolio choice problem with one safe and
one risky asset, implemented in an artefactual field experiment for a representa-
tive population sample in Germany. The data from this experiment exhibit high
degrees of external validity as shown through direct comparison of behavior inside
and outside the experiment. This may be viewed as a success for the standard
portfolio choice model. Despite its extreme reductionism it captures important
real-life tradeoffs in financial markets.
The analysis also shows that the degree of external validity varies between dif-
ferent subgroups. External validity is stronger for skilled and savvy subjects. We
also observe that only these savvier subgroups of subjects respond in a meaningful
way to changes in incentives, highlighting, once again, the important role of cogni-
tive ability for even the simplest financial decision problems (Benjamin, Brown, &
Shapiro, 2013). In our setting less educated subjects forgo substantial additional
earnings by not responding to exogenous shifts in investment incentives. Related
to previous studies on financial literacy (e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) on re-
tirement savings, Gerardi, Goette, and Meier (2013) on mortgage foreclosure and
von Gaudecker (2015) on portfolio diversification), this difference addresses the
possibility of distributional effects that arise from cognitive differences. Similar
interventions to foster investments in real life (such as tax subsidies for equity
holdings) could have similar undesired effects.
In a separate experiment, we also find evidence that asset complexity is a fac-
tor in this under-reaction to incentives. Even university students, who compare
favorably with the general population on proxies for cognitive ability, react more
strongly to shifts in the return of an asset with a constant return than to shifts in
an asset with a stochastic return when both shifts are economically equivalent. To
our knowledge, this is a phenomenon that has not yet been documented in the liter-
ature on financial literacy, with the exception of the related effects in Chetty et al.
(2009) and Abeler and Jäger (2015). This phenomenon—performance in addition
truncated responses is higher in treatments 4 and 8 than it is in treatments 2 and 6. The
truncation therefore potentially obscures larger differences between treatments 3 and 4, and 7
and 8, and biases the differences the test statistic towards zero.
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can be depend on the nature of the variable to which a number is added—raises
questions for the psychology of arithmetic (Ashcraft, 1992) and has potentially nu-
merous applications in the realm of economic decision making under uncertainty.
For future research, our study may inform the design of further wind tunnels
for interventions regarding financial investment of households. In particular, in
the light of the current underfunding of many pension systems (both pay as you
go and capital funded), greater stock market participation by the middle class
appears desirable to many economists and policy makers. Testing interventions in
artefactual field experiments such as ours might avoid costly mistakes.
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Historical benchmark for each treatment indicated by black horizontal lines.
Figure 2.A1: Historical distribution of returns vs. the average distributions in Lab and
SOEP
Figure 2.A1 compares the respondents’ beliefs about the fund’s return with the
true historical distribution of DAX returns. The figure shows, in different shades of
gray and ordered from left to right within each bin, the five different distributions
of beliefs for the five different treatments. The figure also compares these distri-
butions with five corresponding true distributions, indicated by black horizontal
lines for each bin and treatment, that result from the true historical distribution
plus the five shifters (in the same order, that is, from -10 to the very left to +10
to the very right, within each bin). The figure shows that SOEP respondents are
remarkably well calibrated. In none of the seven bins are respondents off by more
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than 5 percentage points when data are pooled across treatments. The largest two
deviations are that the frequency of small losses between 0 and 30% is slightly
underestimated and the frequency of larger losses is slightly overestimated. The
good calibration can also be seen in other metrics. While the mean return on the
DAX from 1951 to 2010 was 15.5%, both the imputed and the stated expected re-
turn on the experimental asset of 12.5% and 8.3% respectively—while lower—are
at least similar in magnitude to the historical mean. Moreover, while the relative
frequency of a positive return over these six decades was 70.0%, SOEP respondents
thought the DAX had seen a gain 69.3% of the time.32 In contrast, the average
distribution of our student subjects in the lab (also shown in Figure 2.A1) differs
significantly from the historical benchmark in that too much probability mass is
assumed to be in the tails of the distribution.
Underneath the excellent calibration of the average SOEP respondent’s belief
lies, however, substantial heterogeneity in beliefs and miscalibration at the indi-
vidual level. Very few of the distributions provided by individual respondents are
close to the historical benchmark, and what produces the excellent calibration in
the aggregate is a mixture of respondents who put the entire probability mass into
a single bin and respondents who report diffuse distributions.
That the return expectations we elicit show such remarkable calibration stands
in contrast to evidence from other countries, where substantial miscalibration is
commonly observed. For the US Kézdi and Willis (2009) report that HRS re-
spondents expected a stock market gain with roughly 50% probability in the 2002,
2004 and 2006 waves while the historical frequency of a gain on the Dow Jones
was 68%. Similarly, the probability of a gain larger than 10% was estimated at
39% but the corresponding frequency was 49%. Dominitz and Manski (2011) find
similar numbers in the monthly surveys of the Michigan Survey of Consumers from
mid-2002 to mid-2004. In the Netherlands, Hurd et al. (2011) find that in 2004
the median expected rate of return on the Dutch stock market index was a mere
32 In order to predict whether subjects invest in the risky asset, a relevant question—under
expected utility, the only relevant question—is whether respondents expect a strictly positive
excess return, i.e. a mean return that exceeds 4%. Based on reported beliefs, the proportion
of respondents who expect a strictly positive excess return is 69.2% when using stated beliefs,
and 72.6% when using imputed beliefs. The historical frequency of the DAX returning strictly
more than 4% is 68.3%.
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Error bars are 95% confidence interval.
Figure 2.A2: Average distributions of past and future returns
0.3%, a severe underestimate of the historical median return of 14%. A downward
bias in expectations is by no means a universal finding, however. Respondents in
the 1999, 2000 and 2001 waves of the Survey of Economic Expectations reported
expectations for the S&P500 that were substantially above the historical average,
but also held the S&P500 to be more volatile than has been the case historically
(Dominitz & Manski, 2011).
What explains these differences with the existing literature? One possible expla-
nation is that the papers quoted above compare respondents’ expectations about
the future with returns realized in the past. A test for correct calibration in this
setting then amounts to a joint test of whether subjects hold the historical distri-
bution of returns to be identical to the distribution of returns in the future and,
if so, whether they have an accurate picture of the historical distribution. In con-
trast, we elicit beliefs about the distribution of returns over a well-defined period
of time in the past and can test for calibration without auxiliary assumptions.
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The beliefs that we elicit about the next 12 months look, however, fairly similar, if
somewhat more pessimistic – see Figure 2.A2. This may not be entirely surprising
as the survey period was just after the economic crises in parts of Europe had
reached their peak intensity. In contrast to expectations about the past, where
SOEP respondents and students differed substantially (with the former being more
realistic), we find virtually identical expectations about the future between the two
samples. The mean imputed return is 12.5% while the probability of a gain on the
DAX is thought to be 58.8% on average. 51.8% of subjects state that they expect
a return that is higher than 4%.
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2.A2 Equity Share and Beliefs – Regressions
Dependent Variable: Equity Share
SOEP: Stated Beliefs SOEP: Imputed Beliefs Lab: Stated Beliefs Lab: Imputed Beliefs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Imputed Expected Return 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Imputed Expected Return2 −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00001 −0.0001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001)
Imputed Expected Return3 −0.00000∗∗ −0.00000∗∗∗ −0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Imputed S.D. of Return 0.001
(0.001)
Probability of a Gain −0.010
(0.037)
Stated Expected Return 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002 0.006
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005)
Stated Expected Return2 −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.0001
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0002)
Stated Expected Return3 −0.00000 −0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Constant 0.330∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.410∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.110) (0.011) (0.013) (0.110) (0.028) (0.035) (0.030) (0.037)
Personal Controls No No No No No No No No No No
N 562 562 560 562 562 560 198 198 198 198
R2 0.074 0.093 0.160 0.081 0.090 0.140 0.031 0.063 0.016 0.038
Adjusted R2 0.072 0.088 0.120 0.080 0.085 0.100 0.026 0.048 0.011 0.023
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Personal controls include dummy variables for gender, being born in the former GDR, having Abitur, having a university education, being employed,
having a high self-assessed financial literacy, owning stocks and for each level of our wealth proxy. They also include age and age2, household size,
the number of children in the household and household income
All standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust
Figure 2.A3: Equity Share and Beliefs
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2.A3 Different results for different people
In this section we exploit the rich data set on the SOEP respondents in order
to study the role of socioeconomic background variables and direct measures or
plausible correlates of savviness. As described in Section 2.4, we find strong differ-
ences between the SOEP sample and the university student sample regarding the
extent to which they react to incentives. This raises the question of whether there
is other evidence that “smart”, financially savvy respondents react more strongly
to variations in incentives. The following analysis confirms the existence of such
differences.
We caution that our examination of heterogeneity in the SOEP sample is a “fish-
ing exercise”. However, its results are largely in line with what other studies have
documented before, namely the fundamental role of cognitive ability for financial
decisions making.
Table 2.A2 documents treatment effects on choices and beliefs for different sub-
groups. It shows that there are small subsamples of the population that do react
to incentives. For respondents with a university degree, the coefficients indicate an
increase in equity share of one percentage point per one percentage point increase
in return. Moving from the worst shifter of -10 to the best shifter of +10, the
equity share is predicted to increase by 20 percentage points. This is similar to
the effect we observe in the laboratory study with university students where the
equity share increases by 33 percentage points. Hence, it appears that the main
difference between SOEP and lab is driven by selection on educational covariates.
The results for respondents with different wealth levels are somewhat mixed. For
reasons one can only speculate about, the strongest treatment effect is observed for
those who withhold information on income from interest. There is also a notable
composition effect between the two largest categories: respondents with low but
positive levels of income from interest are predicted to increase their equity share
by 14 percentage points when we move from the worst to the best shifter. Those
without any interest earnings are estimated to exhibit a negative treatment effect.
Among the financial literacy questions we find a heterogeneous treatment effect
only for the compound interest question. The other variables that might capture
financial literacy do not show significant interactions with the experimental treat-
88
ment. While the results on financial literacy and wealth are a bit patchy, overall
a picture emerges that is familiar from the literature. Even relatively simple in-
vestment tasks as the one we have implemented here appear to be cognitively so
complex that sensible responses to variations in parameters are shown only by
skilled and sophisticated subjects.
An inspection of the two right-hand columns of Table 2.A2 reveals that when
it comes to belief manipulation no systematic patterns emerge. Only one of the
interactions is statistically significantly different from zero, but only marginally so.
Given that we can identify some subgroups that react better to incentives, it is
not far-fetched to presume that we might also be able to detect a stronger external
validity of investment levels for these groups. With less noise in behavior inside
and presumably outside the laboratory, the measured correlations between the
experimental equity share and stock market participation may increase. Table 2.A1
shows the regression-based conditional correlates of stock market participation,
separately for different subgroups. Indeed it is the case that “smarter” subsamples
show stronger external validity.
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Stock Market Participant
All Abitur University Degree Financially Literate
Equity Share 0.200∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗ 0.480 0.230∗∗
(0.064) (0.180) (0.300) (0.110)
Female −0.029 −0.120 −0.230 −0.049
(0.030) (0.110) (0.150) (0.052)
Born in East Germany −0.044 −0.021 −0.160 −0.083
(0.033) (0.120) (0.190) (0.061)
Age 0.004 −0.028 −0.062 0.002
(0.006) (0.023) (0.044) (0.011)
Age2 −0.0001 0.0003 0.001 −0.00004
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0001)
Abitur 0.150∗∗ 0.240∗∗
(0.058) (0.100)
University Degree −0.003 −0.002 −0.041
(0.072) (0.097) (0.120)
Household Size −0.004 0.036 0.045 −0.020
(0.022) (0.087) (0.110) (0.035)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.034 −0.015 −0.0003 0.048
(0.035) (0.110) (0.140) (0.059)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.058 −0.002 0.098 0.058
(0.043) (0.160) (0.240) (0.064)
Imputed expectation of DAX 0.0003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003)
S.D. of DAX −0.001 −0.002 0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Gain Probability of DAX 0.039 −0.051 −0.330 0.062
(0.085) (0.310) (0.480) (0.160)
Number of Children in Household −0.057∗ −0.110 −0.180 −0.062
(0.030) (0.110) (0.150) (0.049)
Employed −0.024 0.033 0.022 −0.007
(0.037) (0.120) (0.210) (0.067)
Financially Literate 0.080∗∗∗ 0.170∗ 0.200
(0.031) (0.100) (0.150)
Interest: < 250 Euros 0.061∗ 0.047 −0.033 0.086
(0.033) (0.110) (0.170) (0.054)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.270∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 0.270 0.320∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.140) (0.220) (0.084)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.430∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.180) (0.240) (0.110)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.310∗∗∗ 0.150 0.013 0.560∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.170) (0.300) (0.170)
Interest: refused to answer 0.150 0.350 0.046 0.260
(0.100) (0.250) (0.360) (0.170)
Household Income (missing=0) 0.023 0.039 0.029 0.010
(0.018) (0.040) (0.059) (0.029)
Household Income: missing 0.210∗∗ 0.150 0.520 0.140
(0.084) (0.330) (0.560) (0.130)
Constant −0.130 0.580 1.400 −0.007
(0.140) (0.490) (0.910) (0.260)
N 560 122 72 283
R2 0.280 0.360 0.480 0.320
Adjusted R2 0.250 0.220 0.260 0.260
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Standard errors are Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust. Household income is set to zero where missing (48 cases). Moreover, a
dummy variable is added to the regression which is 1 for the observations with missing household income. “Financially Literate” is
an indicator variable which is 1 whenever the respondent states that he/she is either “good” or “very good” with financial matters.
For details on this and the other variables, see Appendix 2.A8.
Table 2.A1: Stock market participation by subgroups
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Equity Share Imputed Expectation of
Fund
Stated Expectation of Fund
Mean Treatment Effect Mean Treatment Effect Mean Treatment Effect
Education
< University Degree 0.373 (0.011) 0.000 (0.002) 12.646 (0.922) 0.107 (0.139) 8.649 (0.815) 0.076 (0.113)
University Degree 0.349 (0.033) 0.010∗∗ (0.004) 11.426 (2.619) 0.325 (0.353) 5.586 (2.039) -0.115 (0.300)
Interest from Wealth
0 0.368 (0.017) -0.005∗∗ (0.002) 13.265 (1.572) 0.110 (0.224) 9.012 (1.597) 0.086 (0.214)
< 250 Euros 0.360 (0.019) 0.007∗∗∗ (0.003) 10.576 (1.344) 0.320 (0.207) 7.759 (1.113) 0.076 (0.163)
250 - 1.000 Euros 0.344 (0.027) 0.001 (0.004) 18.231 (1.758) -0.123 (0.297) 9.618 (1.569) -0.247 (0.301)
1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.422 (0.048) -0.005 (0.007) 13.582 (3.266) 0.501 (0.518) 7.783 (1.846) 0.011 (0.204)
> 2.500 Euros 0.382 (0.054) 0.004 (0.007) 7.830 (8.722) -0.653 (1.246) 5.481 (3.307) 0.206 (0.246)
refused to answer 0.339 (0.073) 0.015∗∗ (0.007) 1.971 (8.978) 0.558 (1.030) 3.353 (3.572) 0.543 (0.351)
Financial Literacy: self-assessed
’good’ or ’very good’ 0.360 (0.015) 0.002 (0.002) 14.064 (1.231) 0.287 (0.180) 8.047 (1.059) 0.153 (0.153)
’a little’ or ’not at all’ 0.381 (0.016) -0.001 (0.002) 11.052 (1.227) -0.001 (0.183) 8.479 (1.091) -0.056 (0.147)
Financial Literacy: compound interest
correct 0.384 (0.014) 0.004∗ (0.002) 13.066 (1.157) 0.177 (0.178) 8.741 (0.865) 0.080 (0.117)
incorrect 0.349 (0.018) -0.003 (0.003) 11.381 (1.415) 0.119 (0.190) 7.701 (1.431) 0.004 (0.213)
don’t know 0.365 (0.059) -0.003 (0.006) 15.608 (3.751) -0.161 (0.547) 8.560 (4.725) 0.005 (0.533)
Financial Literacy: volatility
correct 0.400 (0.047) -0.005 (0.007) 21.056 (4.591) -0.415 (0.664) 14.726 (4.607) -0.763 (0.640)
incorrect 0.372 (0.012) 0.001 (0.002) 11.938 (0.906) 0.161 (0.134) 7.911 (0.755) 0.084 (0.102)
don’t know 0.301 (0.041) 0.003 (0.006) 11.234 (3.342) 0.556 (0.439) 4.944 (3.744) 0.980∗ (0.561)
Stock Owner
yes 0.448 (0.028) -0.002 (0.004) 12.828 (1.756) -0.054 (0.308) 9.280 (1.417) -0.439∗ (0.237)
no 0.353 (0.011) 0.002 (0.002) 12.483 (0.992) 0.185 (0.142) 8.099 (0.878) 0.157 (0.118)
The table shows the results of multivariate regressions in which, for each set of rows, the outcome variables in the columns are regressed on indicator variables for the different levels
of the row variables and a variable for the size of the shifter interacted with the different levels of the row variables. “Mean” and “Treatment Effect” therefore correspond to the
constants and slope coefficients in bivariate regressions of the column variables on each of the different levels of the row variables. Standard errors for OLS regressions are Huber-White
heteroskedasticity-robust.
Table 2.A2: Treatment effect by subgroups
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2.A4 Histogram Belief Elicitation Screen
Figure 2.A4: Belief elicitation screen
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2.A5 Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Female 700 0.480 0.500 0 1
Age 700 53.000 17.000 16 94
Born in Germany 700 0.860 0.350 0 1
Born in the GDR 700 0.200 0.400 0 1
Abitur 700 0.200 0.400 0 1
University degree 700 0.120 0.330 0 1
Employed 700 0.500 0.500 0 1
Household Size 700 2.300 1.200 1 8
Number of Children in Household 700 0.360 0.780 0 6
Monthly Household Income (in 1000s of Euros) 652 2.500 1.500 0.100 12.000
Risk Tolerance 700 4.900 2.500 0 10
Financial Literacy (self-assessed: ’good’ or ’very good’) 697 0.500 0.500 0 1
Financial Literacy (compound interest question correct) 690 0.580 0.490 0 1
Financial Literacy (volatility question correct) 690 0.840 0.370 0 1
Equity share (in experiment) 562 0.370 0.260 0.000 1.000
Imputed expectation of fund 562 13.000 21.000 −80.000 110.000
Stated expectation of fund 562 8.300 18.000 −80.000 95.000
Gain Probability of Fund 562 0.690 0.280 0.000 1.000
Imputed expectation of DAX 562 5.500 18.000 −60.000 90.000
Gain Probability of DAX 562 0.590 0.330 0.000 1.000
Total Liquid Assets 515 19.000 44.000 0.000 446.000
Stock Market Participation 693 0.180 0.390 0 1
Stocks (amount) 671 1,780.000 7,874.000 0 110,000
Stocks / Total Liquid Assets 452 0.066 0.190 0.000 1.000
Total Debt 666 17,174.000 54,514.000 0 800,000
N is the number of non-missing observations
Table 2.A3: Descriptive statistics for the 700 heads of household in SOEP sample
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Figure 2.A5: 24 randomly chosen belief distributions from both the SOEP and the lab
sample.
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2.A7 Imputation of Moments
To derive various summary statistics from the elicited belief distributions we fit
continuous distributions to the raw data and calculate the statistics from these
distributions.
While much of the existing literature fits parametric distributions we follow an
approach similar to Bellemare et al. (2012) and fit cubic interpolating splines using
an approach due to Forsythe, Malcolm, and Moler (1977). We first cumulate the
probabilities that respondents place within each of the seven bins. This yields
8 points on the cumulative distribution function from which the responses were
generated. We take these 8 points to be the knots of the spline (that is, we ignore
any rounding in the response and assume that the CDF at these points is known)
and interpolate between them with a piecewise cubic polynomial.
Since each of the 7 pieces is defined by four polynomial coefficients this is a
problem with 28 unknowns. The condition that the spline must go through each
of the 8 points gives 14 equations (one each for the end-points and two each
for the interior knots) and further assuming that the spline is twice continuously
differentiable at each of the knots yields 12 additional equations. What pins down
the spline are two boundary conditions, which are found by fitting exact cubics
through the four points closest to each boundary and imposing the third derivatives
of these cubics at the end-points on the spline.
What is problematic about using such a spline to impute a CDF is that nothing
in the procedure described above guarantees that the resulting spline is monotonic.
To overcome this problem we apply a filter to the spline that is due to Hyman
(1983). The filter relaxes some of the smoothness conditions enough to ensure
monotonicity.33
Figure 2.A6 demonstrates the fit for six representative respondents. Circles
show the raw cumulative probabilities to which both the Hyman-filtered cubic
splines as well as various alternative distributions are fitted. By construction the
splines are extremely close to the data in all cases – often much closer than any
of the parametric distributions that have been fit to the data by minimizing the
33 Both the Forsythe et al. construction of the spline as well as the Hyman filter are implemented
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Figure 2.A6: CDFs derived from the belief data using both spline interpolation and
parametric distributions fit via least squares
sum of squared deviations at the 8 points. The two distributions on the left are
single-peaked and have non-zero probability in several bins and for these cases all
of the methods yield roughly the same fit. The distributions in the middle have
mass only in a single or in two of the bins, which is a problem for the parametric
distributions because in such cases the fit can be improved ad infinitum by reducing
the variance of the distribution and thereby reducing the sum of squared deviations
at the 8 points. In the two cases on the right the distribution is multi-modal,
which naturally leads to terrible fit for the parametric distributions, all of which
are unimodal. The splines, in contrast make no such assumptions and therefore
fit even these cases rather well.
Finally, we calculate both the mean and the standard deviation from these
distributions numerically using adaptive Gauss-Kronrod quadrature.
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2.A8 Variable Description and Coding
The full data set contains 1146 respondents in 700 households. Since asset allo-
cation is commonly seen in the literature as the result of joint optimization of all
household members we narrow the sample to the 700 heads of household, which
we identify as the respondents who filled out the SOEP household questionnaire.
All demographics whose coding is detailed below are the demographics of this
household head.
Abitur
Germany has a multi-track educational system in which only students who gradu-
ate from high school with an “Abitur” diploma are automatically allowed to enroll
at university. In the SOEP respondents are asked directly for the highest sec-
ondary school degree they have obtained and our Abitur variable is coded mainly
according to the answer to this question. There is one special case, however, that
requires special attention. 59 respondents obtained their secondary education out-
side of Germany and a separate question gives too little information to be able to
map the secondary education they obtained into the German educational system
precisely. Of these subjects, 11 have university degrees, however; education for
which, had it been obtained in Germany, the Abitur would almost always be a
prerequisite. Since we are interested in the Abitur as a proxy for higher ability
and higher education and foreign respondents with university degrees plausibly
posses the same higher ability and higher education we recode these subjects as
having Abitur.
Born in East Germany
This indicator variable is 1 if the respondent was born in the German Democratic
Republic. It is 0 for respondents born in the Federal Republic of Germany, those




This variable is our main proxy for respondents’ liquid wealth holdings. Though
our survey module included detailed questions about more specific asset classes,
item non-response rates for the questions asking for the invested amounts were
fairly high. The household questionnaire also included the question “How large, all
in all, was your income from interest, dividend payments and capital gains in 2011”,
with six answer categories.34 For the econometric analysis we generate a variable
that uses information from both questions. We create a new category for subjects
who report that their capital income was precisely zero, sort all respondents who
gave exact answers into the six categories above and then merged the highest three
categories into a single category for capital incomes above e2500 to increase the
cell count (counts before the merge were 20 for the e2500 to e5000 category, 5 for
the e5000 to e10000 category and 5 for the more than e10000 category). Lastly,
we added a category for all subjects who refused to answer both questions.
Financial Literacy
We assess respondents’ financial literacy in two different ways. First, we ask people
to self-assess their financial literacy with the question:




• not at all
Second, we ask two questions that explicitly test respondents’ financial literacy:
“Suppose you have e100 in a savings account. You receive 20% on
this amount per year and leave the money in the account for 5 years.
34 In German: “Wie hoch waren, alles in allem, die Einnahmen aus Zinsen, Dividenden und
Gewinnen aus allen IhrenWertanlagen im Jahr 2011?”. Many respondents were either unwilling
or unable to provide a precise answer to this question. In a follow-up question they were
therefore asked to estimate the amount and choose between 6 categories: below e250, e250
to e1000, e1000 to e2500, e2500 to e5000, e5000 to e10000, more than e10000
35 In German: “Wie gut kennen Sie sich alles in allem in finanziellen Angelegenheiten aus? Gar
nicht, ein bisschen, gut oder sehr gut?”
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How much money will be in the account after these 5 years?”36.
• more than e200
• exactly e200
• less than e200
• don’t want to answer
“Which of the following types of investments has the largest fluctua-
tions in returns over time?”37.
• savings accounts
• fixed income securities
• stocks
• don’t want to answer
Liquid assets




3. call deposit accounts (“Tagesgeld”)
4. fixed deposits
5. covered bonds, municipal bonds, bank bonds, corporate bonds or sovereign
bonds
6. stock market mutual funds, stocks or reverse convertible bonds (“Aktienan-
leihen”)
7. real estate funds
8. bond and money market funds
9. other funds
10. other securities
For each of these types, respondents are first asked whether they own any assets of
that type at all and, if the question is answered affirmatively, about the size of the
36 In German: “Angenommen, Sie haben 100 eGuthaben auf Ihrem Sparkonto. Dieses Guthaben
wird mit 20% pro Jahr verzinst, und Sie lassen es 5 Jahre auf diesem Konto. Wie viel Guthaben
weist Ihr Sparkonto nach 5 Jahren auf?”
37 In German: “Was glauben Sie: Welche der folgenden Anlageformen zeigt im Laufe der Zeit die
höchsten Ertragsschwankungen? Sparbücher, festverzinsliche Wertpapiere oder Aktien?”
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asset holdings. Respondents are instructed to estimate this amount should they
be unable to provide an exact figure. We code a household as participating in the
stock market if the head of household answers the question about stock market
mutual funds, individual stocks and reverse convertible bonds with “yes”.
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2.A9 Predicting real-world stock-market participation –
alternative wealth measures and specifications
Dependent Variable: Stock Market Participant
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Probit marginal effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity Share 0.220∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.140∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.068) (0.064) (0.066) (0.076) (0.056)
Female −0.043 −0.029 −0.028 −0.028 −0.016
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.029)
Born in East Germany −0.058∗ −0.044 −0.032 −0.021 −0.079∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
Age 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.003
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age2 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.00004 −0.0001 0.000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000)
Abitur 0.200∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.120∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.058) (0.058) (0.065) (0.044)
University Degree 0.049 −0.003 0.013 −0.014 −0.021
(0.078) (0.072) (0.074) (0.083) (0.052)
Household Size 0.039∗∗ −0.004 0.003 0.013 0.003
(0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.028) (0.019)
Risk Tolerance: Low 0.020 0.034 0.033 0.020 0.017
(0.037) (0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.033)
Risk Tolerance: High 0.008 0.058 0.052 0.058 0.068
(0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.048) (0.042)
Imputed expectation of DAX 0.001 0.0003 0.0005 −0.0002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
S.D. of DAX −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗ −0.001 −0.002∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Gain Probability of DAX −0.003 0.039 0.035 0.096 0.003
(0.088) (0.085) (0.081) (0.096) (0.083)
Number of Children in Household −0.096∗∗∗ −0.057∗ −0.067∗∗ −0.072∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.031)
Employed −0.015 −0.024 −0.030 −0.006 −0.015
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.042) (0.039)
Financially Literate 0.140∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗ 0.071∗∗
(0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.036) (0.030)
Interest: < 250 Euros 0.061∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.046)
Interest: 250 - 1.000 Euros 0.270∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.047)
Interest: 1.000 - 2.500 Euros 0.430∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(0.086) (0.058)
Interest: > 2.500 Euros 0.310∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.069)
Interest: refused to answer 0.150 0.170∗
(0.100) (0.090)
Total Liquid Assets (missing=0) 0.011∗∗∗
(0.003)
Total Liquid Assets2 (missing=0) −0.0001∗∗
(0.00003)
Total Liquid Assets3 (missing=0) 0.00000
(0.00000)
Total Liquid Assets: missing 0.130∗∗∗
(0.040)
Household Income (missing=0) 0.023 0.032∗ 0.020∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.012)
Household Income: missing 0.210∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.084) (0.082) (0.069)
Total Liquid Assets 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003)
Total Liquid Assets2 −0.0001∗∗
(0.00003)




Constant 0.110∗∗∗ −0.130 −0.130 −0.100 −0.210
(0.029) (0.140) (0.140) (0.130) (0.140)
N 561 560 560 560 417 560
R2 0.021 0.150 0.280 0.290 0.310
∗p < .1; ∗∗p < .05; ∗∗∗p < .01
Income and Liquid assets are in thousands of Euros. Standard errors for OLS regressions are Huber-White
heteroskedasticity-robust. Standard errors for probit marginal effects are bootstrapped with 1000 replicates
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Point size is proportional to the number of overlapping observations.
Figure 2.A7: Raw Data in Complexity Experiment
3 Measuring Ambiguity Aversion: Experimental
Tests of Subjective Expected Utility
based on work with James Andreoni & Charles Sprenger
3.1 Introduction
Many of the most important economic decisions are made in environments in
which no appeal can be made to objective probabilities. In areas such as portfolio
allocation, healthcare and insurance coverage, the likelihood of decision-relevant
events is not externally “given” but must be judged by the decision maker herself.
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) provides an elegant representation of choice
in such contexts (Anscombe & Aumann, 1963; Savage, 1954). Under SEU, a
decision maker acts as if she maximizes the expectation of the utility outcomes
of her choice with the expectation governed by a coherent subjective probability
measure.1 The Savage development and critical contributions of the Anscombe
and Aumann (1963) framework have made SEU a benchmark model of choice
throughout economics.
Subjective Expected Utility came under scrutiny from its origination.2 Notably,
the Ellsberg (1961) urn paradoxes drew attention sharply towards potential SEU
violations.
Ellsberg’s two color problem presents two urns,
1 That is, the subjective probability of each event is in the interval [0, 1], the probability of
the union of disjoint event is the sum of their probabilities, and the entire state space has
probability 1
2 Interestingly, for decision-making with objective probabilities, the famous Allais (1953) para-
doxes were distributed at the same conference as Savage’s presentation of the Sure-Thing




• Urn A: 100 red and black balls in unknown proportion
• Urn K: 50 red balls and 50 black balls,
and requests consideration of the following four choices:
1. Bet red A or Bet black A
2. Bet red K or Bet black K
3. Bet red K or Bet red A
4. Bet black K or Bet black A.
A bet on Urn A is a bet on a subjective event, while a bet on Urn K is a bet on
an objective event. A likely choice pattern is indifference in (1) and (2), and strict
preference for bets on Urn K in (3) and (4). This violates SEU as there exists no
probability measure which can rationalize choice.3 Originally stated as a thought
experiment the Ellsberg two color problem, and variants thereof, have since been
demonstrated in laboratory experiments (see Camerer & Weber, 1992, for a sur-
vey of the early experimental evidence). Subjective Expected Utility requires a
consistency of behavior across subjective event bets that is clearly violated in the
data.
Important theoretical contributions have sought to relax the requirement of
consistent subjective probabilities. One clarifying development is presented by
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) who consider decision makers who, when faced with
ambiguity, behave as if they did not attribute a single probability measure to an
event, but rather consider a set of probabilities and maximize expected utility
with respect to the least favorable probability measure from the set. Such a “max-
min" decisionmaker can easily display the inconsistency shown in the two color
problem. At the most extreme, the decisionmaker is permitted to entertain the
pessimistic notions that all the balls in Urn A are black when choosing between
the bets in (3) and that all balls in Urn A are red when choosing between the bets
in (4). Additional models have been developed with more nuanced objectives of
3Under SEU a decision maker strictly prefers a bet on red from Urn K to a bet on red from
Urn A iff he believes the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn K to be higher than the
probability of drawing a red ball from Urn A. He prefers a bet on black from Urn K to a bet
on black from Urn A iff he believes the probability of drawing a black ball from Urn K to be
higher than the probability of drawing a black ball from Urn A. Since drawing a red ball and
drawing a black ball are complementary events, by additivity and unitarity their probabilities
must add to one and so the latter implies that the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn
K must be lower than the probability of drawing a red ball from Urn A, which contradicts the
belief that rationalizes the first choice.
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describing decisionmaking under ambiguity, chief among them the smooth model
of Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005).
Our objective in the present study is to return to the consistency requirements of
the SEU model in order to develop deeper insights into individual decisionmaking
and potentially provide identification of competing non-SEU models. In addition
to consistency à l’Ellsberg between two subjective events, Subjective-Subjective
Consistency, we consider Subjective-Objective Consistency. Subjective-Objective
Consistency states that when considering mixtures between subjective and objec-
tive bets, a decisionmaker must also behave as if a single probability measure gov-
erned her choice.4 The distinction between Subjective-Subjective Consistency and
Subjective-Objective Consistency is important for two reasons. First, of the two
popularized non-SEU models we discuss, both deliver Subjective-Subjective incon-
sistencies while only that of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) maintains Subjective-
Objective Consistency. Hence investigating Subjective-Objective Consistency al-
lows for separation that a standard Ellsberg experiment cannot deliver. Second,
though Ellsberg style experiments are frequent in the literature, questions testing
Subjective-Objective Consistency have yet to be implemented experimentally.5
Particular forms of violations may lead to interesting insights on the structure of
decision making when subjective ambiguity can be replaced with objective uncer-
tainty.
We present a design predicated on testing Subjective-Subjective Consistency
and Subjective-Objective Consistency. Our design elicits precise valuations of sub-
jective, objective, and mixed subjective-objective bets through a series of binary
statements. For example, subjects state whether they prefer a draw from a jar con-
4 This consistency requirement is closely associated with what is known in the literature as the
Certainty Independence axiom. While Anscombe-Aumann Independence requires that prefer-
ences not depend on mixing the acts involved with any act, Certainty Independence requires
merely that preferences be invariant to mixing with constant (objective) acts. Certainty In-
dependence underlies a broad class of non-SEU models, most notably Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) and Schmeidler (1989). For a full characterization of the class that shares this ax-
iom, the class of invariant biseparable preferences, see Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci
(2004).
5An early literature moved suggestively in this direction by examining situations of partial
ambiguity where individuals were told some portion of the distribution from which outcomes
would be drawn. These experiments have been infrequent, with some of the treatments in
Becker and Brownson (1964), Curley and Yates (1985) and Hong, Bin, and Songfa (2013)
being leading examples.
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taining an ambiguous composition of 20 red and green marbles, wherein red pays
$10 and green pays $30, or a draw from a jar of known composition containing 20
yellow and black marbles, wherein yellow pays $0 and blacks pays $30. Variation in
the jar of known composition that induces a change in preference from the ambigu-
ous jar to the known jar provides a measure of valuation. Note this is effectively
the experimental implementation of the Schmeidler (1989) ‘risk equivalent’ and is
the natural extension to the subjective domain of eliciting a cardinal utility index
for an objective lottery.6 Comparing valuations for two complementary subjective
bets allows identification of Subjective-Subjective Consistency à l’Ellsberg.7 Mix-
tures of subjective and objective bets allow identification of Subjective-Objective
Consistency.8
In an experiment conducted with 133 subjects at the University of California,
San Diego, we document substantial deviations for both of our consistency no-
tions. 79% of subjects violate Subjective-Subjective Consistency largely in a man-
ner reminiscent of Ellsberg’s two-color problem. The mean data place valuations
of an ambiguous jar 10% below that of a known 50-50 jar regardless of payment
labels. Such behavior is rationalized in our data by estimates of beliefs indicating
subjects believe an ambiguous jar is composed of around 70% low-paying mar-
bles regardless of the color that pays the low outcome. Surprisingly, over 95% of
subjects violate Subjective-Objective Consistency. The mean behavior indicates
a “directed pessimism," consistent with subjects believing that an ambiguous jar
consists of around 90% low-paying marbles when mixing with a known high out-
come, while believing that the same ambiguous jar consists of only around 55%
low-paying marbles when mixing with a known low outcome. Interestingly, the
correlation between inconsistencies at the individual level is limited, suggesting
possible differentiation in individuals’ ambiguity attitudes and their treatment of
situations in which subjective ambiguity is replaced with objective uncertainty.
6A standard cardinal utility index constructed in proofs of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected
utility identifies the cardinal utility of a gamble as the mixture of the best and worst options
in the space of outcomes that yields indifference. See, for example, Varian (1992).
7 That is, we compare the valuations of ambiguous urns with either red pays $10, green pays
$30 or red pays $30, green pays $10 relative to a jar with known 50-50 composition.
8 For example, we examine the valuation of 10 ambiguous marbles and 10 red marbles with red
pays $10, green pays $30 to the valuation of 10 ambiguous marbles and 10 green marbles with
red pays $10, green pays $30. The operationalization is described in Section 3.3.
107
Our exploration of consistency yields several conclusions and insights for future
work. Our pattern of deviations is at odds with SEU as well as popularized non-
SEU models. Our data, however, give instruction as to what modeling constructs
may prove useful in capturing behavior. Potential suggestions include mixture
dependence for ambiguity attitude and explicit subjective bet considerations costs.
Naturally, however, a full elaboration and foundation for such constructs is outside
the scope of this work. Even without an articulated model, our findings may
prove useful for the investigation of other behaviors. We consider several potential
applications related to the newer finding of Subjective-Objective inconsistency.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents a conceptual framework
for our SEU consistency tests and briefly considers the predictions of alternative
models. Section 3.3 describes the design and procedures. Section 3.4 presents
results and Section 3.5 provides discussion and a conclusion.
3.2 Conceptual Framework
Our broad setting is that of Anscombe and Aumann (1963). There is a finite state
space, S, a set of consequences, X, a set of objective probability distributions
over these consequences, ∆(X), and a set of acts, F , functions which map S into
∆(X).9 Individuals carry preferences, ≿, over acts in F .
If preferences over acts satisfy axioms of completeness, transitivity, monotonic-
ity, independence, continuity and non-degeneracy, they can be represented by the





where p(s) refers to the subjective probability associated with state s ∈ S, ∫
S
p(s)ds =
1 and u(a(s)) is the (von Neumann-Morgenstern) expected utility of the lottery
that act a yields in state s.
9 This, rather than the original formulation by Savage (1954) in which states map directly
into consequences, has become the canonical choice domain on which models of choice under
uncertainty are formulated. Note that objective lotteries are primitives of the model allowing
one to describe “roulette” lotteries with probabilities objectively given and “horse race” lotteries
for which probabilities are wholly subjective.
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With this foundation, we introduce an Ellsberg style jar composed of red and
green marbles with the color of a drawn ball determining the state of the world.
Hence, the state space is binary, S = {red, green}. We establish the set of conse-
quences as X = {0, x, y} with 0 < x < y. We consider two simple subjective acts
that are complements:10
• f : yields y with probability 1 if s = red, yields x with probability 1 if
s = green.
• g: yields y with probability 1 if s = green, yields x with probability 1 if
s = red.
The act f represents a bet on the subjective event red, while the act g represents
a bet on the subjective event green.
In order to elaborate our consistency tests it will be helpful to introduce two
degenerate objective acts:11
• h: yields y with probability 1 if s = red, yields y with probability 1 if
s = green.
• l: yields x with probability 1 if s = red, yields x with probability 1 if
s = green.
These acts yield the high prize, y, with probability 1 in both states, or the low
prize, x, with probability 1 in both states.
Our consistency implications are constructed from these four acts. The develop-
ment is aided by recalling a key axiom used in the SEU construction, Independence.
Definition 1 (Independence). For any three acts a, b, c ∈ F and any α ∈ (0, 1)
a ≿ b⇐⇒ αa+ (1− α)c ≿ αb+ (1− α)c. (3.1)
Independence states that the preference between two acts should not change
when both acts are mixed with any other in equal proportion.12 Independence
helps ensure the SEU formulation is linear in subjective probabilities and that
10 By simple act we mean that the distribution overX, ∆(X), induced in each state is degenerate.
In the literature these are also known as “Savage acts.”
11 That is, the acts are governed by objective probabilities and induce the same degenerate
distribution over X in every state.
12Where mixtures are probabilistic mixtures which are performed state-wise. The mixture αa+
(1− α)c denotes an act, which yields the lotteries αa(s) + (1− α)c(s) in every state s.
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the probabilities indeed constitute a proper probability measure. Our consistency
implications build closely from the requirements of a coherent probability measure
and linearity in probabilities.
3.2.1 Subjective-Subjective Consistency
SEU implies the existence of coherent subjective probability measure between com-
plementary subjective acts. That is, for acts f and g a single subjective probability,
p˜green = 1 − p˜red, must rationalize the valuations for both f and g. Consider the




l, the acts corresponding to Ellsberg’s classic 2-color problem.
Under SEU these acts are associated with the expected utilities
USEU(f) = (1− p˜green) · u(y) + p˜green · u(x)










· u(y) + 1
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· u(x)
We present Subjective-Subjective Consistency as the restriction on the valua-




l. The term derives from the










SEU requires that the average valuation of the subjective acts f and g be equal




l. The implication is clear from noting
that 1
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· u(y) + 1
2
· u(x). Most Ellsberg
style experiments examine and reject an implication of this consistency require-





l. The majority of such experiments rely on binary choices or on
valuing acts via their certainty equivalents (one recent example using valuations
and arriving at the standard conclusion is Halevy (2007)), not on the actual utility




l makes clear the
inconsistency.
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From this consistency test it will be helpful to develop a measure of potential in-
consistencies. We define the premium placed on subjective acts over their objective










The SEU model predicts δS = 0. Note δS < 0 for individuals exhibiting the
standard pattern of ambiguity aversion and δS > 0 for individuals exhibiting the
opposite pattern of ambiguity seeking. In our experiment, the subjective premium
can be measured precisely, giving a clear sense of the size of potential violations.
3.2.2 Subjective-Objective Consistency
A second notion of consistency arises when considering the evaluation of a single
subjective act, say g, and altering the decision maker’s exposure to this act by
mixing with objective acts like h and l. This notion of consistency relies tightly
on linearity in mixture proportions.
Consider the subjective act g, with
USEU(g) = p˜green · u(y) + (1− p˜green) · u(x).
Combine g with h in proportion (α, 1− α) to arrive at
USEU(αg+(1−α)h) = α·(p˜green ·u(y)+(1−p˜green)·u(x))+(1−α)·(1·u(y)+0·u(x))
Combine g with l in proportion (α, 1− α) to arrive at
USEU(αg+(1−α)l) = α·(p˜green ·u(y)+(1−p˜green)·u(x))+(1−α)·(0·u(y)+1·u(x))
This yields two facts about mixtures of a single subjective act with objective acts.
First, the valuation of a mixture is linear in the mixture proportion α. Second,
the distance between USEU(αg+(1−α)l) and USEU(αg+(1−α)h) is independent
of the subjective probability, p˜green. That is, when mixing with high constants
or low constants an individual values the remaining subjective portion the same
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way. Hence, differences in valuations between mixtures must be independent of
subjective probabilities. To see this consider
USEU(αg + (1− α)h)− USEU(αg + (1− α)l) = (1− α)u(y)− (1− α)u(x)
= u(y)− (αu(y) + (1− α)u(x)),
which is identical to
USEU(αg + (1− α)h)− USEU(αg + (1− α)l) = USEU(h)− USEU(αh+ (1− α)l).
We state Subjective-Objective Consistency as the restrictions placed on the above
mixture valuations under SEU. The term derives from the fact that only a given
subjective act is considered and consistency is required for mixtures with objective
acts.
Subjective-Objective Consistency: For a given subjective act and α-proportion
mixtures with h and l, the difference in valuations is independent of subjective
probabilities.
USEU(αf + (1−α)h)−USEU(αf + (1−α)l) = USEU(h)−USEU(αh+ (1−α)l),
and
USEU(αg + (1− α)h)−USEU(αg + (1− α)l) = USEU(h)−USEU(αh+ (1− α)l).
From this second consistency implication it will be helpful to develop another
measure of potential inconsistencies. We define the Mixture Distances, δM(α, f)
and δM(α, g), as the difference in the distance between the valuations of subjective-
objective mixtures and the distance between corresponding purely objective mix-
ture valuations. For example,
δM(α, g) = [U(αg + (1− α)h)− U(αg + (1− α)l)]− [U(h)− U(αh+ (1− α)l)].13
Note the SEU model predicts δM(α, g) = 0 and δM(α, f) = 0 for all α. Impor-
tantly, a non-SEU decision maker who behaves as if a single probability governs
13 Correspondingly, δM (α, f) = [U(αf+(1−α)h)−U(αf+(1−α)l)]− [U(h)−U(αh+(1−α)l)].
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her behavior when facing a single subjective act will also exhibit δM(α, f) = 0 and
δM(α, g) = 0 for all α. Deviations from this benchmark can be delivered from non-
linearity in mixture proportions with the nature of the non-linearity determining
the direction of inconsistency. In our experiment, the mixture distance can be
measured precisely giving a clear sense of the size of potential violations.
The requirements of Subjective-Subjective Consistency and Subjective-Objective
Consistency both derive largely from SEU’s Independence assumption. The two
concepts, however, are differentiated by the observation that Subjective-Objective
Consistency may hold even when Subjective-Subjective Consistency fails. In the
following subsection we highlight the predictions of non-SEU models documenting
where and how each model delivers inconsistencies.
3.2.3 Alternative Theories
We focus our attention on two principal generalizations of SEU: Max-min Expected
Utility (MEU, Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989) and the smooth ambiguity model of
Klibanoff et al. (2005, KMM). We present these formulations and describe the
potential violations of the SEU consistency requirements that each can accommo-
date.
Max-min Expected Utility
MEU relaxes the Anscombe-Aumann Independence axiom for subjective acts, us-
ing instead
Definition 2 (Certainty Independence). For all f, g ∈ F , all lotteries r, and for
all α in [0, 1]
f ≿ g =⇒ αf + (1− α)r ≿ αg + (1− α)r. (3.2)
The MEU framework yields a representation in which the probability measure is
no longer unique, and decision makers behave as if they maximized expected utility
following the most pessimistic (minimal) of these measures. The MEU valuation







where P is a convex set of probability measures, minp(s)∈P selects the most pes-
simistic measure in the set, and everything else is as in SEU. Under our formulation,
the act f has valuation
UMEU(f) = min
p˜green∈P
(1− p˜green) · u(y) + p˜green · u(x).
The act g has valuation
UMEU(g) = min
p˜green∈P
p˜green · u(y) + (1− p˜green) · u(x).
This development helps to clarify which consistency implications will be violated
by MEU. First, for Subjective-Subjective Consistency, it is easy to see that δS = 0
may not hold. Instead, the valuations for the ambiguous acts, f and g, may both




l such that δS < 0. Consider the
convex set of probability measures P = [0, 1]. The minimal measure for act f has
p˜green = 1, yielding UMEU(f) = u(x). The minimal measure for act g is p˜green = 0,
yielding UMEU(g) = u(x). Hence, δS = 12 [u(x) + u(x)]− [12u(x) + 12u(y)] < 0.14
Second, for Subjective-Objective Consistency we recall the relaxed independence
axiom, Certainty Independence, used in the MEU formulation. Certainty Indepen-
dence states that independence holds for mixing subjective acts with objective acts.
While MEU allows decision makers to entertain different beliefs when considering
complementary subjective acts, it requires that unique beliefs be used to evaluate
mixtures of a single subjective act with objective acts. For example, the MEU
valuation of αf + (1− α)h is
UMEU(αf+(1−α)h) = min
p˜green∈P
[α(p˜green · u(y) + (1− p˜green) · u(x)) + (1− α)u(y)] ,
which is linear in α. Importantly, differences in valuations are, again, independent
of subjective probabilities, e.g., UMEU(αf + (1 − α)h) − UMEU(αf + (1 − α)l) =
14 The pattern UMEU (f), UMEU (g) < UMEU ( 12h +
1
2 l) is the only violation of Subjective-
Subjective Consistency MEU allows. Since minp(s)∈P ps + minp(s)∈P (1 − ps) ≤ 1 it does not
allow ambiguity seeking. This was one of the reasons for the development of its generalization,
α-maxmin (Ghirardato et al., 2004), in which expected utility is calculated with respect to a
convex combination of the worst-case and the best-case probability measure. The consistency
violations implied by MEU will be shared by the more general α-MEU model.
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1−UMEU(αh+(1−α)l). For a fixed subjective act, an MEU agent’s preferences over
mixtures with objective acts will be indistinguishable from those of an SEU agent.
Hence, Subjective-Objective Consistency will hold for MEU such that δM(α, f) = 0
and δM(α, g) = 0 for all α.
A model with similar consistency implications in our environment to MEU is
Choquet Expected Utility (CEU, Schmeidler, 1989). Like MEU, CEU departs
from Anscombe-Aumann by weakening the Independence axiom but does so in
a slightly different way. Instead of demanding invariance to mixing with all acts
(Independence) or objective acts (Certainty Independence), the theory’s central
axiom, termed Comonotonic Independence, demands invariance to mixtures with
comonotonic acts only.15 This yields a representation of the expected utility form
in which subjective probabilities over events (termed capacities) are no longer ad-
ditive.16 Capacities for complementary events, like f and g, that add to less than
or more than one deliver Subjective-Subjective inconsistencies.17 For Subjective-
Objective Consistency, we note that constant acts (including our simple objective
acts) are comonotonic with all acts, hence Comonotonic Independence implies Cer-
tainty Independence in the presence of the other axioms (see Gilboa & Marinacci,
2011). Consequently, like MEU, CEU delivers consistency for subjective-objective
mixtures.
Klibanoff et al. (2005) Smooth Ambiguity
Klibanoff et al. (2005, KMM for short) features a decision maker who has a proper
probability distribution over states but does not treat the expected utilities ob-




p(s) ϕ (u(a(s))) ds,
where u(a(s)) is the expected utility in state s and these expected utilities are
then aggregated over states by the utility aggregation function ϕ(·). First, for
15 Two acts a, b ∈ F are comonotonic if it is never the case that both a(s) ≻ a(s′) and b(s) ≺ b(s′)
for some states of the world s and s′
16 I.e. p(A ∪B) ̸= p(A) + p(B) for mutually exclusive events A and B
17 Indeed, when capacities sum to one, the SEU form is recovered.
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Subjective-Subjective Consistency, the model generates the inconsistencies of am-
biguity aversion, δS < 0, if ϕ(·) is strictly concave, the model generates the incon-
sistencies of ambiguity seeking, δS > 0, if ϕ(·) is strictly convex, and the model
collapses to SEU, δS = 0, if ϕ(·) is linear.18
For Subjective-Objective Consistency, KMM generates valuations for mixtures
between subjective and objective acts that are not in general linear in mixture
proportion.19 Further, differences in mixture valuations will not generally be in-
dependent of subjective probabilities.20 The shape of the aggregator function,
ϕ(·), determines whether δM(α, f) and δM(α, g) are greater than or less than
18 To illustrate the principle with a concave ϕ(·), assume for simplicity that the decision maker
believes with probability 12 that the ambiguous jar contains only green marbles and with











































where the inequality is a straight-forward consequence of the concavity of ϕ(·).
19 For simplicity, assume that the decision maker believes with probability p˜ that the unknown jar
contains only green marbles and with probability 1− p˜ that the jar contains only red marbles.
The act f would then be evaluated as








Then mixtures involving f and h, for example, are
UKMM (αf + (1− α)h) = p˜ϕ (α · u(y) + (1− α)u(y)) + (1− p˜)ϕ (α · u(x) + (1− α)u(y))
This form is linear in α only if ϕ(·) is linear, i.e. if the KMM agent is SEU.
20 Continuing the example where the decision maker believes with probability p˜ that the ambigu-
ous urn contains only green balls and with probability 1 − p˜ that the urn contains only red
balls.
UKMM (αf + (1− α)h) = p˜ϕ (α · u(y) + (1− α)u(y)) + (1− p˜)ϕ (α · u(x) + (1− α)u(y))
and
UKMM (αf + (1− α)l) = p˜ϕ (α · u(y) + (1− α)u(x)) + (1− p˜)ϕ (α · u(x) + (1− α)u(x)) .
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Table 3.1: Consistency Tests and Predictions
Model
Consistency Test SEU MEU KMM
ϕ(·) Concave ϕ(·) Convex
Subjective-Subjective
Consistency:
Yes No No No
δS = 0 δS < 0 δS < 0 δS > 0
Subjective-Objective
Consistency:
Yes Yes No No
δM(α, f) = 0 δM(α, f) = 0 δM(α, f) > 0 δM(α, f) < 0
δM(α, g) = 0 δM(α, g) = 0 δM(α, g) > 0 δM(α, g) < 0
zero. A concave (convex) ϕ(·) function yields δM(α, f), δM(α, g) greater (less)
than zero.21 Note that the shape of ϕ(·) determines the nature of inconsistencies
for both Subjective-Subjective and Subjective-Objective Consistency. If ϕ(·) is
concave, one predicts, δS < 0 and δM(α, f), δM(α, g) > 0, while if ϕ(·) is convex,
one predicts, δS > 0 and δM(α, f), δM(α, g) < 0.
Table 3.1 summarizes our developments from SEU, MEU, and KMM models,
providing both our definitions of consistency and evaluating the extent to which
each is respected by each model. Note that non-SEU models are potentially sep-
arable by investigating both Subjective-Subjective and Subjective-Objective Con-
sistency. While both MEU and KMM can rationalize ambiguity aversion, and so
Subjective-Subjective inconsistencies, MEU maintains consistency for subjective
objective mixtures. Epstein and Schneider (2010) provide an intuitive explanation
for this distinction between KMM and other non-SEU models. The main difference
between MEU and KMM is the kinds of mixtures that are valued by the decision
maker. MEU holds that only mixtures between complementary subjective acts are
Hence,
UKMM (αf + (1− α)h)− UKMM (αf + (1− α)l) =
p˜ϕ (α · u(y) + (1− α)u(y)) + (1− p˜)ϕ (α · u(x) + (1− α)u(y))−
p˜ϕ (α · u(y) + (1− α)u(x)) + (1− p˜)ϕ (α · u(x) + (1− α)u(x)) .
Note that the beliefs, p˜, do not cancel unless ϕ(·) is linear.
21 The proof, primarily graphical, is provided in Appendix 3.A1.
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valuable because only such mixtures reduce the dependence of payoffs on the state
of the world.22 In contrast, in KMM mixing between a subjective act and another
act can be valuable even if that act is objective. A KMM decision maker, in fact,
even values mixing a subjective act with its certainty equivalent.
The objective of our experimental study is to develop empirical analogues for
δS, δM(α, f), and δM(α, g). The next section describes our experimental environ-
ment and the operationalization of our consistency tests.
3.3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We experimentally test the consistency implications of Section 3.2 using a multiple
price list style design.23 Subjects make a series of binary choices between a poten-
tially subjective act, say f , yielding outcomes x and y > x, and a known objective
lottery yielding outcome y with probability q and outcome 0 with probability 1−q.
In each task, the probability q is varied from 0 to 1 in steps of 0.05. Hence, where
an individual switches from preferring the given act, f , to the objective lottery
yields interval information on the indifference condition
f ∼ qf · h+ (1− qf ) · 0,
and hence the valuation of the act.24
The decisions were introduced as a choice between drawing a marble from ‘Jar
A’ and drawing a marble from ‘Jar B’. Subjects were told “For each decision,
22As in the famous suggestion by Raiffa (1961) to simply flip a coin to decide which color from
the Ellsberg urn to bet on, a strategy which reduces all subjective ambiguity to objective
uncertainty
23 The closest designs to our own are found in decision-making under objective uncertainty and
were initially suggested in Farquhar’s (1984) survey of utility assessment methods. They were
implemented experimentally in one study of nine subjects using hypothetical monetary rewards
(McCord & de Neufville, 1986), a number of medical questionnaires (Bleichrodt, Abellan-
Perinan, Pinto-Prades, & Mendez-Martinez, 2007; Magat, Viscusi, & Huber, 1996; Oliver,
2005, 2007), and one incentivized experiment of decision-making under objective uncertainty.
For decision-making with subjective events Baillon and Bleichrodt (2011) implements a similar
method though with only two outcomes and refers to the task as “matching probabilities". Such
methods also have close relations to the binary lottery procedure that is used in the literature
on belief elicitation.
24A higher value of qf corresponds to a higher valuation.
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your task is to decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or draw a
marble from JAR B.”25 The contents of Jar A were potentially subjective while the
contents of Jar B were always fully objective. Hence, where an individual switched
from preferring to draw a marble from Jar A to preferring to draw from Jar B,
carries interval information on q in the indifference condition above.
Specific colors linked exclusively to the contents of each jar. Red, green and
white linked to the potentially subjective Jar A. Black and yellow linked to the
objective Jar B, with black marbles yielding the high outcome, y, and yellow
marbles yielding 0. Throughout the experiment the values x = $10 and y = $30
were maintained and each jar contained exactly 20 marbles. Figure 3.1 provides a





Eliciting valuations with lotteries in this manner has one key advantage over
preference rankings or certainty equivalents. Under SEU, the equivalent lottery
for f , qf , is a linear function of the subjective expected utility of the act. That is,
the equivalent lotteries preserve not just the ordinal ranking of expected utilities
but also its cardinal scale. Hence, when u(0) and u(y) are normalized to 0 and 1
respectively, qf = USEU(f). This stands in contrast to certainty equivalents which
are non-linear functions of expected utility for any non-linear utility function.
Under SEU we can directly use the elicited equivalent probabilities to calculate
subjective premia and mixture differences. We denote these empirical analogues
to our consistency measures by dS, dM(α, f) and dM(α, g).26
For MEU, under the normalization above, it is also the case that qf = UMEU(f),
such that valuations translate directly to consistency measures. However, under
KMM the relationship between utility and equivalent probabilities is confounded
by the shape of the utility aggregator, ϕ(·). Under the same normalization as
above UKMM(f) = ϕ(qf ) and so qf = ϕ−1(UKMM(f)). Though the implications










dM (α, g) = [qαg+(1−α)h − qαg+(1−α)l]− [1− qαh+(1−α)l],
and
dM (α, f) = [qαf+(1−α)h − qαf+(1−α)l]− [1− qαh+(1−α)l].


























10 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
Figure 3.1: Multiple price list for task 4: 12g +
1
2 l
for δS are maintained, since UKMM(f) is a concave function of α and ϕ−1(·) is
a convex function of its argument, the full set of implications for the mixture
differences δM(α, f) and δM(α, g) displayed in Table 3.1 do not carry through to
the empirical analogues of these measures, dM(α, f) and dM(α, g). As is shown
in Appendix 3.A2, the sign of these empirical measures turns on the absolute
concavity of the utility aggregator, −ϕ
′′(·)
ϕ′(·) . Two functional forms for ϕ(·), prominent
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in the literature on smooth ambiguity aversion are exponential, ϕ(x) = −e−θx,
and power, ϕ(x) = x1−θ
1−θ . For the exponential family,
−ϕ′′(·)
ϕ′(·) is constant in its
argument and mixture distances will be zero for all α. That is, in our experiment,
exponential KMM and MEU are not separable. For the power family, when θ > 0
and thus dS < 0, −ϕ
′′(·)
ϕ′(·) is decreasing, and empirical mixture distances, dM(α, f)
and dM(α, g), will be positive. Negative mixture distances can be delivered only
if −ϕ
′′(·)
ϕ′(·) is increasing in its argument.
Another important point is that the absolute concavity of the aggregator, −ϕ
′′(·)
ϕ′(·) ,
is distinct from the sign of the second derivative, ϕ′′(·). As such, for KMM the em-
pirical predictions with respect to the mixture distances, dM(α, f) and dM(α, g),
are distinct from the predictions for dS, which turns only on the sign of ϕ′′(·).
Stated otherwise, KMM is flexible enough in our environment to rationalize any
pattern of behavior given choice of the aggregator. Thus, our exercise with re-
spect to KMM will be reduced to analyzing the consistency of the data with the
popularized functional forms for the aggregator function: exponential and power.
3.3.1 Implementing Ambiguity
In order to identify valuations for subjective acts and mixtures of subjective and
objective acts, an experimental device was introduced to implement ambiguity.
Prior to making any experimental decisions, subjects were told that the colors of
some marbles of Jar A may be unknown to them. These marbles of unknown color





l represented in Figure 3.1. Hence, Jar A could be described as having some
red marbles, some green marbles and some unknown white marbles that could be
red or green.
Because valuations for multiple subjective acts and subjective-objective mixtures
were elicited, we found it critical to attempt to fix beliefs for the unknown white
marbles. Hence, subjects were introduced to a third jar, Jar X. Jar X was in the
front of the laboratory at the beginning of the experiment and was not moved
throughout. Jar X was surrounded by a cylindrical piece of construction paper,
obscuring its contents. Subjects were told
“There is a third jar on the table at the front of the room right now,
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marked JAR X. JAR X contains 20 marbles. These marbles are some
combination of red and green and have already been determined. There
may be anywhere from 0 red marbles and 20 green marbles to 20 red
marbles and 0 green marbles in JAR X, or any combination of 20 red
and green marbles."27
If an unknown white marble was drawn from Jar A it would induce a draw from
Jar X to determine its color and hence payment.28 Subjects were then told “A
number of questions will refer to the unknown white marbles and so refer to JAR
X. You should think carefully about the possible contents of JAR X."
The experimental device for implementing ambiguity allows for the elicitation
of valuations for acts f and g by varying only the labeling of payment for Jar A.
That is, for act f a red marble pays $30 and a green marble pays $10, while for
act g a red marble pays $10 and a green marble pays $30. For each of these purely
subjective acts, Jar A consists only of white marbles, hence one draws from the
unknown Jar X with probability 1. Given that Jar X is unchanged between the
two elicitations, beliefs are plausibly fixed and behavior should accord with SEU.29
The experimental device also allows for subjective-objective mixtures by leaving
payment labels unchanged and varying only the contents of Jar A. For example to




h, Jar A would consist of 15 unknown white marbles and
5 green marbles, with green marbles yielding $30 and red marbles yielding $10.30
27 Incidentally, the contents of Jar X for each session were determined by a visiting, overqualified
research assistant, expert in decision theory, DD.
28 Specifically subjects were told “If a white marble is drawn from JAR A, we will draw a marble
from JAR X. If the marble drawn from JAR X is green you will receive the payment for a
green marble ... If the marble drawn from JAR X is red you will receive the payment for a red
marble. "
29Offering subjects bets with both red and green as the winning color should also dispel any
suspicion amongst subjects that the composition of Jar X was somehow rigged by the experi-
menters, which has been identified in several recent studies as a potential confound (Binmore,
Stewart, & Alex Voorhoeve, 2013; Charness, Karni, & Levin, 2012).
30 This implementation was inspired by the concept of Certainty Independence as the subject’s
exposure to the subjective act (the unknown Jar X) is reduced by the construction of Jar A.
The design differs notably from that used by Hong et al. (2013) to construct “partial ambiguity”.
In these experiments subjects were presented with a decks of cards with varying compositions.
Subjects were told that the number of winning cards would either lie within a certain range
(e.g. between 60 and 80 cards out of 100) or be one of two possibilities (e.g. either 40 out of
100 or 60 out of 100). Since subjects were presented with an entirely different deck of cards
in every round beliefs about the subjective component of the bets may not have been fixed.
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Note that with the exception of fully subjective and fully objective acts, a draw
from Jar A induces a compound gamble. Importantly, for the theories described
in Section 3.2 all predictions are maintained as gambles are appropriately com-
pounded at the stage in question.
3.3.2 Design Details
In total, subjects faced 20 experimental tasks separated into three blocks. In the
first block, red marbles yielded $10 and green marbles yielded $30. Eight tasks
elicited the valuation for subjective act g, and mixtures of g with h and l. The
proportion, α, of act g in each mixture varied from 1 to 0.25. In one task, task 5,





3.2, Panel A provides the tasks.
The third block mirrored the first, except red marbles yielded $30 and green
marbles yielded $10. Eight tasks elicited the valuation for subjective act f , and
mixtures of f with h and l. The proportion, α, of act f in each mixture varied
from 1 to 0.25. In one task, task 17, the objective portion of the mixture was not




h. Table 3.2, Panel C provides the tasks.
In the second block, valuations of purely objective acts are elicited. That is,

















h were elicited. Table 3.2, Panel B provides the tasks.
Two orders of the blocks were implemented at the session level to identify po-
tential order effects: Block 1, Block 2, Block 3; and Block 3, Block 2, Block 1.
The objective acts of Block 2 were maintained as a buffer between the two similar
subjective act task blocks.31 Each block was distributed as a packet of decision
sheets and were collected upon completion. Once all subjects had completed a
block, the next was distributed. Within a block, subjects could work in any order
they chose and each task had specific instructions written at the top of the task
sheet.32
Six sessions with a total of 133 subjects were conducted at the University of
California, San Diego in October of 2011. The experiment was pencil and paper
31No order or session effects were observed.
32 See Appendix S.3.1 for the full set of instructions.
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Table 3.2: Experimental Decisions
Panel A (Block 1) Panel B (Block 2) Panel C (Block 3)
Subjective Act g Objective Acts l and h Subjective Act f
(Red, Green) pays (10, 30) (Red, Green) pays (10, 30) (Red, Green) pays (30, 10)
Task Act Task Act Task Act
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based and subjects were provided with calculators to aid them with any calcula-
tions. In addition to any experimental earnings, subjects received a $5 minimum
payment. Including minimum payments, average subject earnings were $29.89 and
the experimental duration was around 90 minutes.
3.3.3 Implementing Payment
A random incentive mechanism was used to implement payment. One decision
from one task was chosen to be the ‘decision-that-counts’. With 21 decisions per
task and 20 tasks, each decision had a 1 in 420 chance of being the decision-that-
counts. Subjects were told in advance the following order of implementation: the
decision-that-counts would be chosen, then the corresponding Jar A and Jar B
would be constructed, then a marble would be drawn from the Jar corresponding
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to choice.33
This mechanism is commonly used in the experimental literature on ambiguity
aversion (see e.g. Abdellaoui, Klibanoff, & Placido, 2011; Binmore et al., 2013;
Charness et al., 2012). Nonetheless there is some question as to whether the
mechanism satisfies isolation, i.e. whether choices made under the mechanism are
identical to choices that would be made if subjects were presented with only a
single choice.
Neither the theoretical nor the empirical literature on the issue have so far
provided a definitive answer to the question. The theoretical literature on choice
under risk, dating to Holt (1986) and Karni and Safra (1987), has suggested that
random mechanisms need not be incentive compatible for choices between risky
prospects if either the Independence or Reduction of Compound Lotteries axioms
are violated. If ambiguity aversion is caused by violations of Independence one may
therefore suspect that random mechanisms cannot possibly elicit ambiguity averse
preferences. Indeed, Bade (2014) proves an impossibility result for the elicitation
of ambiguity preferences under a random incentive mechanism. Fortunately, things
may not be quite as dire. Both Azriely, Chambers, and Healy (2014) and Baillon,
Halevy, and Li (2014) show that the random incentive mechanism can be incentive
compatible even if subjects are offered bets on complementary acts.
The key issue in this theoretical debate is whether the random payment mech-
anism affords a subject the opportunity to hedge against ambiguity. For example,
consider only two tasks eliciting the valuations only for the complementary acts f
and g. This presents a case in which the logic in Raiffa (1961) suggests subjects
should perfectly hedge via the mechanism. A subject could, in principle, state the
highest possible valuation in each case, choosing the subjective act in every binary
decision. Then the random payment mechanism would give this subject either act
f or act g with equal probability. Regardless of the color of the drawn marble the
individual is holding an objective 50-50 gamble, hedging completely. Two things
are of note. First, such opportunities should make subjective acts seemingly more
attractive, leading to ambiguity seeking behavior. Hence, the extent to which
33 In practice one ‘decision-that-counts’ was chosen for each session, the jars were constructed
and a ball was drawn from each to determine the payments for individuals that had preferred
each. Hence, in practice subjects did know the realization from their unchosen jar in the
decision-that-counts.
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the data exhibit ambiguity aversion may be instructive on the prevalence of such
strategies. Second, there is a nuance in the argument above with respect to the
order of conditioning (Azriely et al., 2014; Baillon et al., 2014). An individual
is holding an objective 50-50 gamble only if the task implementing payment is
chosen after the state (drawn marble color) is realized. If the task implementing
payment is chosen first, then the opportunity to hedge is plausibly reduced as for a
given task an individual exploiting the strategy above continues to hold a subjec-
tive bet. Note that our order of implementation chooses the decision-that-counts
first, then constructs the corresponding jars, and then draws marbles, potentially
limiting such hedging opportunities. Reassuringly, in an application that is very
close to ours, Binmore et al. (2013) find no evidence that choices are affected by
the opportunity to hedge via the mechanism.
3.4 Results
The results are presented in two sub-sections. First, we investigate aggregate
decision-making describing the extent to which average behavior adheres to the
requirements outlined in Section 3.2 for Subjective-Subjective Consistency and
Subjective-Objective Consistency. Second, we investigate individual consistency
measures and explore the extent of correlation between Subjective-Subjective and
Subjective-Objective inconsistencies. We also document a further deviation from
SEU in our environment: the presence of inconsistent valuations between sub-
jective and objective acts with a dominance relation. In order to describe our
inconsistencies via the beliefs and utility parameters that rationalize behavior,
throughout we make appeal to an exploratory appendix (Appendix 3.A4), which
estimates decision-making parameters based on the observed stylized facts.
Of 133 subjects who participated in the experiment, 22 (17%) subjects exhib-
ited multiple switching points in at least one task.34 Such multiple switching is
frequently found in multiple price list experiments and normally occurs for 10-15%
of subjects (Holt & Laury, 2002; Meier & Sprenger, 2010). Our analysis focuses
on the 111 subjects who completed all aspects of the experiment without multiple
34Of these 22, 13 subjects failed to indicate a unique switching point exactly once. There does
not seem to be a systematic pattern to the tasks for which such multiple switches occurred.
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switching. However, the results are virtually unchanged when including all 133
subjects and removing only the errant data.
3.4.1 Aggregate Results
Figure 3.2 presents the aggregate data graphically, providing the mean valuation,
q × 100, and corresponding standard error for each task. These valuations are
expressed in probability units of $30 such that one can say the mean subject
would be indifferent between act g and a 69.8% chance of receiving $30. Each panel
corresponds to a distinct block in the experiment and each series corresponds to a
mixture. For example, Panel A corresponds to Block 1 of the experiment, eliciting
valuations for act g and mixtures with h and l. In act g a green marble pays $30 and
a red marble pays $10. The red series links mixtures αg+(1−α)l, corresponding to
mixing g with low-paying red marbles. The green series links mixtures αg+(1−α)h,
corresponding to mixing g with high-paying red marbles. The mixture proportion,
α, is on the horizontal axis and the corresponding valuations are on the vertical
axis. The two series come together at α = 1 corresponding to the fully subjective
act, g. Panel C provides the same information corresponding to Block 3 of the
experiment, but with the labeling reversed to reflect that for act f red marbles pay
$30 and green marbles pay $10. Panel B provides the data for Block 2 graphing
λl+(1−λ)h against their valuations. The proportion of low-paying balls, λ, is on
the x-axis.
The multiple price lists we use to elicit valuations only identify the point at
which a subject’s preference switches from Jar A to Jar B to within a 5% interval.
To account for this interval censoring of the data, we estimate an interval regres-
sion with indicator variables for each task (Stewart, 1983) and standard errors
clustered at the individual level to capture arbitrary correlation in errors within
individual across tasks. The corresponding mean and standard error are calculated
for each task, generating the point and standard error bars presented in Figure
3.2.35 We use the estimates from similar interval regressions to statistically test
our consistency requirements.
Several features of Figure 3.2 are worthy of attention. First, note that a coherent
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Figure 3.2: Estimated mean valuations and standard errors from interval regressions
(Stewart, 1983) for all experimental choices. See Appendix Table 3.A3 for further detail.
pattern of mixtures appears in Panels A and C. Mixtures of a subjective act with h
yield increased valuations while mixtures with l yield decreased valuations. Second,
though four points in each series are likely too few to make conclusive statements,
each series is approximately linear in the object of interest, either α or λ. Though
such data suggest comprehension and systematic response for each series, it is the
links between the series that deliver our consistency tests.
Subjective-Subjective Consistency Our test for Subjective-Subjective Con-





The mean valuation of act f is qf = 69.89 (clustered s.e. = 1.70) and the
















l = −6.53 (1.13). Under SEU this represents the subjective
expected utilities of each gamble such that dS is predicted to be zero. We reject
the null hypothesis of zero at all conventional levels (χ2(1) = 33.4, p < 0.01).36
We find dS of around 6.5 percentage points, or around 9.4% of the average valua-
tion of the subjective acts in question. Valuing the average of subjective acts lower
36All hypotheses tests are reported in Appendix Table 3.A1.
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than their objective counterpart is evidence of δS < 0, or ambiguity aversion. As in
other Ellsberg style experiments, regardless of the labeling of the states, subjective
acts yield lower valuations than an objective 50-50 mixture. In Appendix 3.A4 we
provide estimates of utility parameters. In our preferred specification, Table 3.A2,
column (4), belief estimates indicate that act f is believed to be 69.2% (clustered
s.e = 3.5%) low-paying green marbles while act g is believed to be 69.5% (3.7%)
low-paying red marbles. The null hypothesis of additive beliefs under subjective
expected utility is rejected at all conventional levels, (χ2(1) = 41.1, p < 0.01).
Subjective-Objective Consistency We turn next to Subjective-Objective Con-
sistency examining mixtures between subjective and objective acts. Consider Panel




























l = 76.37 (1.20), and l, ql = 62.41 (1.76). Such comparisons
already demonstrate potential inconsistencies in the treatment of the subjective
act, g, depending on whether it is mixed with a high or a low outcome.








l are almost identical.
Such similarity would occur if subjects believed that g delivered only low-paying









l lies significantly above ql,













l = 68.76(1.45). Such similarity would occur if subjects be-
lieved that g delivered 50% low-paying marbles and 50% high-paying marbles.38
This initial comparison provides a compelling suggestion of Subjective-Objective
inconsistency. Individuals appear to exhibit a “directed pessimism", exhibiting
more pessimism when mixing with a high outcome than when mixing with a low
outcome.
To explore further, for every α we calculate the average dM(α, f) and dM(α, g)
from linear combinations of interval regression coefficients with standard errors




2 high-paying marbles and
1
2 low-paying marbles.
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Table 3.3: Estimated Mixture Distances
α
0.25 0.5 0.75
Act f dM(α, f) -13.00*** -13.90*** -10.83***
(1.10) (1.26) (1.17)
Act g dM(α, g) -14.26*** -15.56*** -10.02***
(1.36) (1.16) (1.06)
Average distance measures calculated from linear combinations of regression coefficients after interval regression with standard
errors clustered at individual level. Regression table available as Appendix Table 3.A1. All values tested for H0 := 0. Level of
significance: *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
clustered at the individual level.39 The average values and standard errors are
reported in Table 3.3. Table 3.3 reveals a clear pattern of inconsistency. For every
act and every mixture, we reject the null hypothesis that the mixture distances
are zero. Depending on the act and mixture, the empirical mixture distance lies
between 10 and 15 percentage points below the SEU prediction. As demonstrated
above, such negative distances are consistent with subjects acting as if they place
a significantly lower likelihood of the subjective act yielding a high-paying marble
when mixing with h than when mixing with l. In Appendix 3.A4 we provide
estimates of utility parameters. In our preferred specification, Table 3.A2, column
(4), belief estimates are supportive of a directed pessimism. When mixing with h,
subjective acts are believed to consist of around 90% low-paying marbles, while
when mixing with l they are believed to consist of around 55% low-paying marbles.
The null hypothesis of consistent mixing is rejected at all conventional levels,
(χ2(6) = 109.4, p < 0.01).
The aggregate data are broadly inconsistent with SEU, but rather indicate both
Subjective-Subjective and Subjective-Objective inconsistencies. These deviations
from subjective expected utility are not necessarily well-accommodated by other
models. Consider first MEU, which predicts dS < 0 and dM(α, g), dM(α, f) = 0 for
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− 1. The corresponding regression table is available
as Appendix Table 3.A1 with all corresponding calculations.
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all α. Though the data adhere with the first prediction, the second is not supported
as we find negative mixture distances inconsistent with MEU preferences. Next,
consider KMM preferences, which can accommodate both Subjective-Subjective
and Subjective-Objective inconsistencies. However, the presence of both dS < 0
and dM(α, g), dM(α, f) > 0 requires a concave aggregator, ϕ(·), to rationalize dS <
0, and increasing absolute concavity, −ϕ′′(·)
ϕ′(·) , to rationalize dM(α, g), dM(α, f) > 0.
Neither popularized functional form for KMM delivers such behavior. Hence, the
observed effects are inconsistent with popular formulations for KMM preferences.
Given the flexibility of the KMM model, however, one could view our results as
potentially disciplining future KMM applications to functional forms satisfying the
properties above.
We now turn to individual level analyses attempting to measure both the het-
erogeneity in violations across individuals and the linkages between inconsistency
measures.
3.4.2 Individual Results
We document widespread violations of our two SEU consistency requirements in
the aggregate. The present subsection analyzes individual heterogeneity in behav-
ior, a topic of recent interest (see, e.g. Abdellaoui, Baillon, Placido, & Wakker,
2010; Halevy, 2007). We also explore the interrelations between inconsistencies
to shed light on a potential unifying explanation for our results. Our individual
results broadly reproduce the aggregate data showing evidence of both Subjective-
Subjective and Subjective-Objective inconsistencies. The two phenomena, how-
ever, are largely independent. The individual analysis documents an additional
feature of our data: the presence of inconsistent valuations between subjective
and objective acts with a dominance relation.
Subjective-Subjective Consistency The aggregate data show an average val-
uation for an ambiguous urn to be around 10% below its objective counterpart.
Though this helpfully demonstrates the strength of preference in the aggregate
data, the mean behavior masks substantial heterogeneity. In order to analyze








l,i, based upon the midpoint of individual responses. Figure
3.3, Panel A presents the distribution of dS,i. 23 of 111 (21%) have dS,i = 0 while
20 (18%) have dS,i > 0, indicating ambiguity seeking behavior. The remaining 68
subjects (61%) have dS,i < 0, indicating ambiguity aversion.40
Subjective-Objective Consistency The aggregate data show evidence of Subjective-
Objective inconsistency. Subjective bets are not treated the same way when mixed
with a high versus a low outcome. In order to develop an individual measure of
subjective-objective consistency, we calculate the average individual level distance
over the six subjective-objective mixtures based upon the midpoint of their re-
sponses, dM,i.41 Figure 3.3, Panel B presents the distribution of dM,i. 105 of 111
(94.6%) exhibit dM,i < 0. The average distance is -12.92, again consistent with
the aggregate behavior of a directed pessimism.
Interrelation: We document two patterns of behavior inconsistent with SEU
and mutually inconsistent with popularized non-SEU theories. However, the data,
at least in the aggregate appear to be systematically generated. Here we ex-
amine the extent of correlation between our patterns of behavior. Figure 3.3,
Panel C presents the individual level correlation between dS,i and dM,i. A neg-
ative and significant correlation is observed wherein those subjects who exhibit
the patterns of ambiguity seeking, dS,i > 0 have more negative distance measures,
ρ = −0.233, p < 0.05. However, this raw correlation is largely driven by outliers.
Insignificant correlations are found when conducting a 1% trim of either dS,i or
dM,i.42 Appendix Table 3.A1 also provides the aggregate regressions separately
for the groups dS,i > 0, dS,i = 0, and dS,i < 0. Negative mixture distances are
observed for all three groups though they appear somewhat more pronounced for
40Appendix Table 3.A1 also provides the aggregate regressions separately for these three groups.
Individuals with dS,i < 0 have an average strength of preference of 12.9 percentage points for
the objective jar, while individuals with dS,i > 0 have an average strength of preference of 7.5
percentage points for the subjective jar.




j∈g,f dM (α, j)i and dM (α, j)i = qαj+1−αh,i −
qαj+1−αl,i+qαh+1−αl,i−1. Taking the individual mean is a natural measure as a high degree of
intercorrelation is observed between the six individual mixture distances, Cronbach’s α = 0.78.
42With a 1% trim of dS,i the correlation with 105 subjects is ρ = −0.14, p = 0.15. With a 1%
trim of dM,i the correlation with 107 subjects is ρ = −0.13, p = 0.18. With a 1% trim along
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Figure 3.3: Individual Data
the 20 individuals with dS,i > 0. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that those
subjects with dS,i < 0 and dS,i = 0 have the same mixture distance values, but
those subjects with dS,i > 0 and dS,i < 0 do differ significantly.
The patterns of and correlations in deviations we uncover are inconsistent with
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both MEU and KMM preferences. First, MEU predicts zero Subjective-Objective
inconsistencies which is soundly rejected in the data. Second, KMM under the
exponential formulation would predict the same pattern and so is also rejected
in the data. KMM under the power formulation with θ > 0 predicts that if
dS,i < 0, then dM,i > 0, and there should exist a negative correlation between the
two.43 Though the full data set do provide a negative correlation, the correlation
is not robust and the general location of the data (dMi < 0) is not in accord with
prediction. An alternative formulation of KMM featuring a concave aggregator
with increasing absolute concavity may be able to match broad features of the
data, but the lack of correlation between dS,i < 0 and dM,i > 0 potentially suggests
a formulation where these two features are independent.
Additional Inconsistencies: Dominance In addition to Subjective-Subjective
and Subjective-Objective inconsistencies, the individual data afford the opportu-
nity to investigate other potentially interesting patterns. Chief among these are
situations in which one can compare a subjective-objective mixture with a purely
objective act for which a dominance relation maintains. Indeed, our data have
many such situations and we were surprised to see substantial violations of domi-
nance.
We investigate situations in which individuals value the subjective portion of an
act, g, higher than it’s best possible outcome, h, or lower than its worst possible
outcome, l. That is, we investigate whether the following inequalities are violated:
qαl+(1−α)h < qαg+(1−α)h < qαh+(1−α)h.
Each one of these comparisons is indirect in the sense that the valuations come
from different tasks.
To begin, 10 of 111 subjects (9%) have lower valuations for f and g than for l,
valuing an ambiguous draw lower than its worst possible outcome.44 In moving
along the series of mixtures between given acts and h and l subjects have additional
43 That is under the power formulation, the greater is θ, the lower is dS,i and the higher is dM,i.
44 Such individuals have disproportionately lower values for dS,i with a mean of -20.5 (s.d.
=16.91) relative to the average of the other 101 subjects of −5.15 (10.43), (t(109) = 4.17, p <
0.01). No difference in mixture distances is observed.
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opportunities to violate dominance either by valuing the subjective portion too low
(in the case of h) or valuing it too high (in the case of l). In total, subjects have 6
opportunities to violate dominance when mixing with h and 6 opportunities when
mixing with l. Interestingly, different subjects violate dominance in different ways
and do so on multiple occasions.
Table 3.4 presents count measures of dominance violations and the relation-
ship between dominance violations and δS,i. Dominance violations are frequent
throughout the data, and are substantially more prevalent when considering mix-
tures with h as oppposed to l.45 When mixing with the high-paying act h vio-
lations are more prevalent among ambiguity averse, δS,i < 0, subjects (p < 0.01,
two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test). Indeed, among δS,i < 0 subjects only 16%
never violate dominance while this is the case for more than 70% of the non-averse
subjects. For mixtures involving the low-paying act l, in contrast, ambiguity seek-
ing subjects δS,i > 0 are more likely to violate dominance (p < 0.01, two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).46
An initial view of our dominance violations suggests subject errors, potentially
indicative of subject confusion. Though this is one potential explanation, the
extent of correlation with frequently observed experimental findings such as Ells-
berg paradox behavior is a sign of regularity. Hence, we are hesitant to draw
such conclusions. Instead, we recognize the inconsistency of dominance violations
with all considered models, both SEU and non-SEU, and present the violations
as evidence of an incomplete understanding of attitudes towards ambiguity which
perhaps future work can rationalize.
Our dominance violations are observed when comparing subjective to objective
bet evaluations. The majority of violations are in the direction of valuing a sub-
jective act below its worst possible objective counterpart. For such observations,
beliefs and risk aversion will not be sufficient to rationalize the data.47 As these
45 80% of subjects have zero or one violation of the form where the subjective act is valued higher
than its best possible outcome (mixing with l), while only 55% of subjects have zero or one
violation of the form where the subjective act is valued lower than its worst possible outcome
(mixing with h).
46 There is also a significant correlation between dominance violations when mixing with l and
dM,i, (ρ = −0.504, p < 0.01). No significant correlation exists for dominance violations when
mixing with h and dM,i, (ρ = −0.034, p = 0.72).
47Violating dominance is akin to believing a subjective act as consisting of more than 100%
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dominance Violations
when mixing with h
δS,i > 0(N=20) 70.00 15.00 10.00 5.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
δS,i = 0 (N=23) 78.26 13.04 8.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
δS,i < 0 (N=68) 16.18 19.12 19.12 23.53 14.71 2.94 4.41
Total (N=111) 38.74 17.12 15.32 15.32 9.01 1.80 2.70
Dominance Violations
when mixing with l
δS,i > 0 (N=20) 10.00 25.00 25.00 20.00 10.00 5.00 5.00
δS,i > 0 (N=23) 73.91 13.04 4.35 4.35 0.00 4.35 0.00
δS,i < 0 (N=68) 69.12 19.12 11.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total (N=111) 59.46 18.92 12.61 4.50 1.80 1.80 0.90
Table 3.4: Number of Individual Dominance Violations
violations are delivered through indirect comparisons, this is potentially suggestive
of explicit costs of consideration for subjective acts. In Appendix 3.A4 we provide
estimates specifically accounting for such consideration costs. In our preferred
specification, Table 3.A2, column (4), consideration costs for subjective acts f and
g are found to be around 4 percentage points. That is, not considering ambiguity is
estimated be worth about a 4% chance of winning $30. We reject the null hypoth-
esis of zero consideration costs at all conventional levels, (χ2(2) = 29.2, p < 0.01).
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) provides a representation of choice that is of-
ten rejected by urn paradoxes of the form presented by Ellsberg (1961). Such
phenomena draw attention to inconsistencies between two subjective acts. In re-
turning to the consistency implications of SEU, our tests also draw attention to
inconsistencies for subjective-objective mixtures. Analyzing subjective-objective
inconsistencies is critical because non-SEU models are potentially separable along
this dimension. That is, though the popularized models of Max-min Expected
Utility (MEU) (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989) and Klibanoff et al. (2005) (KMM)
both deliver inconsistencies between two subjective bets, only KMM can deliver
Subjective-Objective inconsistencies. Under MEU’s relaxed independence axiom,
Certainty Independence, one may carry pessimistic beliefs with respect to a given
act, but that pessimism must be consistently applied to all subjective-objective
low-paying marbles.
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mixtures. Under KMM, mixing with any act yields hedging benefits, including
mixing with objective lotteries.
We document Subjective-Subjective inconsistencies in the form of the Ellsberg
(1961) two-color example by comparing the average valuation of two complemen-





jective acts, on average, are valued around 9% below their objective counterpart
and 60% of subjects are inconsistent in the Ellsberg sense. The average behavior
is consistent with believing a fully ambiguous jar contains around 70% low-paying
marbles regardless of whether the act in question is f or g.
The novel result of our experiment is the documentation of Subjective-Objective
inconsistencies. Our results point to a “directed pessimism" wherein subjective
acts are treated differently depending on whether they are mixed with high or low
outcomes. Individuals do not treat ambiguous jar portions identically when mixing
with high and low. Rather, the average behavior is consistent with believing the
ambiguous portion is around 90% low-paying marbles when mixing with the high
outcome, h, and only around 55% low-paying marbles when mixing with the low
outcome, l. Further, 95% of subjects exhibit such directed pessimism and it is
largely independent of standard Ellsberg-style behavior.
The collection of behavior lies outside both MEU and popularized functional
forms for KMM. However, given the flexibility of the KMM model, the broad
patterns could potentially be accommodated by alternative functional forms with
specific restrictions on the nature of the aggregator function, ϕ(·). Hence, our
results on the collection of Subjective-Subjective and Subjective-Objective incon-
sistencies may helpfully distinguish both between competing non-SEU models and,
within the class of smooth models, the nature of preferences.
Our individual data allow us to investigate a further pattern of inconsistency
in comparisons between subjective and objective acts. In particular our data
show a prominence of dominance violations, particularly for mixtures with the
high outcome, h. That is, an ambiguous jar portion is treated as potentially
being worse than its worst possible distribution. Such behavior lies outside of all
considered SEU and non-SEU models. Though one might view such behavior as
mistaken, it does correlate highly with standard Ellsberg-style behavior. Hence,
we are hesitant to jump to conclusions. We present the violations as primarily
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suggestive, potentially indicating some costs of consideration for ambiguous acts.
Importantly, such consideration costs need not be large to generate our effects.
Estimates of such cost parameters are around a 4% chance of winning $30. That
is, subjects are willing to give up around $1.20 in expected value to not have to
think about ambiguity.
Given our results lie outside both SEU and current non-SEU models of choice,
they present an important challenge for theoretical developments of decision-
making under ambiguity. Articulating such a model is outside of the scope of
this work, but our analysis points to several key elements. Mixture dependent
ambiguity attitudes could be a feature of such a model, deliverable either through
non-linearities as in KMM, or through explicit statement of directed pessimism.
Consideration costs could be another feature, deliverable either through changing
curvature under ambiguity or fixed costs. In Appendix 3.A4, we estimate a bench-
mark of SEU and then allow explicitly for non additive beliefs of the MEU form,
mixture dependence in beliefs, and fixed consideration costs. Though far from an
articulated model of choice and without even a hint of the necessary axiomatic
foundation, this suggestive first step matches well the key components of the data.
Even without a model, we believe insights can be drawn for applied work relying
on reduced form results. In particular, the intuition of directed pessimism may
shed light on a variety of phenomena in risk taking. One natural application might
be the environment of rainfall index insurance in developing countries. Take up of
such products has been generally low (for discussion, see e.g., Chantarat, Mude,
Barrett, & Carter, 2013). The value of index insurance can be viewed as the valu-
ation of a subjective act and standard economics holds that low demand is driven
by beliefs that make the product unattractive. Now consider offering the contract
where half the time the person receives the index insurance payout and half the
time they receive a high outcome regardless of the realized event. Under the view
of directed pessimism, this would make individuals substantially more pessimistic
for the ambiguous portion of the act and so make insurance take-up more likely.
Though such a product has, to our knowledge, never been tested, it is in some ways
close in spirit to a financial innovation occurring in the life insurance industry in
the 19th century. Tontine life insurance was introduced at a moment of stagnation
in the term life insurance industry (Ransom & Sutch, 1987). The product took
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the insurance premiums paid by policy holders and, instead of paying out annual
dividends, invested the surplus premiums in a tontine account. At the end of the
term, the tontine account was paid to survivors current on their policies. Demand
increased dramatically such that by 1906, before tontine insurance became illegal,
an estimated two-thirds of policies were of the form (Ransom & Sutch, 1987).
In effect, the innovation made the bad state worse (as no premium surplus divi-
dends were received) and the good state better (as one won the survivor lottery).
With objective probabilities, no dependence on others, and actuarially fair values
this should, in the presence of risk aversion, lead to less demand. Stylistically,
the tontine policy would generate a mean preserving spread of the initial policy.
Additionally, however, the tontine mixed the insurance act in question with an
additional act based upon others’ deaths and policy maintenance. For the healthy
and organized this may be mixing with quite a good act, with directed pessimism
leading to increased demand, and, interestingly, positive selection. Though these
are only two examples, we believe the insights from this experiment for directed
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3.7 Appendices
3.A1 KMM Preferences and δM(α, f) / δM(α, g)




p(s) ϕ (u(a(s))) ds,
with ϕ(·) strictly increasing and strictly concave everywhere, δM(α, f) ≥ 0 for all
α.
We introduce an Ellsberg style jar composed of N red and green marbles. The
state of the world is determined by the composition of the jar.48 Hence the state
space has N+1 elements and we can label states S = {0, .., N} by how many of the
marbles in the jar are red. We establish the set of consequences as X = {0, x, y}
with 0 < x < y. Under the state space as defined above our four basic acts are:
• f : in each state i: yields y with probability i
N
, yields x with probability N−i
N
.
• g: in each state i: yields y with probability N−i
N




• h: in each state i: yields y with probability 1.
• l: in each state i: yields x with probability 1.













where πi is the subjective probability the decision maker attaches to the state






48We use this state space rather than one in which the state is determined by the color of the
drawn marble because while the two state space formulations are equivalent under SEU, MEU
and CEU (the probabilities in the compositions-as-states formulation can be reduced to yield
the draws-as-states formulation) assuming the binary state space is not without loss under
KMM
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where Ai = iN u(y) +
N−i
N
u(x). Now consider the mixture acts αf + (1− α)h and
αf + (1− α)l with α ∈ (0, 1),
UKMM(αf + (1− α)h) =
N∑
i=0
πiϕ(αAi + (1− α)u(y)),
UKMM(αf + (1− α)l) =
N∑
i=0
πiϕ(αAi + (1− α)u(x)).
Note, by the strict concavity of ϕ(·)
ϕ(αAi + (1− α)u(y)) > αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(y))
ϕ(αAi + (1− α)u(x)) > αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x))
Let ϵyAi > 0 and ϵxAi > 0 be defined such that
ϕ(αAi + (1− α)u(y)) = αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(y)) + ϵyAi
ϕ(αAi + (1− α)u(x)) = αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x)) + ϵxAi
Hence UKMM(αf + (1− α)h)− UKMM(αf + (1− α)l) is
N∑
i=0
πi{[αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(y)) + ϵyAi ]− [αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x)) + ϵxAi ]},
or
(1− α)ϕ(u(y))− (1− α)ϕ(u(x)) +
N∑
i=0
πi[ϵyAi − ϵxAi ].
Now consider the mixture act αh+ (1− α)l with corresponding KMM utility
UKMM(αh+ (1− α)l) = ϕ(αu(y) + (1− α)u(x)),
Note, by the strict concavity of ϕ(·)
ϕ(αy + (1− α)u(x)) > αϕ(u(y)) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x))
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Let ϵ be defined such that
ϕ(αy + (1− α)u(x)) = αϕ(u(y)) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x)) + ϵ.
Hence,
UKMM(αh+ (1− α)l) = αϕ(u(y)) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x)) + ϵ.
Now consider UKMM(αf+(1−α)h)−UKMM(αf+(1−α)l)+UKMM(αh+(1−α)l).
Under SEU such a sum is equal to the utility of the highest outcome, y, or, by
normalization equal to 1. Under KMM this sum is
(1−α)ϕ(u(y))− (1−α)ϕ(u(x)) +αϕ(y) + (1−α)ϕ(u(x)) + ϵ+
N∑
i=0





πi[ϵyAi − ϵxAi + ϵ],




πi[ϵyAi − ϵxAi + ϵ],
We now recall the definition of δM(α, f) as
δM(α, f) = U(αf + (1− α)h)− U(αf + (1− α)l) + U(αh+ (1− α)l)− 1.
Subtracting 1 from the above we obtain only the sum of error terms,
N∑
i=0
πi[ϵyAi − ϵxAi + ϵ].
We can now investigate the sign of ϵyAi−ϵxAi+ϵ to recover whether δM(α, f) ≥ 0
or δM(α, f) ≤ 0. We wish to prove that if ϕ(·) is concave, ϵyAi − ϵxAi + ϵ ≥ 0 for
every Ai and for every α such that δM(α, f) ≥ 0 for every α.
Note that for a given u(x) < Ai < u(y), the error terms are each associated with












Figure 3.A1: A Standard Case
on the chord is determined by the mixture α. Figure 3.A1 illustrates a standard
case with ϵyAi and ϵ in red and ϵxAi in blue. We can investigate the limiting
case that maximizes ϵxAi and minimizes ϵyAi and ϵ. This is done by replacing the
function away from u(x) with the extended chord between Ai and u(y). This is
illustrated in Figure 3.A2.
In the limiting case, ϵyAi = 0. Hence, the relevant comparison is between ϵxAi













Figure 3.A2: Limiting Case
Now consider the slope between the points, (αAi + (1 − α)u(x), αϕ(Ai) + (1 −
α)ϕ(u(x))) and ((αu(y) + (1− α)u(x), αϕ(u(y) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x))). This slope is
[αϕ(u(y) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x))]− [αϕ(Ai) + (1− α)ϕ(u(x))]
[αu(y) + (1− α)u(x)]− [αAi + (1− α)u(x)] =
ϕ(u(y))− ϕ(Ai)
u(y)− Ai ,
parallel to the extended chord. Hence, a parallelogram is constructed with the
error terms, ϵ and ϵxAi and the chords connecting their endpoints. Because in a
parallelogram opposite sides are of equal length, in the limiting case ϵ = ϵxAi.
As ϕ(·) is assumed strictly concave everywhere, the limiting case occurs only if
i = 0 or i = N . In all other cases ϵ is strictly bounded below by its limiting value
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and ϵxAi is strictly bounded above by its limiting value. Hence, ϵ ≥ ϵxAi always
and ϵyAi− ϵxAi+ ϵ ≥ 0. The same graphical technique can be applied for every Ai
and for every α. Hence, for a strictly concave and increasing ϕ(·) we conclude that
ϵyAi − ϵxAi + ϵ ≥ 0 for every Ai and for every α. Moreover, for all 0 < i < N the
inequality is strict. For strictly concave and strictly increasing ϕ(·), δM(α, f) ≥ 0
for every α. One can easily prove the opposite for a strictly convex and strictly
increasing ϕ(·).
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3.A2 KMM Preferences and dM(α, f) / dM(α, g)
In this appendix section we prove results about the shape of the uncertainty equiv-
alent functions and the empirical mixture differences dM(α, f) and dM(α, g) under
KMM. The setting is identical to the setting assumed in the previous section.
Theorem 1. For a KMM agent with strictly increasing and four times continu-
ously differentiable utility aggregator ϕ (·) uncertainty equivalents for the subjective-
objective mixtures αf + (1− α)(pl + (1− p)h) with α ∈ (0, 1) and p ∈ [0, 1] are
• a concave function of the mixture probability α if ϕ′′(·) < 0 and the coefficient
of absolute ambiguity tolerance −ϕ
′(·)
ϕ′′(·) is convex, and
• a convex function of the mixture probability α if ϕ′′(·) > 0 and the coefficient
of absolute ambiguity tolerance −ϕ
′(·)
ϕ′′(·) is concave.
Proof. The proof is adapted from the proof of Theorem 106 in Hardy, Littlewood,
and Pólya (1934). The uncertainty equivalent q for the subjective-objective mix-
ture αf + (1− α)(pl + (1− p)h) satisfies the following equality:
















+ (1− α) ((1− p)u(y) + pu(x))
)


















+ (1− α) ((1− p)u(y) + pu(x))))− u(0)
u(y)− u (0)
In the following define pi ≡ iN+p−1 and Ei ≡ u(x)+(αpi + (1− p)) (u(y)− u(x)).
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A necessary and sufficient condition for global concavity of q is that the second














































































































































The first inequality is therefore a sufficient condition for the second. After can-

































The convexity of Φ(·) is therefore sufficient for the concavity of the uncertainty
equivalents.







































Φ(·) is convex if its second derivative is positive, i.e. if ϕ′(E)
ϕ′′(E) is convex, which
is equivalent to the coefficient of absolute risk tolerance −ϕ
′(E)
ϕ′′(E) being concave.
The proof for the case when ϕ′′(·) > 0 and the coefficient of absolute ambiguity
tolerance −ϕ
′(·)
ϕ′′(·) is convex is analogous and therefore omitted.
How restrictive is the condition that the coefficient of absolute ambiguity tol-
erance −ϕ
′(·)
ϕ′′(·) be concave? Not very restrictive at all. In fact the whole class of






1− γ + β
)γ
has coefficients of absolute ambiguity tolerance that are linear and therefore both
convex and concave. The function above nests the popular exponential ϕ(x) =
−e−θx and power ϕ(x) = x1−θ
1−θ functions.
We next prove a result about the sign of the empirical mixture differences
δM(α, f) and δM(α, g), which is our main object of interest. This sign will depend
upon the difference between the sign of the difference between the uncertainty
equivalents of the two mixtures, which will in turn depend upon whether uncer-
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tainty equivalents as a function of α are more or less concave when mixing with
h or mixing with l (for an illustration, see Figure 3.A3). Intuitively mixing with
any constant act has three effects in KMM:
1. It pulls the distribution of state expected utilities in the direction of the
expected utility of the constant act. This is the only effect that plays a role
in SEU.
2. It reduces the spread of state expected utilities. As shown in the previous
theorem, under fairly general assumptions ambiguity averse KMM agents, in
contrast to SEU agents, value this reduction because state expected utilities
are aggregated with the concave function ϕ(·). This increase in utility is
reflected in an additional increase in uncertainty equivalents.
3. There may be an additional effect on the uncertainty equivalents that de-
pends on the exact functional form of ϕ(·) in a way that is analogous to the
behavior of risk premia in expected utility under risk. Just as risk premia
depend on the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (See Pratt,









Figure 3.A3: Uncertainty equivalents q under Certainty Independence (CI) and KMM
with decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion. Mixtures displayed are those with the acts
h and l
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solute ambiguity aversion. If the coefficient of absolute ambiguity aversion
ϕ′′(u)
ϕ′(u) is decreasing in u, for example, this means mixing with h pulls the
distribution of state expected utilities into a region in which ϕ(·) is less con-
cave, which raises the uncertainty equivalent further. Conversely, in this case
mixing with l pulls the distribution of state expected utilities into a region
in which ϕ(·) is more concave, which lowers the uncertainty equivalent.
Theorem 2. Assume a KMM agent with strictly increasing and twice continuously
differentiable utility aggregator ϕ (·).
• dm(α, f) > 0 and dm(α, g) > 0 for all α if the coefficient of absolutel ambi-
guity aversion −ϕ
′′(u)
ϕ′(u) is strictly decreasing in u




• dm(α, f) < 0 and dm(α, g) < 0 for all α if the coefficient of absolutel ambi-
guity aversion −ϕ
′′(u)
ϕ′(u) is strictly increasing in u
Proof. By definition the mixture difference dm(α, f) is given by the following linear
combination of uncertainty equivalents:
dm(α, f) = qαf+(1−α)h − qαf+(1−α)l + qαh+(1−α)l − 1
Under KMM uncertainty equivalents of the mixtures αf+(1−α)c where c ∈ {l, h}








where U(c) = u(x) for act l and U(c) = u(y) for act h are the von-Neumann-








the vNM-utility of the lottery that f yields in state i. The uncertainty equivalent
of αh+ (1− α)l is simply
qαh+(1−α)l =
αu(y) + (1− α)u(x)− u(0)
u(y)− u(0)
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αu(y) + (1− α)u(x)− u(0)
u(y)− u(0) − 1





















































































πiϕ (αU(f(i)) + (1− α)U(c))
))
that is, if the average marginal utility of a mixture is larger than the marginal
utility at the certainty equivalent of that mixture. To see that this is true if −ϕ
′′(·)
ϕ′(·)
is decreasing, consider the indifference condition for the certainty equivalent:
N∑
i=0






πiϕ (αU(f(i)) + (1− α)U(c))
))
Now modify both the mixture and its certainty equivalent by adding an ε > 0
to the vNM utility (not to the prize) in every state. Because the function has
decreasing absolute ambiguity aversion adding this additional utility means she
will now prefer the modified mixture over the modified certainty equivalent49:
N∑
i=0










49 The proof of this claim is analogous to the proof that risk premia in choice under risk are
decreasing functions of wealth if the coefficient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing (see
Pratt, 1964), which implies that such a DARA agent will prefer a risky gamble to its certainty
equivalent after all prizes in the gamble and the certainty equivalent are increased by a small
amount
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πiϕ (αU(f(i)) + (1− α)U(c))
))
as desired.




ϕ′(·) increasing are analoguous.
Note that the above result is independent of the sign of ϕ′′(·), i.e. of whether
the agent is ambiguity averse or ambiguity seeking.
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3.A3 Full Regression Results
Task Act Midpoints Interval Regression















































h 74.12 (1.44) 74.12 (1.44) 78.00 (2.30) 82.93 (2.31) 70.00 (1.93)















h 68.76 (1.46) 68.76 (1.45) 66.25 (2.61) 73.80 (3.73) 67.79 (1.80)







































h 73.09 (1.50) 73.09 (1.49) 77.25 (3.40) 81.20 (2.73) 69.12 (1.86)
20 f 69.89 (1.71) 69.89 (1.70) 77.50 (2.16) 78.80 (2.97) 64.63 (2.28)
dS -6.53 (1.14) -6.53 (1.13) 7.50 (1.48) -12.87 (1.24)
H0 : dS = 0 F = 33.10 χ
2(1) = 33.39 χ2(1) = 25.85 χ2(1) = 107.00
























) -10.83 (1.17) -10.83 (1.17) -16.00 (3.28) -9.239 (1.74) -9.853 (1.49)
H0 : dM(f, α) = dM(g, α) = 0; χ







} (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0 : dM(f, α), dM(g, α) χ
2(6) = 22.30
identical for dS,i > 0 and dS,i < 0 (p < 0.01)
H0 : dM(f, α), dM(g, α) χ
2(6) = 4.34
identical for dS,i = 0 and dS,i < 0 (p = 0.63)
# Individuals 111 111 20 23 68
Interval regression. Standard errors clustered on individual level. Subjective premium and mixture distances calculated as linear
combinations of regression coefficients. Hypothesis tests across dS,i groups from regression of response on indicators for task
number interacted with dS,i group.
Table 3.A1: Mean uncertainty equivalents, subjective premia and mixture distances.
158
3.A4 Estimating Decisionmaking Parameters
Our data are clearly at odds with SEU as well as popular non-SEU formulations
such as MEU and KMM. Our findings of Subjective-Subjective and Subjective-
Objective inconsistency suggest two key features of decision-making: non-unique
beliefs across subjective acts and a sensitivity of either the perception of ambiguity
or subjects’ attitude towards it to mixing subjective acts with either high or low
outcomes. In this appendix we attempt to explicitly model these two features and
provide corresponding parameter estimates. We additionally provide estimates
related to consideration costs for ambiguous acts that may account for the observed
violations of dominance. In the spirit of full disclosure, providing simple parametric
methods for the estimation of beliefs and risk aversion in SEU and non-SEU models
was an original objective in experimental design. Given the non-adherence of the
data to all considered models of decision making under ambiguity, this exercise
moved from being at the fore to an exploration outside of the theory.
For a given individual who makes j = 1, 2, . . . , J decisions, let p˜green(f) be the
beliefs on the probability of a green marble induced by subjective act f , where a
green marble yields x and a red marble yields y > x. Consider binary objective
acts, cj, with the same consequences as f , summarized by pcj and mixtures αj ∈
[0, 1] representing the degree of ambiguity. Let preferences satisfy SEU such that
the utility of the mixture αjf + (1− αj)cj is represented as
αj · [p˜green(f)u(x) + (1− p˜green(f))u(y)] + (1− αj) · [pcju(x) + (1− pcj)u(y)].
We consider the equivalent constant act qj over y and 0, summarized by qj such
that the indifference condition
αj·[p˜green(f)u(x)+(1−p˜green(f))u(y)]+(1−αj)·[pcju(x)+(1−pcj)u(y)] = qju(y)+(1−qj)u(0)
is met. Rearranging terms one arrives at the equality
qj = 1 + αj · p˜green(f) · [u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] + (1− αj) · pcj ·
[u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] .
This in turn suggests a method for simultaneously estimating and testing the
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consistency of beliefs, p˜green(f), and risk aversion, [u(x)−u(y)]/[u(y)−u(0)]. Vari-
ation in mixtures αj alone can identify a combination of beliefs and risk aversion,
while for a fixed αj, variation in pcj identifies risk aversion independently.50
We assume an individual makes her J choices following
qj = 1+αj · p˜green(f) · [u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] +(1−αj) ·pcj ·
[u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] +uj, j = 1, . . . , J,
(3.3)
where uj is assumed to be drawn identically and independently from a mean zero
normal distribution with variance σ2j . Define the vector xj = [1, αj, (1 − αj)pcj]
such that one can rewrite (3) as
qj = xjβ + uj (3.4)
where β = [1, β1, β2]′ = [1, p˜green(f) · [u(x)−u(y)][u(y)−u(0)] , [u(x)−u(y)][u(y)−u(0)] ]′
Importantly, in our experimental environment, we do not observe qj directly
as individual responses are interval coded. Maximum likelihood methods such
as those outlined in Stewart (1983) can be implemented to consistently estimate
the key parameters of interest. We observe responses in one of twenty intervals
(Ak−1, Ak) = (0, 0.05), (0, 05, 0.10), . . . , (0.95, 1). We assess the probability of an




)− Φ(Ak−1 − xjβ
σj
),
where Φ(·) represents the standard normal distribution. Hence the log-likelihood
50Note that in (3) variation in mixtures αj identify a combination of beliefs, p˜green(f), and risk
aversion for ambiguous outcomes, [u(x)− u(y)]/[u(y)− u(0)]. For a fixed αj , variation in pcj
identifies risk aversion independently, though for unambiguous outcomes. This implies that
without the assumption that risk aversion is the same across the two, one cannot separately
identify beliefs and risk aversion for ambiguous outcomes. Further, without this assumption
one cannot establish that the constant is equal to 1 in (3). However, even without this assump-
tion, one can potentially still make progress exploring differential behavior across conditions.
One can restate the comparative statics on beliefs presented in Table 3.A2 as comparative
statics on risk aversion under ambiguity, fixing some level of belief. We opt to maintain the
assumption that [u(x) − u(y)]/[u(y) − u(0)] is constant over ambiguous and unambiguous
outcomes and present our analysis in terms of comparative statics on beliefs.
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)− Φ(Ak−1 − xjβ
σ
)]. (3.5)
Maximizing (5) with respect to the parameters of interest delivers estimates for
βˆ = [1, βˆ1, βˆ2] and σˆ with an estimate of beliefs recovered as p˜green(f) = βˆ1/βˆ2
and standard error recovered via the delta method. We alter this basic framework
in one dimension: we restrict the estimate of p˜green(f) to be in the interval [0, 1]
by estimating a belief parameter, a, such that p˜green(f) = 1/(1 + exp(a)). This
change of variables allows us to investigate when beliefs alone are insufficient to
rationalize key observations.
Note that this framework can be extended to multiple ambiguous acts. Beliefs
induced by act g, p˜red(g), can be estimated alongside p˜green(f) by altering (3) to
qj =1 + 1fjαj · p˜green(f) · [u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)]
+ 1gjαj · p˜red(g) · [u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] + (1− αj) · pcj ·
[u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] + uj, (3.6)
where 1fj and 1gj indicate acts f and g being under consideration in choice j,
respectively. Note that for act f , p˜green(f) summarized the belief that the act
would yield the low outcome x < y, corresponding to the draw of green marble.
Similarly for act g, p˜red(g) summarizes the belief that the act yields the low out-
come x < y, corresponding to the draw of red marble. The likelihood function (5)
can be adjusted with similar ability to recover the key parameters of interest: risk
aversion, p˜green(f) , and p˜red(g). The SEU restriction of p˜green(f) + p˜red(g) = 1
can then be tested.
Table 3.A2 provides maximum likelihood estimates of decision-making param-
eters building from this foundation. Column (1) presents the estimates of (6)
corresponding to SEU with the restriction p˜green(f) + p˜red(g) = 1. We estimate
p˜green(f) = 0.495 (0.009), p˜red(g) = 0.505 (0.009) and a risk aversion parameter
of −0.466 (0.021).51 Column (2) allows for p˜green(f) and p˜red(g) to be estimated
51A risk neutral individual would have a parameter value of -0.666, lower numbers indicate risk
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independently finding p˜green(f) = 0.888(0.031), p˜red(g) = 0.901(0.030). The beliefs
that rationalize the data are that subjective acts deliver around 90% low-paying
balls and 10% high-paying balls regardless of the labeling of the states. Consistent
with our finding of subjective-subjective inconsistency, one rejects the SEU null
hypothesis of p˜green(f) + p˜red(g) = 1, (χ2(1) = 194.8, p < 0.01). Correspondingly,
the beliefs for the good outcome, y, across subjective acts are substantially sub-
additive, with an estimate of p˜red(f) + p˜green(g) = 0.21, (clustered s.e = 0.06).52
Column (3) of Table 3.A2 allows for the estimated beliefs p˜green(f) and p˜red(g) to





Consistent with our aggregate findings on subjective-objective inconsistency, esti-
mates show that when mixing with h individuals are substantially more pessimistic
about subjective acts than when mixing with l. Indeed, when mixing with h, the
estimate of beliefs is censored at 100% low-paying balls, indicating potentially that
beliefs alone are insufficient to rationalize the high mixture data. The null hypoth-
esis of consistent beliefs across mixtures is rejected, (χ2(6) = 422.6, p < 0.01).54
Additionally, allowing for differential treatment of mixtures, the null hypothesis
p˜green(f) + p˜red(g) = 1 continues to be rejected based upon the fully subjective
data alone, (χ2(1) = 221.3, p < 0.01).
In the final column of Table 3.A2 we include the insights from the individual
level dominance violations and allow for explicit subjective act consideration costs,
Kf and Kg.55 We estimate Kf and Kg around -0.04 and reject the null hypothesis
aversion as they imply the distance between the utility of $10 and the utility of $30 to be less
than two-thirds the distance between the utility of $0 and the utility of $30.
52As these are the complementary probabilities of those estimated the test statistic for the null
hypothesis that p˜red(f) + p˜green(g) = 1 is again χ2(1) = 194.8, p < 0.01.
53 That is, we assume the functional form a = γ0+ γ11h+ γ21l+ γ31l1h. Hence, p˜green(f × l) =
1/(1 + exp(γ0 + γ2)), p˜green(f × h) = 1/(1 + exp(γ0 + γ1)), and p˜green(f × [ 12h + 12 l]) =
1/(1 + exp(γ0 + γ1 + γ2 + γ3)).
54Due to censored belief estimates, this hypothesis test conducted prior to transformation from
belief parameter a to beliefs p˜. Null hypothesis is γ1 = γ2 = γ3 = 0 for both act f and
act g. A Likelihood Ratio test of column (3) vs. column (2) yields an identical conclusion,
χ2(6) = 72.03, p < 0.01.
55 The likelihood is augmented to reflect the decision cost of evaluating act f and act g, Kf and
Kg. We assume Kf and Kg are constant over the j questions and are independent of αj and
the constant act c. We normalize consideration costs associated with considering the constant
act c such that when αj = 0, consideration costs are zero. The new estimation equation is
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of zero consideration costs, (χ2(2) = 29.2, p < 0.01).56 The estimates indicate
that considering a subjective act costs an individual around a 4% of winning $30
relative to an act with identical objective probability. Hence, not having to think
about ambiguity is worth around a 4% chance of $30.
This appendix demonstrates the possibility of estimating decision-making pa-
rameters linked to our observed inconsistencies. We allow for three key deviations
from subjective expected utility: subjective-subjective inconsistency, subjective-
objective inconsistency, and explicit subjective act consideration costs. Taken
together these effects are significant in the data with substantial improvements in
fit at each stage. To demonstrate the fit of the final model, Figure 3.A4 relates
predicted and actual values for Table 3.A2, column (4). Open circles correspond to
predicted valuations and are presented for every point. The model is able to match
key observations quite closely such as the behavior when α = 1, and the broad
patterns of behavior when mixing with high and low outcomes. Some systematic
over-prediction exists for choices that are only risky potentially indicating some
remaining misspecification. Broadly, however, the relationship between predicted
and actual valuations is tightly grouped around the 45 degree line. The correlation
between predicted and actual mean valuations is 0.96, though when regressing ac-
tual valuations on predicted valuations, one rejects the null hypothesis that the
intercept is zero and the slope is 1, F (2, 18) = 18.86, p < 0.01. This suggests some
remaining elements of choice not accounted for even in the rich model of column
(4).
then
qj =1 + 1fjKf + 1gjKg + 1fjαj · p˜green(f) · [u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)]
+ 1gjαj · p˜red(g) · [u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] + (1− αj) · pcj ·
[u(x)− u(y)]
[u(y)− u(0)] + uj . (3.7)
Note thatKf is measured on the same scale as qj such that the following sentence has empirical
content: “Not thinking about ambiguity is worth a 5% chance of receiving $y.” This as well
can be adjusted to multiple subjective acts f and g with corresponding decision costs Kf and
Kg.
56 The null hypothesis of zero consideration costs is also rejected by a likelihood ratio test between
columns (3) and (4), χ2(2) = 12.27, p < 0.01.
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Table 3.A2: Estimates of Decisionmaking Parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p˜green(f) 0.495 0.888 0.765 0.692
(0.009) (0.031) (0.020) (0.035)
p˜red(f) = (1− p˜green(f)) 0.505 0.112 0.235 0.308
(0.009) (0.031) (0.020) (0.035)
p˜green(f × h) 1 0.880
(.) (0.046)
p˜green(f × l) 0.659 0.537
(0.026) (0.052)
p˜green(f × [12 l + 12h]) 0.831 0.676
(0.036) (0.064)
p˜red(g) 0.505 0.901 0.763 0.695
(0.009) (0.030) (0.023) (0.037)
p˜green(g) = (1− p˜red(g)) 0.495 0.099 0.237 0.305
(0.009) (0.030) (0.023) (0.037)
p˜red(g × h) 1 0.898
(.) (0.052)
p˜red(g × l) 0.684 0.572
(0.026) (0.047)
p˜red(g × [12 l + 12h]) 0.863 0.719
(0.035) (0.065)
u(10)−u(30)
u(30)−u(0) -0.466 -0.369 -0.395 -0.376





σ 0.168 0.158 0.155 0.155
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
# Observations 2220 2220 2220 2220
# Clusters 111 111 111 111
Log-Likelihood -5843.20 -5710.96 -5674.94 -5668.80
H0 : p˜green(f) + p˜red(g) = 1 χ
2(1) = 194.8 χ2(1) = 221.3 χ2(1) = 41.1
(p < 0.01) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0 : p˜red(g) = p˜red(g × h) = p˜red(g × l) = p˜red(g × [12 l + 12h]); χ2(6) = 422.6 χ2(6) = 109.4
p˜green(f) = p˜green(f × h) = p˜green(f × l) = p˜green(f × [12 l + 12h]) (p < 0.01) (p < 0.01)
H0 : Kf = Kg = 0 χ
2(2) = 29.2
(p < 0.01)
Maximum Likelihood Estimates with standard errors clustered on the individual level in parentheses. Belief estimates restricted
to be in the interval [0, 1] by estimating a belief parameter a such the p˜ = 1/(1 + exp(a)). Hypothesis test of equal beliefs
across mixtures conducted prior to transformation due to censored estimate in column (3). Conducted tests before and after




















.25 .5 .75 1
Degree of Ambiguity (α)
c = h c = l
c = 0.5 l + 0.5 h α=1
Model (4) Prediction



















.25 .5 .75 1
Chance of $10 (λ)
Model (4) Prediction



















.25 .5 .75 1
Degree of Ambiguity (α)
c = h c = l
c = 0.5 l + 0.5 h α=1
Model (4) Prediction















50 60 70 80 90 100
Model (4) Predicted Value
45 Degree Line
Predicted and Actual Values
Figure 3.A4: Estimated mean valuations and standard errors from interval regressions
(Stewart, 1983) for all experimental choices. See Appendix Table 3.A3 for further detail.
Model prediction from Column (4) of Table 3.A2.
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S.2 The Standard Portfolio Choice Problem in
Germany
S.2.1 Instructions – SOEP study (original German)
Einwilligung zur Teilnahme
Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, an einem “Finanzentscheidungsexperiment” teilzu-
nehmen.
Sie können auf keinen Fall Geld verlieren!
Abhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung und zufälligen Faktoren, bekommen Sie am Ende
der Befragung einen Geldbetrag tatsächlich ausbezahlt.
O Finanzentscheidungsexperiment starten
O Möchte nicht teilnehmen
Einwilligung zur Teilnahme – Nachfrage
Das “Finanzentscheidungsexperiment” ist Teil der Befragung, bei dem Sie zusätz-
lich einen Geldbetrag ausbezahlt bekommen. Sind Sie sicher, dass Sie nicht teil-
nehmen wollen?
O Finanzentscheidungsexperiment doch starten
O Möchte nicht teilnehmen, weil: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Baseline – Schirm 1
Wir bieten Ihnen eine Investitionsmöglichkeit an.
Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, 50.000 EUR aus eigenem Besitz zu investieren.
Diesen Betrag können Sie auf die folgenden beiden Geldanlagen verteilen:
1. Ein vom deutschen Staat ausgegebenes Wertpapier, das Ihnen einen Zins
von 4% garantiert. Das Wertpapier wird im weiteren Text “Bundesanleihe”
genannt.
2. Ein Bündel von Aktien, das im weiteren Text “Fonds” genannt wird. Der Ge-
winn oder Verlust dieses Fonds orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index
DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen zusammen-
fasst.
Wir werden Sie entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung in einem kleineren Maßstab tat-
sächlich bezahlen.
Nehmen Sie sich Zeit, die Anweisungen in Ruhe durchzulesen und über Ihre Ent-
scheidung nachzudenken.
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Treatment – Schirm 1
Wir bieten Ihnen eine Investitionsmöglichkeit an.
Stellen Sie sich bitte vor, 50.000 EUR aus eigenem Besitz zu investieren.
Diesen Betrag können Sie auf die folgenden beiden Geldanlagen verteilen:
1. Ein vom deutschen Staat ausgegebenes Wertpapier, das Ihnen einen Zins
von 4% garantiert. Das Wertpapier wird im weiteren Text “Bundesanleihe”
genannt.
2. Ein Bündel von Aktien, das im weiteren Text “Fonds” genannt wird. Der Ge-
winn oder Verlust dieses Fonds orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index
DAX, der die Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen zusammen-
fasst.
Der Fonds schneidet entweder 5 Prozentpunkte besser oder 5 Prozentpunkte schlech-
ter ab als der DAX. Welche der beiden Möglichkeiten zutreffen wird, erfahren Sie
gleich.
Wir werden Sie entsprechend Ihrer Entscheidung in einem kleineren Maßstab tat-
sächlich bezahlen.
Nehmen Sie sich Zeit, die Anweisungen in Ruhe durchzulesen und über Ihre Ent-
scheidung nachzudenken.
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Baseline – Schirm 2
Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesanleihe
und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.
• Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung ein-
fach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie investieren
einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
• Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen, be-
nutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis
2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und be-
rechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag geworden
wäre.
Hier sehen Sie zwei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über
die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen:
Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr
• einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die
Sie in den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 15 EUR
• einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann verlieren Sie für jede 100 EUR, die
Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, 15 EUR.
Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch Inves-
titionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen wir
Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für je 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am Ende des
Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.
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Treatment (minus) – Schirm 2
Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesanleihe
und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.
• Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung ein-
fach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie investieren
einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
• Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen, be-
nutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis
2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und
berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag gewor-
den wäre.
Zusätzlich wurde vom Computer zufällig bestimmt, dass Sie 5 Pro-
zentpunkte weniger erhalten.
Hier sehen Sie drei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über
die tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen: Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig
ausgewählten Jahr
• einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn
von 15% - 5% = 10%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in
den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 10 EUR
• einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust von
-15% - 5% = -20%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den
Fonds investiert haben einen Verlust von -20 EUR.
• Einen Gewinn von +2% gemacht hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust
von 2% - 5% = -3%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den
Fonds investiert haben, einen Verlust von -3 EUR.
Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch Inves-
titionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen wir
Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für je 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am Ende des
Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.
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Treatment (plus) – Schirm 2
Sie verteilen zunächst, wie oben beschrieben, die 50.000 EUR auf Bundesanleihe
und Fonds. Wir berechnen dann den Ertrag, den diese Investition erzielt.
• Für Geld, das Sie in die Bundesanleihe investieren, ist diese Berechnung ein-
fach: Bei einem Zins von 4% machen Sie für jede 100 EUR, die Sie investieren
einen sicheren Gewinn von 4 EUR.
• Um Gewinne und Verluste für Investitionen in den Fonds festzustellen, be-
nutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis
2010. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und
berechnet für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag gewor-
den wäre.
Zusätzlich wurde vom Computer zufällig bestimmt, dass Sie 5 Pro-
zentpunkte mehr erhalten.
Hier sehen Sie drei Beispiele, die natürlich nur willkürlich sind und nichts über die
tatsächliche Entwicklung des DAX aussagen:
Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr
• einen Gewinn von +15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn
von 15% + 5% = 20%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in
den Fonds investiert haben einen Gewinn von 20 EUR
• einen Verlust von -15% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Verlust von
-15% + 5% = -10%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den
Fonds investiert haben einen Verlust von -10 EUR.
• einen Verlust von -2% erzielt hat, dann macht der Fonds einen Gewinn von
-2% + 5% = 3%. Das heißt, Sie machen für jede 100 EUR, die Sie in den
Fonds investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 3 EUR.
Ihr Gesamtgewinn ist dann einfach die Summe des Gewinns, den Sie durch Inves-
titionen in die Bundesanleihe und den Fonds erzielen. Diesen Betrag zahlen wir
Ihnen in kleinerem Maßstab aus. Für jede 2000 EUR bekommen Sie am Ende des
Experiments 1 EUR in bar ausbezahlt.
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Baseline – Schirm 3
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung
von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und
DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010 erzielen kann.
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den
Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR
ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
Treatment (minus) – Schirm 3
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung
von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und
DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, abzüglich der 5 Prozentpunkte, erzielen
kann.
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den
Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR
ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
173
Treatment (plus) – Schirm 3
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also in jedem Fall eine Verzinsung
von 4% ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der DAX-Gewinne und
DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, zuzüglich der 5 Prozentpunkte, erzielen
kann.
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den
Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass die beiden Beträge zusammen genau 50.000 EUR
ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Baseline – Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX
in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab.
Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds
einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und Ge-





























Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen.
Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den Fonds im jeweiligen
Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken.
Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu
20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie es
halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich
erzielt.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen
Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder
Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen
Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahr-
scheinlich
• Mehr Kästchen — bis zu 20 in einem Bereich — stehen für entsprechend
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Treatment (minus) – Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX in
den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Der Fonds liegt dabei immer 5 Prozentpunkte unter
dem, was der DAX in einem dieser Jahre gezahlt hätte.
Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds
einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und Ge-





























Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen.
Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den Fonds im jeweiligen
Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken.
Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu
20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie es
halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich
erzielt.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen
Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder
Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen
Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahr-
scheinlich
• Mehr Kästchen — bis zu 20 in einem Bereich — stehen für entsprechend
höhere Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Treatment (plus) – Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Entwicklung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX in
den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Der Fonds liegt dabei immer 5 Prozentpunkte über
dem, was der DAX in einem dieser Jahre gezahlt hätte.
Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die möglichen Zahlungen des Fonds
einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Verluste und Ge-





























Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen.
Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den Fonds im jeweiligen
Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken.
Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu
20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie es
halten, dass Ihr Fonds einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechenden Bereich
erzielt.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen
Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder
Gewinn Ihres Fonds nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen
Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahr-
scheinlich
• Mehr Kästchen – bis zu 20 in einem Bereich – stehen für entsprechend höhere
Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Baseline – Schirm 5
Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der Wert-
veränderung des Fonds widerspiegeln. Beachten Sie dabei alle für Sie denkbaren
Möglichkeiten, die sich aus der historischen DAX-Entwicklung ergeben.
Sollten Sie zu diesem Zeitpunkt Ihre Investitionsentscheidung noch einmal ändern
wollen, drücken Sie bitte auf “Zurück”.






























Treatment (plus & minus) – Schirm 5
Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der Wert-
veränderung des Fonds widerspiegeln. Beachten Sie dabei alle für Sie denkbaren
Möglichkeiten, die sich aus der historischen DAX-Entwicklung und dem (Auf-
schlag/Abschlag) von 5 Prozentpunkten ergeben.
Sollten Sie zu diesem Zeitpunkt Ihre Investitionsentscheidung noch einmal ändern
wollen, drücken Sie bitte auf “Zurück”.






























Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 6
Geben Sie bitte außerdem an, welche durchschnittliche Wertveränderung (in %)
Sie für den Fonds erwarten.
→ Bitte maximal auf eine Stelle nach dem Komma eingeben (z.B. xx.x)!
→ Bitte Punkt anstatt Komma eingeben
Durchschnittliche Wertsteigerung . . . . . . . . .
oder
Durchschnittlicher Wertverlust: . . . . . . . . .
Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 7
Wir würden Ihnen nun gern ein paar Fragen zu dem soeben absolvierten Experi-
ment stellen.
Wie Sie diese Fragen beantworten wird keinen Einfluss auf Ihre Auszahlung haben.
Wie sicher sind Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des Fonds?
Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala, bei der “0” gar nicht sicher und
der Wert “10” sehr sicher bedeutet.
Mit den Werten zwischen “0” und “10” können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.
Gar nicht sicher O O O O O O O O O O O Sehr sicher
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Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 8
Wahr oder falsch? Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr einen Gewinn




Wahr oder falsch? Wenn der DAX in dem zufällig ausgewählten Jahr einen Verlust




Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 9
Nachdem es in den bisherigen Fragen um die Entwicklung eines an den DAX
gekoppelten Fonds in der Vergangenheit ging wüssten wir nun gern, was Sie für
die zukünftige Entwicklung des DAX selbst erwarten. Geben Sie auf dem nächsten
Bildschirm an, wo Sie den DAX in einem Jahr sehen, ausgedrückt in Gewinn
oder Verlust gegenüber dem heutigen Wert. Wir fassen dazu erneut die möglichen
Gewinne und Verluste in die sieben größeren Bereiche zusammen.
Wir bitten Sie auch hier, alle für Sie denkbaren Entwicklungen des DAX in Be-
tracht zu ziehen.
Zeigen Sie uns dann an, für wie wahrscheinlich Sie die jeweiligen Gewinne und
Verluste halten.
Bitte drücken Sie dies aus, indem Sie wieder die 20 Kästchen markieren.
Ein Kästchen steht hier wieder für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu 20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns für wie wahrscheinlich Sie die
Wertveränderung des DAX, in einem Jahr, in einem der sieben Bereiche halten.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar keine Kästchen, so bringen
Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass die Wertveränderung
des DAX nicht in diesem Bereich liegt.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie die
Wertveränderung des DAX in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr
wahrscheinlich.
• Mehr Kästchen – bis zu 20 in einem Bereich – stehen für entsprechend höhere
Wahrscheinlichkeiten.
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Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 10
Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der DAX-
Gewinne und DAX-Verlust in den nächsten 12 Monaten, also bis zum 19.11.2013
widerspiegeln.






























Baseline & Treatment – Schirm 11
Außerdem interessiert uns auch hier, wie sicher Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des
DAX sind.
Wie sicher sind Sie sich Ihrer Einschätzung des DAX?
Antworten Sie bitte anhand der folgenden Skala, bei der “0” gar nicht sicher und
der Wert “10” sehr sicher bedeutet.
Mit den Werten zwischen “0” und “10” können Sie Ihre Meinung abstufen.
Gar nicht sicher O O O O O O O O O O O Sehr sicher
Baseline & Treatment – Auszahlungsübersicht
Der Computer hat per Zufall das Jahr 1975 ausgewählt.
In diesem Jahr hat der DAX einen Gewinn von 41.21%,
und der Fonds somit einen Gewinn von 36.21% gemacht.
Wir zahlen Ihnen deshalb auf Basis Ihrer Investition 31 EUR aus, die sich wie folgt
berechnen:
Anlage Investition Gewinn/Verlust Auszahlung
Bundesanleihe 20000 EUR 4,0% 20800 EUR
Fonds 30000 EUR 36,21% 40863 EUR
Summe 61663 EUR
Auszahlung 30,83 EUR
Auf den nächsten Euro gerundet 31 EUR
Das Finanzentscheidungsexperiment ist nun zu Ende
⇒ Der Auszahlungsbetrag wird am Ende des Interviews nochmal angezeigt!
184
S.2.2 Instructions – SOEP study (English translation)
Agreement to Participate
In the following we kindly ask you to take part in a “financial decision experiment”.
You cannot possibly lose any money!
Depending on the decisions you will make and some random factors you will,
however, receive some actual money at the end of the survey.
O Start the financial decision experiment
O I do not want to participate
Agreement to Participate – Second Take
The “financial decision experiment” is a part of this survey in which you can earn
some money. Are you sure that you do not want to participate?
O I have changed my mind: Start the financial decision experiment
O I do not want to participate because: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Baseline – Screen 1
We offer you an investment opportunity.
Please imagine that you would like to invest 50,000 EUR of your own savings.
You can distribute this amount between the following investments:
1. A German sovereign bond that guarantees you an interest rate of 4%. We
will call this asset the “Bund” henceforth.
2. A bundle of stocks that will be called the “fund”. The gains and losses on
this fund will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is a
summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises.
We will pay you according to your decision on a smaller scale.
Please take your time to carefully read the instructions and think about your
decision.
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Treatment – Screen 1
We offer you an investment opportunity.
Please imagine that you would like to invest 50,000 EUR of your own savings.
You can distribute this amount between the following investments:
1. A German sovereign bond that guarantees you an interest rate of 4%. We
will call this asset the “Bund” henceforth.
2. A bundle of stocks that will be called the “fund”. The gains and losses on
this fund will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which is a
summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises.
The return of the fund will be either 5 percentage points higher or 5 percentage
points lower than that of the DAX. You will find out which of these two possibilities
applies to you soon.
We will pay you according to your decision on a smaller scale.
Please take your time to carefully read the instructions and think about your
decision.
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Baseline – Screen 2
Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We will
then calculate the total return on your investment.
• For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100 EUR
you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure profit of
4 EUR.
• Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical DAX
gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly choose a
year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how your investment
would have fared.
The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the actual
performance of the DAX:
If the DAX in the randomly chosen year had made
• a gain of +15%, you would have earned 15 EUR for each 100 EUR invested
in fund.
• a loss of -15%, you would have lost 15 EUR for each 100 EUR invested in
fund.
Your total profit will be the sum of the profits of your investments in both Bund
and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At the end of
the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.
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Treatment (minus) – Screen 2
Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We will
then calculate the total return on your investment.
• For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100 EUR
you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure profit of
4 EUR.
• Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical DAX
gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly choose a
year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how your investment
would have fared.
Additionally the computer has determined through a random draw
that you will receive 5 percentage points less.
The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the actual
performance of the DAX:
If the DAX in the randomly chosen year had made
• a gain of +15%, the fund would make a gain of 15%-5%=10%. This means
that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 10 EUR.
• a loss of -15%, the fund would make a loss of -15%-5%=-20%. This means
that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 20 EUR.
• a gain of +2%, then the fund would make a loss of 2%-5%=-3%. This means
that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 3 EUR.
Your total profit will be the sum of the profits of your investments in both Bund
and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At the end of
the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.
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Treatment (plus) – Screen 2
Please distribute the 50,000 EUR over Bund and fund as described above. We will
then calculate the total return on your investment.
• For money invested in the Bund the calculation is simple: For each 100 EUR
you invest in the Bund at an interest rate of 4% you will make sure profit of
4 EUR.
• Gains and losses on investments in the fund will be based on historical DAX
gains and losses from 1951 to 2010. The computer will randomly choose a
year in this time period and calculate for this exact year how your investment
would have fared.
Additionally the computer has determined through a random draw
that you will receive 5 percentage points more.
The following two examples are arbitrary and do not say anything about the actual
performance of the DAX:
If the DAX of the randomly chosen year had made
• a gain of +15%, the fund would make a gain of 15%+5%=20%. This means
that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 20 EUR.
• a loss of -15%, the fund would make a loss of -15%+5%=-10%. This means
that for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would lose 10 EUR.
• a loss of -2%, the fund would make a gain of -2%+5%=3%. This means that
for each 100 EUR invested in fund you would earn 3 EUR.
Your total profit will be the sum of the profits of your investments in both Bund
and fund. We will actually pay you this amount on a smaller scale. At the end of
the experiment you will receive 1 EUR in cash for each 2000 EUR.
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Baseline – Screen 3
To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can produce
any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010.
How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much
do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
Treatment (minus) – Screen 3
To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can produce
any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010, minus the 5
percentage points.
How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much
do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Treatment (plus) – Screen 3
To sum up: The Bund guarantees you an interest of 4% while the fund can pro-
duce any of the DAX-gain or DAX-losses from the years 1951 to 2010, plus the 5
percentage points.
How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much
do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that the two amounts sum up to exactly 50,000.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Baseline – Screen 4
As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the
DAX from 1951 to 2010.
In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund’s possible
payoffs.
For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into seven




















On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges. Please
indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in each range
by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box
stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund
will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this
will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain
in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -– up to 20 in one range – imply correspondingly higher proba-
bilities.
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Treatment (minus) – Screen 4
As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the
DAX from 1951 to 2010. The fund will always be 5 percentage points below the
outcome that the DAX would have payed in one of these years.
In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund’s possible
payoffs.
For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into seven




















On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges. Please
indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in each range
by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box
stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund
will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this
will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain
in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -– up to 20 in one range – imply correspondingly higher proba-
bilities.
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Treatment (plus) – Screen 4
As you know, the development of the fund depends on the development of the
DAX from 1951 to 2010. The fund will always be 5 percentage points above the
outcome that the DAX would have payed in one of these years.
In the following we would like to ask you for your expectations of the fund’s possible
payoffs.
For this purpose we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund into seven




















On the next screen 20 boxes will be placed above each of the seven ranges. Please
indicate for all seven ranges how often you expect the fund to be in each range
by clicking on the mentioned boxes. Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box
stands for a frequency of 1 in 20, i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund
will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this
will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain
in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -– up to 20 in one range – imply correspondingly higher proba-
bilities.
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Baseline – Screen 5
Please mark the 20 boxes such that they reflect your assessment of the development
of the fund. Please consider every — in your opinion — possible historical DAX
development.
If you would like to reconsider and change your investment decision, please click
the button “Back”.





















Treatment (plus & minus) – Screen 5
Please mark the 20 boxes such that they reflect your assessment of the development
of the fund. Please consider every — in your opinion — possible combination of the
historical DAX development and the (addition/deduction) of 5 percentage points.
If you would like to reconsider and change your investment decision, please click
the button “Back”.





















Baseline & Treatment – Screen 6
Please also let us know what average return (lit : “change in value”) (in %) you
expect for the fund.
→ Please use a maximum of one decimal! (e.g. xx.x)
→ Please use a decimal point instead of a comma
Average increase in value . . . . . . . . .
or
Average decrease in value: . . . . . . . . .
Baseline & Treatment – Screen 7
We would like to ask you some questions about the experiment which you have
just completed.
Your answers to these questions will not influence your payment.
How confident are you in your assessment of the fund?
Please answer according to the following scale, in which “0” means “not at all
confident” and the value “10” means “very confident”.
With the values between “0” and “10” you can grade your opinion.
Not at all confident O O O O O O O O O O O Very confident
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Baseline & Treatment – Screen 8
True or false? If the DAX made a gain of 40% in the randomly chosen year, the
fund you have been offered would also make a gain of 40%.
O true
O false
True or false? If the DAX made a loss of 4% in the randomly chosen year, the




Baseline & Treatment – Screen 9
The questions so far all concerned the development of a fund whose returns were
tied to the development of the DAX in the past. We would now like to ask you
some questions concerning your expectations for the future development of the
DAX itself. On the next screen, please let us know where you see the DAX in one
year, expressed as a gain or loss relative to its current value. We will again group
the possible gains and losses into seven larger ranges.
Again we ask you to consider all of the developments of the DAX that you believe
are possible. Please indicate how likely you think the different profits and losses
to be. Please express this by again marking 20 boxes. As before, one box stands
for a frequency of 1 out of 20, i.e. 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you consider the change in value
of the DAX in one year to lie in each of the 7 ranges
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this
will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will not lie in this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain
in this range to be possible, but not very likely.
• More boxes -— up to 20 in one range — imply correspondingly higher prob-
abilities.
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Baseline & Treatment – Screen 10
Please mark the 20 boxes according to your assessment of the development of the
DAX-profits and DAX-losses in the next 12 months, i.e. until 19.11.2013.





















Baseline & Treatment – Screen 11
Morevoer, we are interested in how sure you are about your assessment of the
DAX.
How confident are you in your assessment of the DAX?
Please answer according to the following scale, in which “0” means “not at all
confident” and the value “10” means “very confident”.
With the values between “0” and “10” you can grade your opinion.
Not at all confident O O O O O O O O O O O Very confident
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Baseline & Treatment – Payout Overview
The Computer randomly chose the year 1975.
In this year the DAX incurred a profit of 41.21%
which means that fund incurred a profit of 36.21%
As a result, we will pay you 31 EUR based on your investment, according to the
following calculation:
Asset Invested Amount Gain/Loss Payment
Bundesanleihe 20.000 EUR 4.0% 20.800 EUR
Fonds 30.000 EUR 36.21% 40.863 EUR
Sum 61.663 EUR
Payment 30.83 EUR
Rounded up to the next Euro 31 EUR
This concludes the financial decision experiment.
⇒ The amount of payment will reappear on the screen at the end of the interview.
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S.2.3 Instructions – Complexity Study (original German)
Willkommens-Schirm
Willkommen!
Im Folgenden bitten wir Sie, an einem Finanzentscheidungsexperiment teilzuneh-
men.
Abhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung und zufälligen Faktoren, bekommen Sie am En-
de der Befragung einen Geldbetrag tatsächlich ausbezahlt. Sie können dabei auf
keinen Fall Geld verlieren.
Es ist wichtig, dass Sie während des Experiments still bleiben und nicht mit an-
deren Teilnehmern kommunizieren. Sollten Sie Fragen haben oder Hilfe brauchen,
dann heben Sie bitte die Hand, und ein Experimentator wird zu Ihnen kommen.
Sollten Sie sich nicht an diese Anweisung halten, so müssen wir Sie vom Experi-
ment ausschließen. Vielen Dank.
204
Schirm 1
Im Folgenden müssen Sie in 8 Runden jeweils eine Investitionsentscheidung fäl-
len. Alle Runden sind gleich aufgebaut. Eine der 8 Runden wird am Ende des
Experiments zufällig ausgewählt und Ihnen tatsächlich ausbezahlt. Wie genau das
passiert, dazu gleich gleich mehr.
Sie haben in jeder Runde jeweils eine Summe Geld zur Verfügung, die Sie zwischen
zwei Geldanlagen aufteilen müssen. Außerdem bekommen Sie jeweils einen zusätz-
lichen festen Geldbetrag, unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung in dieser Runde.
Eine der beiden Geldanlagen hat einen festen Zinssatz. Die andere Geldanlage
hat einen Zinssatz, der von der Entwicklung am Aktienmarkt abhängt. Darüber
hinaus gibt es pro Runde auf jede der beiden Geldanlagen einen Bonus (das heißt
der Zinssatz wird um einen festen Betrag erhöht).
Die Geldanlage mit dem festen Zinssatz zahlt in jeder Runde 2% Zinsertrag zuzüg-
lich des Bonus. Diese Geldanlage wird im weiteren Text “Bundesanleihe” genannt.
Die andere Geldanlage orientiert sich am Deutschen Aktien Index DAX, der die
Entwicklung von 30 deutschen Großunternehmen zusammenfasst. Um die Verzin-
sung dieser Geldanlage festzustellen, benutzen wir historische DAX-Gewinne und
DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010, und addieren den entsprechenden Bonus
hinzu. Der Computer wählt zufällig ein Jahr aus diesem Zeitraum aus und berech-
net für dieses Jahr, was aus dem von Ihnen investierten Betrag geworden wäre.
Diese Geldanlage wird im weiteren Text “Fonds” genannt.
Schirm 2
Ein Beispiel könnte wie folgt aussehen. Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie auf Bundes-
anleihe und Fonds aufteilen müssen und eine Auszahlung von 14.000 Euro, die Sie
unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung bekommen. Auf den Zins der Bundesanleihe
erhalten Sie einen Bonus von 3 Prozentpunkten, auf den Zins des Fonds erhalten
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Sie ebenfalls einen Bonus von 3 Prozentpunkten.
Konkret bedeutet das in diesem Beispiel, dass Sie für den Betrag, den Sie in die
Bundesanleihe investieren, einen Zins von 5% erhalten: die stets gleichen 2% zu-
züglich des in dieser Runde relevanten Bonus von 3%. Sie machen also für jede
100 Euro, die Sie in die Bundesanleihe investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 5 Euro,
und bekommen am Ende 105 Euro ausgezahlt. Die Verzinsung des in den Fonds
investierten Betrags wird in diesem Beispiel wie folgt bestimmt: Sie ist die reali-
sierte Kursentwicklung des DAX in einem zufällig gezogenen Jahr (aus 1951 bis
2010) plus der Bonus von 3
• Hat also der DAX zum Beispiel in dem zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Ge-
winn von 3,5% gemacht, erhalten Sie auf den Betrag, den Sie in den Fonds
investiert haben, eine Verzinsung von 6,5%. Sie machen also für jede 100
Euro, die Sie in den Fonds investiert haben, einen Gewinn von 6,50 Euro,
und bekommen am Ende 106,50 Euro ausgezahlt.
• Hat der DAX dagegen im zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Gewinn von 12%
gemacht, erhalten Sie auf Ihren investierten Betrag eine Verzinsung von 15%
(mit 115 Euro Auszahlung pro 100 Euro Investition).
• Hat der DAX im zufällig gezogenen Jahr einen Verlust von 12% gemacht,
so erhalten Sie eine negative Verzinsung, die aber wegen dem Bonus um 3%
geringer ist, also ein Verlust von 9%. In diesem Fall würden Sie für jede 100
Euro Investition eine Auszahlung von 91 Euro bekommen.
Ihre Gesamtauszahlung ergibt sich in diesem Beispiel als 14.000 Euro (die feste
Auszahlung) plus die verzinste Investition in die Bundesanleihe plus die verzinste
Investition in den Fonds.
Bitte beachten Sie, dass der Bonus auf die Bundesanleihe sich später vom Bonus
auf den Fonds unterscheiden wird. Sie sind nur in diesem Beispiel gleich hoch
gewählt.
(Das Beispiel ist natürlich willkürlich und sagt nichts über die tatsächliche Ent-
wicklung des DAX oder über andere unbekannten Größen aus.)
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Schirm 3
Die Gesamtauszahlung zahlen wir Ihnen für eine der 8 Runden im kleineren Maß-
stab aus. Das heißt, der Computer wählt am Ende des Experiments zufällig eine der
8 Runden aus. Dabei hat jede Runde die gleiche Wahrscheinlichkeit, ausgewählt
zu werden. Diese Runde wird Ihnen in bar ausbezahlt.
Zusätzlich zieht der Computer ebenso zufällig und mit gleicher Wahrscheinlichkeit
ein Jahr aus dem Zeitraum 1951 bis 2010. Der Gewinn oder Verlust des DAX in
diesem Jahr wird dann herangezogen, um Ihre Auszahlung zu bestimmen.
Für je 5000 Euro, die Sie in der Runde als Gesamtauszahlung bekommen, erhalten
Sie 1 Euro in bar.
Zusammenfassend: Die Bundesanleihe wirft also eine Verzinsung von 2% zuzüglich
des entsprechenden Bonus ab, während der Fonds für Ihre Auszahlung jeden der
DAX-Gewinne und DAX-Verluste der Jahre 1951 bis 2010 zuzüglich des entspre-




Sie haben 50.000 Euro, die Sie zwischen der Bundesanleihe und dem Fonds auf-
teilen müssen. Unabhängig von Ihrer Entscheidung erhalten Sie zusätzlich einen
Betrag von 17.550 Euro.
Für die Bundesanleihe gibt es einen Bonus von 2,80 Prozentpunkten.










2,80 5,90 50.000 17.550
Prozentpunkte Prozentpunkte Euro Euro
Wie viel der 50.000 EUR investieren Sie in die Bundesanleihe und wie viel in den
Fonds?
Bitte achten Sie darauf, dass beide Beträge ganze Zahlen sind und zusammen genau
50.000 EUR ergeben.
In die Bundesanleihe . . . . . . . . . Euro
In den Fonds . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Schirm 4
Wie Sie wissen, hängt die Verzinsung des Fonds von der Entwicklung des DAX
in den Jahren 1951 bis 2010 ab. Im Folgenden wollen wir Sie fragen, wie Sie die
Gewinne und Verluste des DAX in diesem Zeitraum einschätzen.
Hierfür fassen wir auf dem nächsten Bildschirm die möglichen Gewinne und Ver-





























Über den sieben Bereichen befinden sich auf dem nächsten Schirm je 20 Kästchen.
Zeigen Sie uns für diese sieben Bereiche an, wie häufig Sie den DAX im jeweiligen
Bereich vermuten, indem Sie die Kästchen über den sieben Bereichen anklicken.
Markieren Sie genau 20 Kästchen. Ein Kästchen steht für eine Häufigkeit von 1 zu
20, also 5 Prozent.
Durch das Markieren der Kästchen zeigen Sie uns Einschätzung darüber, wie häufig
der DAX in den Jahren 1951-2010 einen Verlust bzw. Gewinn in dem entsprechen-
den Bereich erzielt, an.
• Markieren Sie beispielsweise in einem Bereich gar kein Kästchen, so bringen
Sie damit zum Ausdruck, dass Sie sich sicher sind, dass der Verlust oder
Gewinn des DAX nie in diesem Bereich lag.
• Markieren Sie ein oder zwei Kästchen in einem Bereich, so halten Sie einen
Verlust oder Gewinn in diesem Bereich für möglich aber nicht sehr wahr-
scheinlich.




Markieren Sie jetzt bitte die 20 Kästchen so, dass Sie Ihre Einschätzung der Wert-
veränderung des DAX im Zeitraum 1951 bis 2010 widerspiegeln.































Das war’s. Vielen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!
Der Computer hat per Zufall bestimmt, dass Ihnen ihre Investition aus Runde 6
ausbezahlt wird. In dieser Runde haben Sie 25.000 EUR in die Bundesanleihe und
25.000 EUR in den DAX investiert. Der Bonus auf den Zins der Bundesanleihe
betrug in dieser Runde 3,00 Prozentpunkte, der Bonus auf den DAX betrug 6,05
Prozentpunkte.
Der Computer hat außerdem per Zufall das Jahr 1992 ausgewählt. In diesem Jahr
hat der DAX einen Verlust von 0,66% gemacht.










Bundesanleihe 25.000 EUR 2 % 3,00 % 5,00 % 26.250 EUR













Bitte bleiben Sie noch einen Moment sitzen. Sobald die große Mehrzahl der Teilneh-
mer das Experiment abgeschlossen hat, werden wir mit der Auszahlung beginnen.
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S.2.4 Instructions – Complexity Study (English translation)
Welcome Screen
Welcome!
In the following, we kindly ask you to take part in a financial decision experiment.
Depending on your decision and some random factors, you will receive an amount
of money for real at the end of the experiment. You cannot possibly lose any
money.
It is important that you remain silent throughout the experiment and that you do
not communicate with other participants. Should you have any questions or need
any help, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you
do not follow these instructions, we will have to exclude you from the experiment.
Thank you very much.
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Screen 1
In the following you have to make one investment decision in each of 8 rounds.
All rounds are constructed in the same way. At the end of the experiment one of
the 8 rounds will be randomly selected and the money earned in this round will
be your payment. We will tell you more about the exact way this works shortly.
In each round you will have a certain amount of money, which you must distribute
among two financial assets. Furthermore, in each round you will receive an ad-
ditional fixed amount of money that you will receive independent of what your
investment decision is.
One of the two financial assets offers a fixed rate of interest. The other asset has an
interest rate which depends on the development of the stock market. In addition
there will be a bonus applied to both assets (i.e. the interest rate will be increased
by a fixed amount).
The investment possibility with the fixed interest rate pays 2% plus the bonus
in each round. We will call this asset the “Bund” in the following text. The
other financial asset will be based on the German stock market index DAX, which
is a summary measure of the performance of 30 major German enterprises. To
determine the return on this investment, we use historical DAX-profits and DAX-
losses from the years 1951 to 2010 and then add the bonus. The computer randomly
chooses a year in this period and calculates for this exact year how your invested
sum would have fared. We will call this financial asset the “fund”.
Screen 2
An example could be as follows. Imagine that you have 50,000 Euros, which you
must distribute over Bund and fund, as well as a payment of 14,000 Euros that
you receive independent of your investment decision. You receive a 3 percentage
points bonus on the interest of the Bund, and a 3 percentage points bonus on the
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interest of the fund.
Concretely for this example, that means that you would receive an interest of 5%
for the amount invested in the Bund: the usual 2% plus the relevant bonus of 3%
for this round. For each 100 Euros invested in the Bund, you earn 5 Euros, and
are paid 105 euros at the end. The interest of the amount invested in the fund is
calculated as follows: It will be the realized return of the DAX in one randomly
chosen year (from 1951 to 2010) plus the bonus of 3%.
• If the DAX made a profit of 3.5% in the randomly chosen year, you would
would get an interest rate of 6.5 % on the amount invested in the fund. This
means that you earn 6.50 Euros for each 100 Euros invested in the fund and
are paid 106.50 Euros at the end of the experiment.
• If, in contrast, the DAX made a gain of 12% in the randomly chosen year,
you would receive an interest rate of 15% on your investment (with 115 Euros
earned for each 100 Euros of your investment).
• If, in the randomly chosen year, the DAX made a loss of 12%, you would
receive a negative interest rate, which however would be lower due to the
bonus of 3%, i.e. a loss of 9%. In this case you would earn 91 Euros for each
100 euros invested.
In this example your complete payment would be made up of 14.000 Euros (the
fixed payment) plus the result of the investment in the Bund plus the result of the
investment in the fund.
Please note that the bonus on the Bund later may differ from the bonus on the
fund. They are merely equally high in this example.
(The example is of course arbitrary and does not contain information on the actual
development of the DAX.)
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Screen 3
You will receive the total payment of one of the 8 rounds on a smaller scale. At
the end of the experiment the computer will choose one of the 8 rounds at random.
Every round has the same probability of being chosen. This round will be paid
out in cash.
Moreover, the computer randomly chooses a year from 1951 to 2010, also with equal
probability. The gain or loss on the DAX in this year will be used to determine
your payment.
For every 5000 Euro that you obtain in this round you will receive 1 Euro in cash.
To sum up: The Bund yields an interest of 2% plus the corresponding bonus while





You have 50,000 Euros which you have to distribute over the Bund and the fund.
In addition, you will receive 17,550 Euros independent of your choice.
For the Bund, the bonus is 2.80 percentage points.













How much of the 50,000 EUR do you want to invest in the Bund and how much
do you want to invest in the fund?
Please make sure that both amounts are integers and sum up to exactly 50,000
EUR.
Bund . . . . . . . . . Euro
fund . . . . . . . . . Euro
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Screen 4
As you know, the return on the fund depends on the development of the DAX in
the years from 1951 to 2010. In the following, we want to ask you what you think
the DAX’s gains and losses were during this period of time.
Therefore we will group the possible gains and losses of the fund in seven ranges




















On the next screen there are 20 boxes above each of these seven ranges. Please
show us for the seven ranges how often you expect the DAX to have been in each
range by clicking the mentioned boxes.
Please mark exactly twenty boxes. One box stands for a frequency of 1 in 20,
i.e. for 5 percent.
By marking the boxes you will show us how likely you believe it is that your fund
will produce a gain or loss in the given range.
• If, for instance, you don’t mark any of the boxes in a particular range, this
will mean that you are sure that the gain or loss will never lie in this range.
• If you mark one or two boxes in a particular range, you believe a loss or gain
in this range to be possible, but not very likely.




Please mark the 20 boxes according to your assessment of the development of the
DAX in the years from 1951 to 2010.






















That’s it. Thank you for participating!
The computer has determined by random draw that you will receive your invest-
ment of round 6. In this round you invested 25,000 EUR in the Bund and 25,000
EUR in the DAX. In this round the bonus on the interest rate of the Bund was
3.00 percentage points, and the bonus on the DAX was 6.05 percentage points.
Moreover, the computer has randomly chosen the year 1992. In this year the DAX
made a loss of 0.66%.




Gain / Loss Bonus Overall
Gain/ Loss
Payoff
Bund 25,000 EUR 2 % 3.00 % 5.00 % 26,250 EUR










Please remain seated for a little while. We will start the payment as soon as the
vast majority of participants has completed the experiment.
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S.2.5 Decision Screen in Complexity Experiment
Figure S.5: Decision Screen
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S.3 Measuring Ambiguity Aversion: Experimental
Tests of Subjective Expected Utility
S.3.1 Experimental Instructions
Hello and Welcome.
ELIGIBILITY FOR THIS STUDY:
This study is totally anonymous. You must be willing to receive your payment for this study by cash
at the end of the experiment today.
EARNING MONEY:
To begin, you will be given a $5 minimum payment. Whatever you earn from the study today will be
added to this minimum payment.
In this study, you will make a series of choices between two jars, each containing 20 marbles. The first
jar will always be called JAR A. JAR A will contain green marbles worth either $10 or $30 and red marbles
worth either $10 or $30.
The second jar will always be called JAR B. JAR B will contain yellow marbles worth $0 and black
marbles worth $30. Yellow marbles will always be worth $0 and black marbles will always be worth $30.
For each decision, your task is to decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from
JAR A or draw a marble from JAR B.
Once all of your decisions have been made, we will randomly select one decision as the decision-that-
counts. If you preferred JAR A, then we will draw a ball from JAR A to determine your earnings while if
you preferred JAR B we will draw a ball from JAR B instead.
JAR A, JAR B or both will involve risk. That is, there may be some green marbles and some red
marbles in JAR A. And, there may be some black marbles and some yellow marbles in JAR B.
For example, JAR A might contain 4 green marbles worth $30 and 16 red marbles worth $10. JAR B
might contain 12 black marbles worth $30 and 8 yellow marbles worth $0. Imagine for a second which jar
you would rather draw a marble from. You have been provided with a calculator to help you in making
your decisions.
Additionally, some of the contents of JAR A may be unknown to you. That is, you will know that
there is a mix of red and green marbles, but you will not know the exact proportions. For example, JAR A
might contain 4 green marbles worth $30, 6 red marbles worth $10 and 10 unknown marbles, which could
be red marbles, green marbles, or some mixture of the two. These unknown marbles will be represented
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as white marbles, such that the contents of JAR A would be described as containing 4 green marbles, 6
red marbles and 10 unknown, white marbles.
JAR B will never be unknown. You will always know the contents of JAR B.
Once we know which is the decision-that-counts, and whether you prefer JAR A or JAR B, we will
then determine the value of your payments.
Let’s take the example of the partially unknown JAR A just described containing 4 green marbles
worth $30, 6 red marbles worth $10, and 10 unknown white marbles either $30 green marbles or $10 red
marbles. Suppose this is compared to the JAR B previously described, containing 12 black marbles worth
$30 and 8 yellow marbles worth $0.
If this was chosen as the decision-that-counts, we would prepare JAR A and JAR B.
You will watch as we place 12 green marbles and 8 yellow marbles in JAR B on the table at the front
of the room.
If you preferred JAR B, we will draw a marble from JAR B. If the drawn marble is black you will
receive $30 (+5 minimum payment) = $35. If the drawn marble is yellow you will receive $0 (+5 minimum
payment) = $5.
You will also watch as we place 4 green marbles, 6 red marbles, and 10 white marbles in JAR A on the
table at the front of the room.
If you preferred JAR A, we will draw a marble from JAR A. If the drawn marble is green you will
receive $30 (+5 minimum payment) = $35. If the drawn marble is red you will receive $10 (+5 minimum
payment) = $15.
If the marble drawn from JAR A is one of the white unknown marbles, however, the following procedure
will determine whether the marble is green or red. There is a third jar on the table at the front of the
room right now, marked JAR X. JAR X contains 20 marbles. These marbles are some combination of red
and green and have already been determined. There may be anywhere from 0 red marbles and 20 green
marbles to 20 red marbles and 0 green marbles in JAR X, or any combination of 20 red and green marbles.
If a white marble is drawn from JAR A, we will draw a marble from JAR X. If the marble drawn from
JAR X is green you will receive the payment for a green marble (here it is $30 (+5 minimum payment) =
$35). If the marble drawn from JAR X is red you will receive the payment for a red marble (here it is $10
(+5 minimum payment) = $15). A number of questions will refer to the unknown white marbles and so
refer to JAR X. You should think carefully about the possible contents of JAR X.
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THINGS TO REMEMBER:
1. You will receive a $5 minimum payment just for participating today.
2. You will complete 20 decision tasks
3. In each decision you will be asked whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or JAR B. Your
task is decide whether you prefer JAR A or JAR B.
4. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 and Black marbles worth $30.
5. JAR A will contain Red and Green marbles worth either $30 or $10. Some of the contents of JAR
A may be unknown to you. These unknown marbles will be described as white marbles.
6. White marbles will entail a draw from JAR X. The contents of JAR X are unknown to you. They
could be any combination of red and green marbles.
7. At the end of the study one decision will be chosen as the decision-that-counts.
8. Because each decision is equally likely, you should make each decision as if it is the one that determines
your payments.
9. Once we know the decision that counts, we will construct JAR A and JAR B. If you preferred JAR
B in the decision-that-counts, we would draw a marble from JAR B and pay you accordingly. If
you preferred JAR A in the decision-that-counts, we would draw a marble from JAR A and pay you
accordingly. If the marble drawn from JAR A is a white marble, a marble will be drawn from JAR
X to determine your payments.
In a moment, we will proceed to the tasks. You have been given a subject ID number. Please write it
on the top of your task packet.
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On the following pages you will complete 8 tasks. In each task you are asked to make a series of
decisions between two jars: JAR A and JAR B
JAR A will contain Red Marbles, Green Marbles and Unknown White Marbles which could be
either Red, Green or some mixture between the two. Red Marbles in the following 8 tasks
will be worth $10. Green Marbles in the following 8 tasks will be worth $30. JAR B
will contain Yellow Marbles worth $0 and Black Marbles worth $30.
In each task, JAR A will be fixed, while JAR B will vary. For example, in Task 1 JAR A will
contain 0 $10 Red Marbles, 15 $30 Green Marbles and 5 unknown White Marbles, which could be
red, green or some mixture of the two. This will remain the same for all decisions in the task.
JAR B will vary across decisions. Initially JAR B will contain 20 $0 Yellow Marbles and 0 $30
Black Marbles. As you proceed, the contents of JAR B will change. The number of Black $30
marbles will increase while the number of Yellow $0 marbles will decrease. In each subsequent row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and one Black $30 marble will be added.
For each row, your task is to decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or JAR
B. Indicate your preference by checking the corresponding box.








0 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
15 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
5 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
In the first decision you are asked to decide between a draw from JAR A which contains 0 $10 Red
Marbles, 15 $30 Green Marbles and 5 unknown White Marbles, and a draw from JAR B which contains
20 $0 Yellow Marbles and 0 $30 Black Marbles. If you prefer a draw from JAR A, check the left-hand box
under JAR A. If your prefer a draw from JAR B, check the right-hand box under JAR B.
Each decision could be the decision-that-counts. So, it is in your interest to
treat each decision as if it could be the one that determines your payments.
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TASK 1
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Red marbles worth $10
each, 15 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 5 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
15 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
5 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 2
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 15 Red marbles worth $10
each, 0 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 5 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some mixture
of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each row,
decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking the
corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20 Yellow
$0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row, one
Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















15 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
5 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 3
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Red marbles worth $10
each, 10 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 10 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
10 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 4
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 10 Red marbles worth
$10 each, 0 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 10 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















10 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 5
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 5 Red marbles worth $10
each, 5 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 10 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















5 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
5 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 6
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 5 Red marbles worth $10
each, 0 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 15 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















5 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
15 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 7
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Red marbles worth $10
each, 5 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 15 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
5 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
15 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 8
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Red marbles worth $10
each, 0 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 20 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
20 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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On the following pages you will complete 4 tasks. In each task you are asked to make a series of
decisions between two jars: JAR A and JAR B
JAR A will contain Red Marbles, Green Marbles and Unknown White Marbles which could be
either Red, Green or some mixture between the two. Red Marbles in the following 4 tasks
will be worth $10. Green Marbles in the following 4 tasks will be worth $30. JAR B
will contain Yellow Marbles worth $0 and Black Marbles worth $30.
In each task, JAR A will be fixed, while JAR B will vary. For example, in Task 9 JAR A will
contain 5 $10 Red Marbles, 15 $30 Green Marbles and 0 unknown White Marbles, which could be
red, green or some mixture of the two. This will remain the same for all decisions in the task.
JAR B will vary across decisions. Initially JAR B will contain 20 $0 Yellow Marbles and 0 $30
Black Marbles. As you proceed, the contents of JAR B will change. The number of Black $30
marbles will increase while the number of Yellow $0 marbles will decrease. In each subsequent row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and one Black $30 marble will be added.
For each row, your task is to decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or JAR
B. Indicate your preference by checking the corresponding box.








5 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
15 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
0 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
In the first decision you are asked to decide between a draw from JAR A which contains 5 $10 Red
Marbles, 15 $30 Green Marbles and 0 unknown White Marbles, and a draw from JAR B which contains
20 $0 Yellow Marbles and 0 $30 Black Marbles. If you prefer a draw from JAR A, check the left-hand box
under JAR A. If your prefer a draw from JAR B, check the right-hand box under JAR B.
Each decision could be the decision-that-counts. So, it is in your interest to
treat each decision as if it could be the one that determines your payments.
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TASK 9
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 5 Red marbles worth $10
each, 15 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 0 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















5 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
15 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
0 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 10
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 10 Red marbles worth
$10 each, 10 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 0 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















10 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
10 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
0 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 11
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 15 Red marbles worth $10
each, 5 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 0 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some mixture
of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each row,
decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking the
corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20 Yellow
$0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row, one
Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















15 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
5 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
0 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 12
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 20 Red marbles worth $10
each, 0 Green marbles worth $30 each, and 0 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some mixture
of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each row,
decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking the
corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20 Yellow
$0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row, one
Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















20 Red Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Green Marbles worth $30 each
and
0 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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On the following pages you will complete 4 tasks. In each task you are asked to make a series of
decisions between two jars: JAR A and JAR B
JAR A will contain Red Marbles, Green Marbles and Unknown White Marbles which could be
either Red, Green or some mixture between the two. Green Marbles in the following 8 tasks
will be worth $10. Red Marbles in the following 8 tasks will be worth $30. JAR B will
contain Yellow Marbles worth $0 and Black Marbles worth $30.
In each task, JAR A will be fixed, while JAR B will vary. For example, in Task 13 JAR A will
contain 0 $10 Green Marbles, 15 $30 Red Marbles and 5 unknown White Marbles, which could be
red, green or some mixture of the two. This will remain the same for all decisions in the task.
JAR B will vary across decisions. Initially JAR B will contain 20 $0 Yellow Marbles and 0 $30
Black Marbles. As you proceed, the contents of JAR B will change. The number of Black $30
marbles will increase while the number of Yellow $0 marbles will decrease. In each subsequent row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and one Black $30 marble will be added.
For each row, your task is to decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or JAR
B. Indicate your preference by checking the corresponding box.








0 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
15 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
5 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
In the first decision you are asked to decide between a draw from JAR A which contains 0 $10 Green
Marbles, 15 $30 Red Marbles and 5 unknown White Marbles, and a draw from JAR B which contains 20
$0 Yellow Marbles and 0 $30 Black Marbles. If you prefer a draw from JAR A, check the left-hand box
under JAR A. If your prefer a draw from JAR B, check the right-hand box under JAR B.
Each decision could be the decision-that-counts. So, it is in your interest to
treat each decision as if it could be the one that determines your payments.
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TASK 13
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 15 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 5 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
15 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
5 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 14
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 15 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 0 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 5 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















15 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
5 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 15
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 10 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 10 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
10 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 16
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 10 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 0 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 10 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















10 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 17
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 5 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 5 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 10 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















5 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
5 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
10 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 18
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 5 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 0 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 15 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















5 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
15 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 19
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 5 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 15 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
5 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
15 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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TASK 20
On this page you will make a series of decisions between two jars. JAR A will contain 0 Green marbles worth
$10 each, 0 Red marbles worth $30 each, and 20 Unknown White marbles, which could be Red, Green or some
mixture of the two. JAR B will contain Yellow marbles worth $0 each and Black marbles worth $30 each. For each
row, decide whether you prefer to draw a marble from JAR A or from JAR B. Indicate your choice by checking
the corresponding box. The contents of JAR A will remain the same in each row. JAR B will initially contain 20
Yellow $0 Marbles and 0 Black $30 marbles. The contents of JAR B will change. When you move down one row,
one Yellow $0 marble will be removed and replaced with one Black $30 marble.
JAR A
Marbles






















0 Green Marbles worth $10 each
and
0 Red Marbles worth $30 each
and
20 Unknown White Marbles
JAR B
Marbles
0 5 10 15 20
Yellow Marbles worth $0 each
and
Black Marbles worth $30 each.
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